UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL

VOLUME 8 1987

UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL, Volume 8, 1987

EDITORIAL BOARD:

Editor-in-Chief: Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

Managing Editor: Armando Pimentel

Book Review Editor: G. Mick Smith

Advertising/Associate Editor: Florence Baker

Circulation: Roger Bowerman

Associate Editors: Michael Gelb; David Lorey; Enrique Ochoa; Anne-Marie Poole.

Computer Adviser: Cynthia Nulty

Faculty Adviser: Professor Albion M. Urdank

Published annually. Subscriptions are $7.00 per year for institutions, $5.00 for individuals, and $3.00 for students. Single issues may be ordered at the same prices. For orders from outside the U.S., please add $2.00. All orders must be prepaid and sent to the UCLA Historical Journal, Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. The deadline for receipt of manuscripts is each May 31, but early admission is strongly recommended. Manuscripts must be double-space typed and submitted in triplicate to the Editor at the above address. If authors wish manuscripts returned, a large self-addressed, stamped envelope must be included. Those interested in reviewing a recently published book should write to the Book Review Editor. For questions of style, including footnotes, consult the University of Chicago's Manual of Style, or Kate Turabian,s A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses and Dissertations.

Indexed by Historical Abstracts and America: History and Life.

Partially funded by the UCLA Graduate Students Association.

ISSN: 0276-864X

Copyright 1987, Regents of the University of California

UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL

VOLUME 8 1987

UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL

VOLUME 8 1987

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ARTICLES

Norman Wilson, "Conceptions of Poor Relief in Sixteenth-Century Strasbourg". 5

Donald G. Cooper, "Save the Babies: The Passage of a Federally- Supported Maternal and Infant Health Act" 25

Risa Sodi, "The Italian Roots of Racialism". . 40

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

"The Bombing of Dresden as Portrayed in German Accounts, East and West," by Elizabeth C. Corwin. 71

"Social Centers in Wisconsin, 1911-1915," by Victor Jew. 97

BOOK REVIEWS

Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, by Julio Cesar Pino. 114

Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy, by David M. Esposito 118

Cline and Leon-Portilla, The Testaments of Culhuacan, by Aida Mostkoff 119

Hause and Kenney, Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic, by Anne-Marie Poole 122

Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, by Harold E. Raugh, Jr. 124

Malina, Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation, by G. Mick Smith 128

Mallon, The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and

Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940, by Carlos Perez. 131

Robertson and Berger, Women and Class in Africa, by Kathleen Sheldon. 134

Super and Wright, Food, Politics, and Society in Latin America, by David Lorey 138

Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait, by Enrique Ochoa 140

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The UCLA Historical Journal is pleased to be able to present a professional publication containing three outstanding full-length articles, two superb "Notes and Documents," and a number of excellent book reviews on a myriad of worthwhile topics. This substantive expansion of our contents is due primarily to the record number of high-quality manuscripts submitted to us this year. Hopefully there will be something of interest for each reader, and in order to continually improve the quality of our Journal, I eagerly solicit your comments on Volume 8- as well as your manuscripts for Volume 9.

It is a distinct honor and privilege for me to acknowledge the selfless and outstanding service rendered by a number of our staff members and other staunch supporters over the past year. Managing Editor Armando Pimentel has adroitly completed the multitude of administrative and financial matters associated with such a publication, thus freeing me from the fetters of minutiae. Armando has been a right-hand man second to none. Book Review Editor G. Mick Smith has done a superlative job in establishing an excellent rapport with a number of publishers, which has made an excellent rapport with a number of publishers, which has made books readily available for our reviewers. I am also grateful to Professor Albion M. Urdank, our Faculty Adviser, for his insightful advice and sustained encouragement. The position of Editor-in-Chief is no sinecure, but the collective support, wisdom, and enthusiasm of all staff members has made my tenure a pleasant learning experience rather than a burden.

For the fifth consecutive year, the Editorial Board is pleased to be able to offer the Theodore Saloutos Award for the outstanding article in the Journal. We would particularly like to thank Mrs. Saloutos for her financial and morale support, which not only makes this award possible but also- along with funding from the UCLA Graduate Students Association- greatly aids in defraying the rising cost of publication.

Continuity is of prime importance in a graduate student publication. The staff cooperation and scholastic excellence established over this past year is sure to be continued by G. Mick Smith, our Editor-in-Chief for 1988. I wholeheartedly with him, and all of next year's staff, the very best for continued success.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
Editor-in-Chief

★ ★ Announcing ★ ★

The UCLA Historical Journal

CONGRATULATES

NORMAN WILSON

WINNER OF THE

Theodore Saloutos Award

FOR HIS ARTICLE

"CONCEPTIONS OF POOR RELIEF
IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STRASBOURG"

CONCEPTIONS OF POOR RELIEF IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY STRASBOURG

NORMAN J. WILSON

In a review article of recent trends in social history, Thomas Brady claims:

> The urban reform for the moment takes its place beside the "Weber Thesis" as a central topos of the social history of the Reformation.[1]

Historians have generally agreed on the importance of the social and urban aspects of the Reformation, yet there has been considerable debate over the religious dimensions of the Reformation and urban corporative and communal mentality. The role of the individual is fundamental to interpretations of the Reformation. Bernd Moeller argues that the urban reformers built on the old civic concept of a sacral corporate ideal as they attempted to correct Luther by using the community rather than the individual as a starting place.[2] Steven Ozment rejects Weber's description of "Protestantism as an 'infinitely burdensome and earnestly enforced' regulation of the whole life," claiming instead that the attractiveness of early Reformation theology lay "in its conformity with Luther's original impulse to free individual and civic life from the onerous religious beliefs, practices and institutions."[3] Ozment argues that, similar to Luther's own self-described experience, the new Protestant theology allowed the individual to be liberated psychologically and spiritually from the bonds of

Norman Wilson received his B.A. in English and French Literature at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He received his M.A. in History at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is currently writing a dissertation on urban-rural relations in Bavaria.

an oppressive medieval religion. Thomas Brady ignores the religious dimensions of the Reformation, opting instead for a neo-Marxist conceptual apparatus of class analysis modified by estates theory.[4] He uses prosopographical studies of ruling elites in Strasbourg to argue for the importance of social tensions. Whether the Reformation occurred due to a lingering communal mentality, a need to free individuals psychologically, or due to class conflict, it was an age of vast institutional changes, the remnants of which are still visible.

Modern historians have explained the 1523-25 adoption of the Reformation in Strasbourg according to each of the above mentioned theories.[5] The urban magistrates were able to weather the crisis years of religious reform in Strasbourg without diminishing their control by yielding to popular pressure for reform measures. The popular disturbances were on the surface largely anti-clerical, yet, the deeply entrenched role of the clergy in control of property, in education, in social welfare institutions and in positions of power resulted in concessions that were not just religious: "the regime became willing to go to almost any lengths to bring the popular movement under control."[6] After a period of deadlock, the Rat decided in 1523 to free perpetual rents to rents redeemable at fixed rates. This decision favoring debtors at the expense of lenders "represents a considerable sacrifice by the aristocracy and a (to them) unwelcome restriction of property rights."[7] The concessions culminated in a 1525 tax reform which favored the poorer classes. In spite of these actions, it is clear that Strasbourg experienced a growing influx of poor people, reaching an apex in the bad harvest years of the late 1520's and early 1530's.

In the same year that the council freed perpetual rents they founded a civic welfare fund (*Almosen*) which replaced the haphazard, clerically administered poor relief. The new system of poor relief also provided closer supervision of the lives of the poor. It is my goal in this paper to evaluate the poor relief system in the city of Strasbourg in order to view the attitude of civic authorities towards the poor and to evaluate how ideological, structural, disciplinary, and pedagogical changes in poor relief reflect changing conceptions of the poor, the community, and the individual.

Much of the early German work on poor relief in Strasbourg sees poor relief as resulting from Lutheranism.[8] Recent German studies, such as Thomas Fischer's, attribute a lesser role to Lutheranism than their predecessors, yet they suggest that Catholic and Protestant cities did in fact differ in their treatment of the poor, not only in the form of propaganda but also in general practices: there was a general forbidding of begging in Protestant cities such as Basel and Strasbourg, whereas Catholic cities strictly curtailed begging but did not forbid it.[9] The consensus in English language research rejects the hypothesis that poor relief resulted from Luther's religion:

> The reform of public welfare was not, then, linked directly to the Reformation. It was a normal outgrowth from preceding developments. The Reformation facilitated the emergence of a new system because it provided an effective ideological formulation and because the breakdown of the monastic units made it easier to institute new agencies. But the demand for change was not a result of the religious crisis.[10]

I explore briefly poor relief in the Middle Ages and attitudes towards poor relief expressed by Humanists and clergy. Then I trace poor relief in Strasbourg from the turn of the century. I examine Luther's theology in search of sixteenth-century attitudes towards poverty, poor relief, and the requirements of a community. I turn then to the theology of the Strasbourg reformer Martin Bucer and evaluate the ideological, structural, disciplinary, and pedagogical nature of the changing poor relief system. Lastly, I trace the remnants of these beliefs and actions in search of intended and unintended consequences. It is my contention that the shift in poor relief laws and usury laws, though instituted by anti-capitalists, did in fact instill a work ethic which drastically changed the role of the individual within the civic community.

The terms "Arm", "arme man," and "armen leute" are used to signify two different conditions of the common people in the Middle Ages and in the

Early Modern period: as social position (Stand) they signified the need for privileges and authority in a relationship of domination or "Herrschaft," and as an economic measure (Lage) they signified the urban economic standing (poor as opposed to wealthy).[11] The personal "Herrschaft" aspect was a rural classification and the "Lage" aspect was the product of thirteenth-century citizenship ("bürgerliche Freiheit"). With the growth of a money economy there developed a new measurement of social wealth such that the concept "arm" became one of status difference between city and country. This dichotomy results in two conditions of poverty: Lebensnotwendige, based on the societally determined 'minimum' nourishment and care requirements, and Standesnotwendige, based on a place of dignity or rank within society.[12] For the purposes of this paper I am only concerned with the urban aspect of poverty where "arm" signifies a position below a poverty level; hence, a societal norm or standard of measurement which is based on the living standard of the guilds and handworkers.

Methods of poor relief, except for those used by a few pious bishops of the eleventh century, were not systematic; rather, they were practices of a state religion requiring good works, above all through the giving of alms (Almosenspenden), in order to obtain forgiveness for sins and to secure eternal life. The result was a generous but unsystematic giving of alms, which did not discourage begging and which distributed money not to those in greatest need but to those who were boldest. In the thirteenth century, the situation began to worsen, especially in cities which experienced a huge influx of outside beggars such as those on pilgrimage routes.[13] Some cities and rulers began to regulate begging and charities, thereby impinging on programs which were previously the prerogative of the church. The city of Strasbourg began taking control of the major hospitals and asylums for the poor (Spitäler) in 1263.[14] These hospitals were for the elderly or for people with specific illnesses such as lepers. They took only those citizens who had paid money consistently to the hospital in a form of insurance, or those citizens whose illness was so severe that they were unable to beg for a living. People who could not secure a place in the hospital begged

if their work did not provide enough income.[15]

In the fifteenth century there was a change in attitudes towards begging. In 1391, 1409, and 1411 laws trying to limit begging were instituted: people should not give to but should scold (bitter zur Rede setzen) those who could work but who chose to beg.[16] This shift reflects changing attitudes towards work: "The medieval church's emphasis on asceticism had stigmatized labor; work was an evil, the burden man bore for Adam's original sin."[17] In the course of the sixteenth century the attitudes towards begging and work progressed further as the issue switched from a call for alms based on the rewards in another world and the eradication of sins to a societal issue concerned with the economic position of the poor and ways to alleviate their poverty. This shift to the removal of causes is first seen in the sixteenth century.

The city of Strasbourg was a Free Imperial City (freie Reichsstadt) which owed no regular obligation to the Emperor either in the form of annual tax or fixed military fee. It is located on the Rhine river and was a thoroughfare of north-south and east-west trade routes. In the sixteenth century it was inhabited by 20,000 people, maintaining its population not by births but by a high immigration rate.[18] Both politically and economically stable, Strasbourg was a center of humanist activity and a hotbed of religious and social reform in South Germany. The Reformation took place in Strasbourg in 1523, and the new religion fell under the guidance of Martin Bucer. As a theologian Bucer is known for his attempts to reconcile differences between Luther and Zwingli. The city was recognized at the time as being generous to poor people and as being more tolerant of radical religious beliefs than were most cities. Many rural workers migrated to Strasbourg in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Most of these new inhabitants (Zuzügler) had no handicraft qualifications and were poor. A chasm developed at the time between guild handworkers and the urban poor due in part to the exodus of the very rich to country estates and the influx of poor.[19]

The number of guilds shrunk in the late fifteenth century in a political move which made the guilds more exclusive and less accessible to the poor. The guild system itself was not a

system of economic equality. Huge differences existed between guilds and within single guilds. A greater differentiation of work developed within guilds: work which was previously done by one person was increasingly accomplished in a hierarchical succession with certain people doing only certain tasks. Levels of guild participation became stratified as lower status and corresponding reduced privileges were offered to those of limited means.

Fischer uses tax records from Basel and Freiburg to show that there are three occupational groups characterized by high rates of poverty: textile related workers, construction workers, and urban agrarian workers (Gärtnerzunft).[20] Fischer further differentiates the poor into a six level hierarchy: handicraft workers with a house and small workplace, servants and maids, day laborers, alms recipients, people of disrespectful professions and vagrants, and those who could work but preferred to beg and steal. Many of these people supported themselves fully or partially through begging. Begging was not, in and of itself, seen as wrong. The myth of the holy beggar had become an accepted part of society with the establishment of certain religious orders. Poverty for some was a religious calling: "Begging by monks and stationers was looked upon as a divine duty while the giver was encouraged to give primarily as a good work."[21]

One popular topic of social criticism in late fifteenth and early sixteenth century literature was the plague of beggars. Beggars are typical figures in such works as Brant's Ship of Fools (1494), Beber's Triumphus Veneris (1501) and Murner's Narrensbeschwörung (1512). Considered the "most famous book of its time," Ship of Fools (Narrenschiff), went through many publications and was quickly translated into many foreign languages. Its author, Sebastian Brant, was a well known forerunner of German humanism. His poetry represented the new trend of upper middle class German thinkers, Brant himself being an officeholder and proud resident of Strasbourg. Arguing that it is foolish to seek passing pleasure rather than eternal salvation, he offers sketches of fools complete with over one hundred woodcuts. In chapter 63, "Of Beggars", the poem is prefaced by a woodcut of a rather well-dressed woman drinking wine while her husband and

children, also well suited, travel with a horse towards a city. The two are beggars who live well while travelling and then don old garments to beg in the cities. Below the woodcut it says:

> I feared no fools were left for me,
> The beggars then I went to see,
> Their wisdom was of low degree.[22]

Brant viciously attacks clerical attitudes towards begging and lashes out at beggars for not working, for training to beg, for falsely representing themselves to get more money, and for living a good life:

> To beg some men will always choose,
> Though they could work if but they would
> ...
> Their children in their youth they train
> To profit well by beggar's gain,
> ...
> He uses crutches when he's out,
> But not when no one is about;
> ...
> He borrows children by the score
> so he'll have mouths to feed galore,
> ...
> By begging they can get ahead,
> Some even get to eat white bread,
> And they don't drink the cheaper wine...

Brant also complains that "their numbers grow," and mentions the problem in his home town "at Strasbourg."

Shortly after Brant's book appeared, Geiler of Kaisersberg, a popular reforming preacher active in Strasbourg, began preaching about the excessive extent of begging and the inadequate system of distributing alms.[23] In "The Twelve Fruits of the Holy Spirit," Kaisersberg argues, in agreement with the traditional church position, for unregulated charity which allows alms recipients to receive support without any form of testing or control.[24] Yet, in the thirteenth article of a 1501, twenty-one article memorandum for the council he offers concrete suggestions: the secular government should form new control of poor relief, the city should be divided into six or seven sections with an alms administrator (Armenverweser) at the head of each, and healthy beggars should work.[25] He did

not, however, argue that all begging should be forbidden, merely that healthy people should work instead of beg. In spite of the fact that these articles had virtually no influence on policy at the time, they do reflect an interest in poor relief which had to have been discussed in the council.

The magistrates were interested in reform of the poor relief system and did institute gradual changes. The goal of reducing the number of beggars resulted in a reduction in 1464 of begging allowed by foreigners to a three day stay followed by a required three month absence.[26] In 1506 this was reduced to a limit of one day and one night. There is also record of a 1506 distribution of 'new badges' (nuwe zeichen) which were provided to those who had been deemed legal beggars in the city.[27] All other citizens were encouraged to watch marked people to see that beggars were not getting drunk, or gambling money away.[28]

In the early sixteenth century the right to purchase citizenship was restricted such that the required minimum worth of newcomers was raised.[29] This Kleinbürgerrecht did not offer the full representation of Großbürgerrecht, but it allowed one to be eligible for protection in the city as well as begging and forms of relief. Because of these controls, begging was virtually limited to citizens who were members of the beggars' society (Bettlerbrüderschaft) established in 1411.[30] This organization was slightly restructured in 1469 but functioned until 1523 when it was dissolved as the result of the official decision to end all begging.[31] Although magistrates did show an increased interest in reform of the poor relief system in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, the real reform occurred first in 1523 with the complete rejection of all forms of begging and with the establishment of a more clearly defined work ethic.

The reform of the begging laws reveal a shift from the regulation and control of begging to an attempt to exclude begging within the city walls. The magistrates decided to break with the Catholic tradition concerning begging, but it is not clear just what the punishments were, or if begging still occurred. It appears that begging did indeed continue merely because discussion concerning the end of begging continued.[32] Secondary sources all claim that begging was

eliminated, yet they make mention of later legislation and memorandums concerning begging.[33]

The major institutional changes resulting from the 1523 ordinances were the removal of poor relief from church hands, the construction of a begging control group (Bettlerpolizei), and the conscious effort to raise community awareness of illegal begging. The ordinance was passed at the same time that the convents and monasteries were being dissolved, yet the council refused to turn control of almsgiving and poor relief to the Reformers:

> First, all the established funds for alms should be requisitioned, and these alms should be delivered over to the Rat, whether [collected] by spiritual or worldly persons, pfleger [sic] or others, so that no one will manage such alms subsequently, and thus that alms will be divided among the poor who are in need, as has been ordered. And so that such alms shall be delivered over to the Rat, as it has been drawn up in writing, it is necessary to assign a house where the revenues can be collected ... and kept.[34]

The reformed clergy did not control the welfare system but their ideas are reflected in the new attitude towards alms. The person to community nexus was restructured: alms giving became a Christian duty which was an expression of faith and of love for one's neighbor rather than being a good work which earns merit and salvation. Citizens were encouraged to give freely according to their abilities. The council installed alms boxes in churches and issued an accompanying edict which mixed the old idea of salvation and merit with the new idea of giving out of love and faith:

> Each person can put his alms therein, to share with the poor and show his compassion, as God has admonished. And as he wishes to obtain mercy from God, then each person who in the situation of this disrupted world is concerned for his needy neighbor and gives to his help, must on the day [sic] of Judgment be given a true recompense, and for the earthly, the eternal will be obtained.[35]

The new system of collection and distribution was headed by a welfare administrator. Lucas Hackfurt, appointed in August of 1523, held the position until his death in 1554. One of the earliest priests to marry in Strasbourg, Hackfurt was later attracted to Anabaptist beliefs although his position as welfare administrator forced him to renounce these. Hackfurt kept weekly records during his thirty-one years as welfare administrator. Carrying the main load of the management, he worked with the poor, made initiatives for a single welfare program, and fought for legislation which he felt would aid the poor. He zealously sought to institute reforms based on his religious convictions, but he was only partially successful.

Hackfurt headed a system which was based on home relief for the poor. Funds were collected and distributed by a committee under his charge to those citizens who could not work to support themselves. The recipients were required to wear shields, similar to those worn earlier by beggars, so that citizens would be able to monitor their moral behavior. There was also a regular system of visitation.[36]

A major problem facing Hackfurt was attaining sufficient funds for the welfare problem. Chrisman attributes the problem to the new concept of giving: "voluntary contributions, given in faith and love, never yielded the same quantity of revenue as that obtained when the donors believed their gifts would guarantee a better life in the world to come."[37] Hackfurt constantly lobbied for revenues from the sale of monasteries and other church property. Budget problems forced Hackfurt to try to cut the number of welfare recipients. Of special interest is the exclusion of foreigners from any form of assistance and the effort not merely to serve the poor but to transform them into working members of society.

Foreign poor, most of whom were from rural areas with no system of poor relief, were previously granted a few days of unmolested begging. The idealistic Hackfurt argued in 1527 that because God had given the city more than the rural areas, the burghers should share it with the poor.[38] He was conscious of the conflict between urban and rural inhabitants and felt that because non-urbanites had no systematic means to

deal with the poor, the urban citizens should obey the Christian command to care for neighbors and should provide help.[39]

The lack of any systematic program of poor relief in rural areas caused acute problems for the urban areas in times of periodic crises. Wars and natural disasters had a large impact on migration and on the size and stability of the work force. Poor harvests in 1529, coinciding with an influx of religious refugees from Strasbourg's territories, from other cities, and from rural areas outside of Strasbourg's domain, resulted in many pleas from Hackfurt. Hackfurt based his requests on the idea that high prices and inflation were conditions which God had sent to punish man for his sins. He also argued that even the asocial foreigners and criminals should be provided for.[40] The city did offer some assistance to nonresident poor during certain crisis years. When the preachers Bucer and Hedio joined Hackfurt in requesting assistance to religious refugees, the city set up a program providing all work capable foreigners with a work place in the city.[41]

Poor relief was no longer a matter of alleviating only immediate needs or of providing help only for the moment; rather, permanent provisions were provided with the intention of helping the needy return to a state of economic self sufficiency. The work offered to foreign poor tended to be on municipal projects such as building the city walls, whereas attempts were made to provide citizens with more meaningful and stable positions. In 1525 yarn was given to poor people and poor women so that they could spin.[42] The city then bought the finished product from these same people. Work places were created and special training for children was provided.

Work requirements became a means of social discipline of the poor which brought with it certain problems. Hackfurt argued that people do not work unless they have to work, but he was also faced with the burden of finding work for the untrained.[43] The foreign poor complained in 1544 that the city did not provide work like it used to and that the wages were too low.[44] Although Hackfurt was able to establish one of the best poor relief systems in Europe his inability to establish a methodical system of distributing and providing work, the general inability to limit the number of people receiving

support, and the failure to find adequate funding prevented him from achieving his goals.

Strasbourg did establish one of the most complete and best known systems of poor relief in sixteenth-century German speaking areas. Although the Strasbourg reforms reflected many of the earlier pleas by Geiler of Kaisersberg, they were not consistent with his traditional pre-Reformation notion of the right to practice begging and the nature of alms. Until recently the consensus among many historians was that Luther's theology gave license to the implementation of poor relief reforms such as those proposed by Geiler of Kaisersberg:

> It remained for Luther to connect solutions of the problems of poor relief with the powerful movement of the Reformation, thereby providing a theological basis for the construction of a new system of poor relief, at least in Germany.[45]

This view contends that Luther's conception of justification by faith, of the Bible as sole authority, and of the universal priesthood of believers, places man's relation to God such that a necessary expression of the Christian faith is the obligation to serve the needs of one's neighbors out of love. One sees in Luther's theory about alms and begging many of the same problems and the same calls for change as one finds in the platforms for practical reform instituted in Strasbourg.

In the fourteenth point of "The Long Sermon on Usury" (1520), Luther rejects the giving of alms as he saw it practiced:

> Not what Christ has commanded, but what men have invented, is called "giving for God's sake"; not what one gives to the needy, the living members of Christ, but what one gives to stone, wood and paint, is called "alms".[46]

He argues that the money goes to the church but not to feed the "poor."

In the same work Luther also argues, based on Deuteronomy 15: 4 and 11, that there should be no begging but that one should give to one's "poor and needy brother." In a more theoretical tract he flatly rejects begging: "One of the greatest

necessities is the abolition of all begging throughout Christendom. Nobody ought to go begging among Christians."[47] With his rejection of begging he argues that "every city should support its own poor."[48] The way to provide for the poor is to have "an overseer or warden who knows all the poor and informs the city council or the clergy what they needed."[49] Luther also says that authorities should stop overlapping solicitations of money. A fourth point from "To the Christian Nobility" is his use of Paul's teaching in that "whoever will not work shall not eat."[50] All of these positions are part of the poor relief reforms instituted in Strasbourg.

Luther's views on poor relief do not differ greatly from those of the chief reformer of Strasbourg, Martin Bucer. Bucer's sermons and writings provide a glimpse of his vision of a Christian community and the role of charity and education within society.[51] Scholars familiar with Bucer's thought are unanimous in stressing the importance of ethics in his theology. Bucer's emphasis on good works reflects the strongly ethical nature of his theology. Bucer posits that justification comes from faith alone, apart from works; nevertheless, virtue and good works are the necessary realizations of justification.[52] The role of good works in the life of the Christian is evident in Bucer's concept of double justification: one who has been justified by God through faith will also produce works which are pleasing to God.

Bucer's view of justification requires a Christian to bear ethical fruit. This is manifested in the expression of love for one's neighbor. In one of his earliest published works, a sermon entitled, "That no one should live for himself but for others, and how one may reach this goal," Bucer states: "how gladly do I want to offer (myself) for service to my brother, taking absolutely nothing of his for myself."[53]

The emphasis on love for one's neighbor shaped Bucer's view of the church and society. The "unity of the Church," according to Bucer, "consists therefore in the unity of the Spirit, of love, the word of God, Christ, the sacraments, and the sharing of gifts."[54] The church is a community of individuals consecrated to the fulfillment of the material and spiritual needs of the others. All members of the church are exhorted to use the gifts they have received from

God in order to meet the needs of the others. They are to bring these gifts to the deacons whose duty it is to care for the physical needs of the poor. Mutual assistance and encouragement sanctifies the church as a whole, as well as each individual member.[55]

Before turning to the societal implications of Bucer's system of giving it is worth examining briefly his ideas concerning the promotion of Christian growth in the individual members of the church. Bucer's attempts to strengthen the church and its members through education and church discipline result in the call for a new lifestyle which will enable Christians to live well and happily (*bene beateque vivere*). Education and discipline are not solely the responsibility of the church, as both the church and the Christian magistrate are to work together, although each in their proper sphere, to further the kingdom of Christ on earth. Bucer offered open theological lectures which eventually led to the development of the Strasbourg Academy, later the University of Strasbourg.[56] Bucer's strong support for both secular and religious education is a product of his belief that one can live a life worthy of Christ only if one has first been taught how to live such a life.[57] In Bucer's Strasbourg, the individual is not complete outside of the community because the community defines the individual as needing education.

Bucer advocates church discipline, in the form of pastoral care rather than punishment, as a tool for encouraging Christians to live a life worthy of Christ. In his 1538 treatise, *On True Pastoral Care*, he defends the need for discipline within the church and presents five different ways of exercising discipline, depending on the spiritual condition of the individual. Underlying his methods of disciplining church members, be it by the civil or church authorities, is Bucer's concern first to awaken genuine faith in Christ and then to encourage the believer to greater commitment and growth in sanctification.

Bucer's ideas concerning discipline, pedagogy, the structure of charitable giving, and the underlying ideological basis for giving may seem to be idealistic and unattainable to the modern critic; nevertheless, based on the written record that he and Hackfurt have left behind, it seems

that the Strasbourg clergy did believe that the potential existed for a society eradicated both of begging and of unemployed able-bodied people. The municipal leaders were interested in creating a city where all could work and where everyone could care for himself or herself at home, without the visible presence of begging.[58] In the pursuit of this end, the city of Strasbourg instituted means of restricting and regulating poor relief which involved ideological, structural, disciplinary, and pedagogical changes.

The decision to remove the administration of poor relief from the church's hand and the subsequent council control was the structural change with the greatest impact. The implications of a shift from a universal church's responsibility to that of a geographically limited area's concern for its own poor, effect concepts of community and the individual. Restrictions were imposed on non-citizens and the availability of burgher status shifted in a move which further isolated the community from outsiders. The land-city differentiation was further exacerbated in times of poor harvests and crisis.

The decision to distinguish between foreigners and one's own poor took on a new meaning when the ideological basis for giving shifted from a means of earning salvation to the love of one's neighbor. The result of this ideological shift was not only a change in the community-individual nexus, but also a shift in the geography of begging. The most visible difference was the exclusion by Protestants of all forms of begging from within the confines of the city walls. The seclusion of the poor from the public's eyes and the distancing of the community from the poor was much greater in Protestant than in Catholic cities. The Protestant establishment of a general alms fund, which administered to the poor within the confines of the poor peoples' homes, not only sheltered the poor from the public eye but also institutionalized a change in the nature of transactions. One no longer gave directly to poor people who were a visible part of one's environment, as in Catholic lands; rather, one gave to a black box.

The change in the motive of giving brought with it an assurance that only those who could not support themselves would be recipients of

one's gift. The city was able to decide who would and who would not receive aid. This change and the establishment of a group to distribute the funds established opportunities for discipline and the emergence of a system of surveillance. The establishment of a begging control group, of a bureaucratic system of distribution, and of a welfare administrator allowed for the supervision of the poor in the form of regular visitations. Because these officers had to answer directly to the municipal council it gave the council greater power and more social control. The council became the watchdog concerned with regulating the undesirable aspects of society.

Control was established through disciplinary and pedagogical actions which attempted to direct and control the poor. The council was able to recode the poor population such that many were forced to work while the now limited recipients of municipal alms were more strictly prevented from taking part in certain activities, such as drinking and gambling. The new poor relief system's work requirement established a communal definition of the responsibility of able-bodied individuals who wished to function within the community. This duty to work was founded on the belief, demonstrated above in Luther's work, that "whoever will not work shall not eat." While some work places were created, the important thrust was the demand that people seek work and the establishment of pedagogical opportunities for the poor. Education programs for the poor and for the children of the poor were an important platform of the new poor relief leaders.[59] It is through these ideological, structural, disciplinary, and pedagogical alterations that society established a new emphasis on work which had a lasting impact on the Protestant lands.

The impact of this changing work ethic was not consistent with the intentions of the poor relief reformers. The opinion of the religious and poor relief reformers was that usury and speculation were contributing to poverty. Beyond Luther's disdain for usury, he clearly attacks usurers and rejects capitalism in his tract "Trade and Usury."[60] In the same years that Luther was attacking capitalism and usury, there was a tremendous increase in legislation in Strasbourg concerning usury and speculation of food

prices.[61] Whether one attributes the reform of poor relief to Luther or whether one sees it as a step in a centuries long process, it is clear that the theology and legislation of people who wished to control capitalists and usurers also rejected the traditional interpretation of alms and the virtue of poverty. As one now gave out of love, so too one worked out of duty. The need to work became as important as the need for nourishment. These people strove to instill a work ethic within citizens such that the role of the individual within society shifted from that of giving for one's own benefit to giving out of love, and the role of begging and poverty shifted from an accepted part of Christian society to sometning to be eliminated. The role of the individual changed, taking on a new mentality or work ethic in a society which sought to alleviate the causes for poverty by requiring people to work.

NOTES

[1]Thomas Brady, "Social History," in Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research, ed. Steven Ozment (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), p. 167.

[2]Bernd Moeller, Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays. trans. H.C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards (Durham, North Carolina: Labyrinth Press, 1982).

[3]Steven E. Ozment, The Reformation Cities: The Appeal of Protestantism to Sixteenth Century Germany and Switzerland (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 119, p. 9.

[4]Thomas A. Brady, Ruling Class, Regime and Reformation at Strasbourg, 1520-1555 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978).

[5]All three of the works mentioned above refer frequently to Strasbourg, with Brady's work based solely on Strasbourg. Miriam Usher Chrisman's analysis supports Moeller's thesis: Strasbourg and the Reform: A Study in the Process of Change. Yale Historical Publications, Miscellany, 87 (New Haven,Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967). A fourth tradition of Reformation research which sees anti-clerical sentiment as the moving factor is supported in William Stafford's work Domesticating the Clergy: The

Inception of the Reformation in Strasbourg 1522-1524. American Academy of Religion Dissertation Series, no. 17 (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1976).

[6]Brady, Ruling, p. 207.

[7]Ibid., p.206.

[8]Otto Winckelmann, Das Fürsorgewesen der Stadt Strassburg vor und nach der Reformation bis zum Ausgang des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts (Leipzig: Verein für Reformationsgeschichte, 1922; reprint ed., New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971).

This book comprises two volumes bound into one, with the second volume comprised of source materials. Since most of the documents are from this book, endnotes will refer to I or II, followed by page and document numbers.

[9]Thomas Fischer, Städtische Armut und Armenfürsorge im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert. Hrsg. von Wilhelm Abel und Karl Heinrich Kaufhold (Göttingen: Verlag Otto Schwartz & Co., 1979), p. 181.

[10]Chrisman, Strasbourg, p. 277. Chrisman's position is consistent with that of Natalie Z. Davis, Henry Kamen and Brian Pullan.

[11]Fischer, p. 17 ff.

[12]Ibid., p. 28.

[13]Winckelmann, "Über die ältesten Armenordnungen der Reformationszeit (1522-1525)," Historische Viertelsjahrschrift 17 (1914/15): 188-196.

[14]Ibid., p. 190.

[15]I, p.61.

[16]Winckelmann, "Über die ältesten," p. 192.

[17]Chrisman, Straßbourg, p. 276.

[18]Jean-Piere Kintz, "Notes sur quelques aspects demographiques de la ville de Strasbourg," in Strasbourg au coeur religieux du XVIe siècle, ed. Georges Livet and Francis Rapp (Strasbourg: Librairie Istra, 1977), p. 13.

[19]Fischer, p. 69 ff.

[20]Ibid., p. 67.

[21]Harold Grimm, "Luther's Contributions to Sixteenth-Century Organization of Poor Relief," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 61 (1970): 224.

[22]Sebastian Brant, The Ship of Fools, trans. Edwin H. Zeydel (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), p. 208.

[23]I, p. 63. For more on Geiler of Kaisersberg's views on begging see I, pp. 197-202.

[24]Major portions of this text are provided in the "Quellen und Materialien (in Übersetzungen

von Rolf Müller)" section of Sachße Christoph, and Florian Tennstedt, Geschichte der Armenfürsorge in Deutschland: vom Spätmittelalter bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1980), pp. 57-59.

[25]Léon Dacheux, ed., Die ältesten Schriften Geilers von Kayserberg (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1965), p. 30 f.

[26]II, pp. 83-87, #38.

[27]II, p. 85, #38.

[28]II, p. 100, #43. They make the beggars gather to pick up patches and they justify the patches by saying that they serve to protect the people: "solch almusen nit unzimlich verschwendt oder verthan werde oder durch die ihennen, so solch almusen nemen, desto weniger in würtzhüsern, bierhüsern oder uf stuben verzert oder verspielt werden."

[29]Fischer, p. 33.

[30]II, pp. 78-81, #36.

[31]II, pp. 81-83, #37; II, p. 91, #40.

[32]Hackfurt explored possible ways to eliminate begging in July of 1531. II, pp. 144-149, #108.

[33]Chrisman mentions a March 1531 memorandum from Capito to the Rat requesting "action against those who still begged in the streets, suggesting that if the beggars persisted in their habits, they should be deprived of their Bürgerrecht." Straßbourg, p. 281. Other examples are cited in Fischer, p. 242., and Chrisman, "Urban Poor in the Sixteenth Century: The Case of Strasbourg," in Social Groups and Religious Ideas in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Miriam Usher Chrisman and Otto Gründler (Kalamazoo, Michigan: The Medieval Institute, 1978), p. 63.

[34]They did, of course, consult the reformed clergy concerning poor relief ordinances. For my explanation of the ordinances I rely heavily on Chrisman's account, using her translations of the documents. Straßbourg, pp. 277-283, here a portion of a draft of an ordinance, p. 278.

[35]Chrisman, Straßbourg, p. 279.

[36]II, p. 98, #43.

[37]Chrisman, Straßbourg, p. 280.

[38]II, p. 147, #108.

[39]II, pp. 115-116, #71.

[40]II, p. 121, #77.

[41]II, pp. 128-129, #87.

[42]II, pp. 109-110, #58.

[43]II, p. 156, #113.

[44]II, pp. 202-204, #157.

[45]Grimm, p. 224.

[46]Luther's Works, vol. 45, p. 284.

[47]"To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate," in Luther's Works, vol. 44, p. 189.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ibid., p. 190.

[50]Ibid., p. 191.

[51]De Regno Christi, published 1557 in Basel, six years after Bucer's death, represents the culmination of Bucer's ideas concerning the Reformation and poor relief.

[52]Karl Koch, Studium Pietatis: Martin Bucer als Ethiker (Neukirchen: Neukirchen Verlag, 1962), p. 46.

[53]Martin Bucers Deutsche Schriften (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1960), vol. 1, p. 64.

[54]Martin Bucer, Lectures on Ephesians, trans. and ed. D.F. Wright, The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics, vol. 4, Common Places of Martin Bucer (Appleford, England: The Sutton Courtenay Press, 1972), pp. 201-234, here p. 208.

[55]Koch, pp. 56-58.

[56]Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls, Die Schule bei Martin Bucer in ihrem Verhältnis zu Kirche und Obrigkeit (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1963), pp. 48-50.

[57]Ibid., p. 60.

[58]In the July 19, 1531 Ratsbeschluß auf Grund Hackfurtscher Anträge the council addresses these points: "Siteinmol allenthalb im land genugsam arbeit ... dohär sich menglich bi den sinen wol erhalten und neren kan..." Winklemann, II, pp. 144-149, #107, here p. 144.

[59]One example of this is found in the preacher Casper Hedio's forward to his translation of Ludovicus Vives work "De subventione pauperum." Hedio argues for a strategy which will supply the common man "Education und christlich Zucht...damit er auch das sein thun und dem verarmen so vil an jm ist weren soll." II, pp. 167-172, # 118, here p. 170.

[60]Luther's Works, vol. 45, pp. 245-310.

[61]Laws concerning usury and speculation numbered 12 during the period 1440-1516, 6 during the period 1517-1520, and 32 during the period 1520-1532. Croyants et sceptiques au XVIe siecle: Le dossier des 'Epicuriens'. Société savante d'Alsace de des régions de l'est, Collection "Recherches et Documents" Tome XXX (Strasbourg: Librairie Istra, 1981), here pp. 64-71.

SAVE THE BABIES: THE PASSAGE OF A FEDERALLY SUPPORTED MATERNAL AND INFANT HEALTH ACT

DONALD G. COOPER

The United States led the world in industrial production at the beginning of this century; yet, with all its prosperity, America lagged behind other nations such as England, Sweden, France, and New Zealand in maternal and infant hygiene and care. In 1918 somber statistics published by the Children's Bureau shocked the American middle class public. When compared to the twenty other leading industrial nations of the world, the United States ranked eleventh in infant mortality survival and fourteenth in maternal mortality. As a result of the publication of these figures, several prominent women's organizations demanded federal action to alleviate the problem.

Among the leaders of this movement was Jeannette Rankin of Montana, who served as the first woman in the U.S. Congress from 1917 to 1919. In 1918 Rankin introduced the first federal legislative bill to create a federal grant-in-aid program in the instruction of maternal and infant hygiene and care. Her bill called for the appropriation of federal funds to be matched by state funds for the creation of female hygiene and child-health consultation centers.

This article surveys the role of Rankin and other women leaders in the drafting and final passage of a federal bill promoting maternal and infant health. The bill pioneered federal health

Donald G. Cooper received his B.A. degree in History and Political Science, and M.S. in Education, from James Madison University. He also received an M.A. in History from the University of Southern California, where he is currently a doctoral candidate studying Twentieth-Century American History with an emphasis on Ethnic and Women's History.

care legislation for the twentieth century. This initial bill failed to pass in the 1919 session, but gained overwhelming support in 1921. Although other factors such as presidential and media support contributed to the shift in congressional attitudes towards the legislation, the most important development was the newly-acquired political power of women following the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.

Infancy and maternal care in the United States gained momentum after the turn of the century. The first major step was the White House Conference on Child Welfare Standards held in 1909 by President Theodore Roosevelt. This conference urged the adoption of state and national programs for nutrition, child guidance, infant and maternal health, hygiene, and parental education. Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress urging the creation of a children's bureau, and in 1912, the enabling bill passed. Julia Lathrop was chosen as the first chief of the new bureau.[1]

The first goal of the Children's Bureau was to investigate the causes of maternal and infant mortality in the United States. The bureau also investigated mortality rates of other countries and actions taken elsewhere to lower death rates. After six years of careful study, the bureau issued its report. Infant mortality rates of the United States were higher than ten other prosperous nations in the world. Within the first year after birth the United States lost one in ten of all babies born. The maternal death rate of the United States proved worse. These rates were higher than thirteen other nations.[2]

This study indicated a high correlation between income-level and mortality rates. In families with an earned income of $450 or less, the infant mortality rate was one in six. For those families earning between $650 and $850, the rate dropped to one in ten. Finally, in families with incomes over $1250, the mortality rate was only one in sixteen. Yet, even this rate compared poorly with the figure for New Zealand, whose infant care program produced a mortality rate of one in twenty for families in all income levels.[3]

The study of the Children's Bureau indicated that most of the nations with low infant and maternal rates had established special programs in hygiene and care. New Zealand had adopted a

government subsidized program of instructive nursing and government maternity hospitals making instruction and care available to all mothers. England had appointed health visitors and created consultation centers for their mothers and supported them through grants-in-aid. Finally, France had a program providing for prenatal and natal care in institutions at public expense one month before and one month after confinement.[4]

In light of these findings, the Children's Bureau and supportive women's organizations concluded that an urgent need existed for federal involvement in maternal and child health. They argued that nations with established government programs had been the most successful in reducing infant and maternal mortality rates. The Bureau and numerous reform-minded women urged the American government to take a similar course of action.

In the forefront of this effort was Jeannette Rankin. In 1916 she became the first woman elected to Congress at a time when only eleven states allowed women the right to vote or hold office. Rankin ran on a progressive Republican platform calling for women's suffrage and protective legislation for women and children.[5] After her election, Rankin wrote to the Children's Bureau seeking to discover what they were accomplishing to relieve the hardships of women. She requested a study of the maternal and infant mortality rates for Montana. The subsequent report revealed that "while the average maternal mortality for the nation was high, the average in ... isolated Western districts was even higher."[6] Rankin learned through the Bureau's national report that the high infant mortality in rural areas was due to three major problems. First, rural mothers lacked adequate information concerning prenatal and natal care. Second, rural districts lacked doctors and visiting nurses, and third, most infant deaths were due to gastric and intestinal diseases which resulted from improper care and feeding.[7] After carefully reviewing the national report of the Children's Bureau and Montana's state report, Rankin introduced into the Sixty-Fifth Congress H.R. 12634 on June 26, 1918. Meanwhile, Julia Lathrop of the Children's Bureau had persuaded Joseph Robinson, an Arkansas Democrat in the United States Senate, to co-sponsor the bill to insure a nonpartisan piece of

legislation. As a result, the bill became known as the Rankin-Robinson bill.

The Rankin-Robinson bill called for cooperation between the states and the federal government in the promotion of maternal and infant care in the rural districts and instruction in maternal and infant hygiene. Congress was asked to appropriate $480,000 in 1919 and each successive year thereafter as grants-in-aid to the individual states irrespective of the number of rural inhabitants, with each state receiving $10,000. An additional $1,000,000 in 1919 was to be allotted to the states based on the relationship of their rural population to the total population of the United States based on the 1910 United States Census. The states with larger rural populations were scheduled to receive a greater allotment of the federal funds for maternal and infant hygiene and care. In order for any state to receive this additional federal allotment, however, it had to appropriate an equal sum. The amount of federal money appropriated in successive years would progressively increase to the maximum sum of $2,000,000 by 1924.

Each state was required by the Rankin-Robinson bill to establish a board of maternity aid and infant hygiene. This board was to work closely with the chief of the Children's Bureau in establishing a program "for instruction in the hygiene of maternity and infancy through public-health nursing, consultation centers, and other suitable methods and provisions of medical and nursing care for mothers and infants at home or at a hospital when necessary, especially in remote areas.[8] The state board consisted of the governor, a physician from the state board of health, a representative of the nursing profession, and a representative of the teaching profession from the state university or state college of agriculture. This state board was to determine how it would implement the act and submit a detailed state plan to the Children's Bureau for approval. Finally, the state board was permitted to use the state university, land-grant college, or other educational institution to provide extension courses in hygiene and infant care in the rural areas.

When newspaper reporters asked Rankin why she had introduced this bill, she responded, "It is quite obvious that the national welfare demands

that these children shall live and that their mothers shall live in health and vigor to help them grow into robust men and women."[10] Rankin and other supporters for the bill developed the "Save the Babies" Campaign slogan to help secure the passage of the bill and the creation of the state child hygiene or child welfare divisions to receive the federal funds. "In 1917 only eight states had child-welfare divisions, but by 1920 thirty-five states had a child hygiene or child welfare division."[11] Thus Rankin and other supporters helped to create the apparatus necessary for implementing the bill once it was passed.

The Rankin-Robinson bill advanced to the House Committee on Labor for hearings on January 19, 1919. Rankin presented a brief synopsis of the bill to the committee members. At the end of her presentation, she introduced Caroline Fleming, the assistant chief of the Children's Bureau, who presented a brief for the maternity and infancy bill. The committee heard speakers from the American Federation of Labor, the Children's Bureau, and physicians from numerous state public health departments. Each spokesperson expressed the need for the bill, and how other nations had lowered their mortality rates with a nationally-funded hygiene and care program. These leaders urged the immediate adoption of the bill. The measure was reported out of committee favorably, but the session ended without any further action in March, 1919.[12]

Congressional leaders and supporters of this bill for maternal and infant hygiene and care were aware that many areas of the United States had established programs before the study of the Children's Bureau. In fact, New York City, Boston, and Philadelphia had established municipal agencies such as child-hygiene bureaus or had private organizations such as the Maternity Center Association providing health services before 1917. Those urban centers performed the same functions as described in the Rankin-Robinson bill with considerable success. A report by the committee on statistics of the Maternity Center Association of New York City stated, "Only 86 of the babies born alive in the 4,496 confinements, died in the first month after birth. In the city at large about 1709 such deaths occurred."[13] The reports of these urban centers justified the passage of the Rankin-

Robinson bill for the rural areas where resources and funds were not available. The urban areas proved that a systematic and coordinated maternal and infant health program would reduce mortality rates.

With such evidence and support, the Rankin-Robinson bill did not pass the Sixty-Fifth Congress. Many factors need to be taken into consideration. What was the attitude of the President of the United States towards the bill? What were the feelings of Members of Congress, and did women have any political power to move the bill?

Many years later, Rankin said the bill did not pass "because you know nothing constructive is done during a war."[14] The progressive reforms of the turn of the century had come to a halt due to America's entrance into World War I. American interest shifted from social reform into active support for winning the war. Another factor contributing to the failure of the bill was the defeat of Jeannette Rankin in November, 1918. Her term of office ended on March 3, 1919. With only three months remaining in her term the Committee on Labor conducted its hearings, Rankin placed her remaining energy in securing the passage and ratification of the Susan B. Anthony Suffrage Amendment, which gave women the right to vote. Therefore, she did not have the time to devote a great effort towards the passage of the maternal and infant health bill.

Moreover, President Woodrow Wilson gave little encouragement for the passage of the bill. At the White House Conference on the Standards of Children Welfare in 1919, he urged "certain irreducible minimum standards for the health, education, and work of the American child."[15] This was his only comment towards the Rankin-Robinson bill. He refused to give the endorsement needed for its passage in Congress.

The majority of Congress was unconcerned about the issue of maternal and infant hygiene and care. Women did not possess the right to vote and were unable to influence the Congress into acting. At this particular moment, health concerns were not the leading priority item for American women. In 1919 women spent their energy securing congressional passage and state ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.

A newly-elected Republican Congress convened in April, 1919. During this Sixty-Sixth

Congress, Senator Morris Sheppard (D-Texas) and Congressman Horace Towner (R-Iowa) resubmitted the maternal and infant hygiene bill. The measure was no longer called the Rankin-Robinson bill; rather, it became known as the Sheppard-Towner bill. This measure called for the appropriation of $4,000,000 to provide matching grants to states in addition to the $10,000 provided by the federal government to each state to start the program.[16]

Prominent women's organizations like the National League of Women Voters and the National Consumer's League endorsed the bill. During the summer of 1919 these organizations urged the national parties to endorse the Sheppard-Towner bill in their platforms. The Democratic, Socialist, Prohibition, and Farmer Labor parties approved the proposal.[17] The Republicans did nothing, but their presidential nominee, Warren Harding, supported the measure. In fact, in his Social Justice Day speech on October 1, 1920, Harding said: "We all know that we face tasks of social justice which we must undertake with dispatch and efficiency. Who can suggest one of these tasks which can supersede in our hearts, or in the ranks which foresight and wisdom will give, that of the protection of maternity?"[18]

Since women now possessed the right to vote due to the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, "the bill became the first goal of the newly enfranchised women and took precedence over all other efforts."[19] The twenty leading women's organizations came together under the Women's Joint Congressional Committee. The purpose of the WJCC was to lobby for the Sheppard-Towner bill. The member organizations drummed up the grassroot support through meetings, leaflets, newsletters, and the passing of resolutions and petitions.[20]

Meanwhile the Sheppard-Towner bill lay in the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce from May through December, 1920. The supporters for the bill began to mount an active campaign for its passage. Good Housekeeping became impatient and declared, "Herod is not dead, and urged women to besiege Congress with telegrams and letters."[21] Indeed, Congress was besieged with an avalanche of mail demanding the passage of the bill. These tactics worked. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce began hearings on the bill in December.

The Sheppard-Towner bill began to move steadily forward in Congress toward passage in December, 1920. In the Senate debate, Senator Sheppard informed his colleagues that the bill was endorsed by nearly every women's organization of importance in the country such as the League of Women's Voters, the National Federation of Women's Clubs, and the Women's National Republican and Democratic committees. He stated that the bill was not a radical departure in American government, but simply provided federal and state cooperation in maternal and child hygiene. Further, he argued that the idea of grant-in-aid for the states was not a new concept. States received this type of federal funding for land-grant colleges, agricultural experiment stations, vocational education, and highway construction. Sheppard also pointed out that no department would be created, but it combined serving federal officials into a single board for administration of the program. Sheppard concluded his explanation of the bill by reading the letters of twenty governors who endorsed the measure. The bill passed the Senate quickly with little opposition.[22]

The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce began its hearings on the proposal. Again an endless procession of witnesses favorable to the bill testified before the committee members. One of those witnesses was Jeannette Rankin. She informed the committee of the pressing need for this legislation, particularly in the rural western areas of the country. "The women of this country are behind this bill," declared Rankin. "They realize that they need it. It is the greatest need that they have felt and is the first need expressed by the voting women of this country."[23] Witness after witness restated her argument for the passage of the bill. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce approved the bill during the last week of December. The only modification was a decrease in appropriation from four million dollars to one million dollars.[24]

The Sheppard-Towner bill proceeded to the House Rules Committee where it died. P.P. Campbell (R-Kansas), Chairman of the Rules Committee, refused to release the bill to the floor of the House. He claimed the calendar was already crowded with too many appropriation bills.[25] Thus the bill failed to pass the Sixty-

Sixth Congress. Women were shocked and demanded that President Harding do something. He informed the women organizations that he was sure the bill would pass by July, 1921, during the next session of Congress.[26]

President Harding called the Sixty-Seventh Congress into a special session to deal with the tariff and other budget matters in April, 1921. In his address before Congress, Harding stated: "I assume the maternity bill, already strongly approved will be enacted promptly, thus adding to our manifestation of human interest."[27] The supporters of the Sheppard-Towner bill had persuaded him to single out the bill for passage in his message to Congress. They feared the measure would be ignored unless the president spoke for it.[28]

Sheppard and Towner resubmitted their bill in April. The Senate passed the measure once again on July 22, 1921, by a vote of 63-7. But, the bill appeared doomed in the House. Samuel Winslow (R-Massachusetts), Chairman of the House committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, opposed the bill. He had been an ardent anti-suffragist. For months he delayed the passage of the bill by refusing to hold any hearings on it. He hoped to stall the bill long enough for the opposition to mobilize to block its passage. Harriet Upton, Vice-Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and other women leaders began to put pressure on Harding to dislodge the measure. Women, now that they had the vote, were to be reckoned with. Harding persuaded Winslow to begin the hearings on the bill on July 12.[29]

Winslow had been able to stall the bill until the mobilization of the opposition. The three leading opponent groups were the American Medical Association, the medical liberty organizations, and the National Association Opposed to Woman Suffrage, the last known as the Women Patriots.

The medical liberty organizations opposed any state regulation of medicine, such as licensing of doctors and medical schools, vaccinations, or quarantines. These societies opposed the Sheppard-Towner bill simply because they saw the measure as an attempt by the American Medical Association to use state power to eliminate the medical liberty organizations from practice.[30] Ironically, these organizations and the AMA were against the same bill but for different reasons.

The Woman Patriots were anti-suffragists who opposed the bill in part because the suffragists

endorsed it. These women condemned the plan as a part of a bolshevist conspiracy. Epithets such as Russian, socialist, and bolshevistic were hurled at the Sheppard-Towner bill by this reactionary group of women who claimed that the Children's Bureau was nationalizing children.[31]

But the strongest opposition came from the American Medical Association. The AMA called the measure a form of state medicine that interfered with the private practice of the doctor. The Journal of the American Medical Association stated clearly in May, 1921, the arguments against the Sheppard-Towner bill. The journal argued that public health work was a function of the state and local government. Therefore, the funding for such work should come from state and local funds and not from the national government. Moreover, the AMA opined that no emergency existed for maternal and infant care. They claimed there were no reliable statistics to prove the high mortality rates. Finally, the journal concluded that public health measures such as the care of maternity and infancy should be under the U.S. Public Health Service rather than the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor.[32]

Primarily, the AMA was against the Sheppard-Towner bill because the organization believed the bill threatened the association's power to establish and maintain complete control over the supply of medical services. As long as the federal and state governments worked as a partner with the AMA in establishing standards of medical training, licensing, and ethics of practice, the AMA permitted the government to intervene. The AMA opposed the government if it attempted to provide medical services or considered any program which might promote a compulsory health insurance.[33]

On July 12, Winslow began the hearings of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on the Sheppard-Towner bill. He realized that the bill could be defeated through its opponents. Winslow arranged the agenda so that a predominance of opposition witnesses spoke before the committee. Once again Upton requested Harding to intervene on behalf of the bill.[34]

The Sheppard-Towner bill finally reached the floor of the House on November 18, 1921. "Actual sentiment among Congressmen probably opposed the bill, but the threat of 20,000,000 organized

women was too much to ignore."[35] The WJCC skillfully organized these women. Thousands of letters, telegrams, and petitions rolled into the Capitol demanding the passage of the bill.[36] The Republican congressmen looked to Harding for direction. For example, Congressman Graham wrote Harding inquiring what he should do. The following reply from the president's secretary, George B. Christian, Jr., was sent and read to the House during the concluding debates on the bill.

> My Dear Mr. Graham: The President has seen your letter of September 30 and has asked me to make a reply and say he has already expressed himself relating to the maternity bill ... He does not think that any new expression is, therefore, necessary, and does not think the situation calls for a special message on the subject. The President has said on several occasions that he has spoken of his favorable attitude, and he has had no occasion to change his mind in that regard.[37]

The House passed the bill by a vote of 279 to 39 with 113 abstentions. The Sheppard-Towner Act became law on November 23, 1921 with the signature of President Harding.[38]

Why did the Sheppard-Towner Act pass during this session of Congress? How was the support in 1921 different from that in 1919? What changes were necessary in order for the bill to pass through Congress?

Unlike Wilson, President Harding endorsed the Sheppard-Towner bill. Harding persisted in pushing the measure through Congress. His motives were a combination of humanitarianism mixed with political reality. He knew that a large number of newly enfranchised women voters were yet to be captured by either political party. He believed the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act would sway these women into the Republican party.[39] In 1919, while Wilson was in office, women did not have the right to vote. Therefore, Wilson did not need to appeal to the needs of women.

A second important factor was that the bill was changed in such a way as to appease many of its congressional opponents. For example, the emphasis of the federal government's role shifted

from protection to promotion of maternal and infant health. The state government still retained control of the program. The state legislature implemented the plan through its state health agency, child-welfare, or child-hygiene division instead of establishing a state board as originally proposed in the Rankin-Robinson bill. Finally, the act prevented any person from the Children's Bureau from entering any home or taking charge of any child over the objections of the parents or guardians.[40] These basic modifications made it possible for Congress to enact a law which provided for instruction in the hygiene of maternity and infancy through public health nurses, consultation centers, child-care conferences, and literature distribution.

But the most important factor in securing the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act was the newly-acquired political power of women. Unlike 1919, American women had the right to vote in 1921. Congressional elections were only one year away. Congressmen did not know how the newly-enfranchised women would vote. "For years suffragists had promised to clean house when they got the vote, and they claimed that women would be issue oriented rather than party oriented."[41] At the same time the WJCC emerged as a powerful political lobby for women. This organization combined the efforts of leading women's organizations into one united force. In addition to these political efforts, the leading women's magazines - Good Housekeeping, Pictorial Review, McCalls, and Women's Companion - published articles favorable to the Sheppard-Towner bill and urged their readers to write their congressmen demanding its passage. As a result of the mass media, and the WJCC, Congress was pressured into adopting the measure through the thousands of telegrams, letters, and petitions sent by American women. Thus, through a massive network of organization, skilled leaders, and the power to vote, women were able to persuade Congress into approving special legislation for their needs.

The twentieth century saw the emergence of a new, politically-activated and motivated woman who demanded federal legislation for maternal and infant hygiene care. In 1921, women newly armed with political voting power secured the passage of the Sheppard-Towner Act. Its passage was a

turning point in American history in two ways. First, the act represented the beginning of federal support in an American health program. Second, and more importantly, the law represented the emergence of women as a dynamic voting group capable of securing reforms for themselves and their children.

NOTES

[1]Clarke Chamber, Seedtime of Reform: American Social Services and Action 1918-1933 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 49.

[2]Statement of Miss Caroline Fleming, Children's Bureau to House Committee on Labor, Hygiene and Maternity Hearings, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, on H.R. 12634, 1919, p. 7.

[3]J. Stanley Lemons, The Woman Citizen (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 154.

[4]Fleming, Hygiene and Maternity Hearings, p.8.

[5]Hannah Josephson, Jeannette Rankin: First Lady in Congress (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974), p. 53.

[6]Statement of Miss Jeannette Rankin to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Public Protection of Maternity and Infancy, Hearings, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, on H.R. 10925, 1920, p. 87.

[7]Fleming, Hygiene and Maternity Hearings, pp. 7-8.

[8]H.R. 12634, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1918, Section 8.

[9]H.R. 12634, 65th Congress, 2nd Session, 1918.

[10]Rankin Papers, Series IV, Newsclippings, January-August 1919.

[11]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 145.

[12]Ibid., p. 155.

[13]Richard Bolt, "A National Program for Maternity Aid," American Labor Legislation Review 11 (March, 1921):63.

[14]Statement of Jeanette Rankin in the transcript of oral interview by John Board, Rankin Papers, Series III, folder 204, 34. The reader should note that the war was over by the time the committee began the hearings on the bill. Miss Rankin had introduced the bill (June 1918) before the end of the war, but Congress did not begin action until after the war was over.

[15]Joseph Chepartis, "Federal Social Welfare Progressivism in 1920's," Social Services Review 46 (1971):216.

[16]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 155.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Chepartis, "Federal Social Welfare Progressivism in 1920's," p. 216.
[19]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 155.
[20]Ibid.
[21]Ibid. During this session of Congress the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held the hearings on the maternity and infancy bill instead of the Committee on Labor. The Republicans had the majority in the House after the 1919 elections. The Speaker of the House, Frederick Gillette, was a Republican from Massachusetts. His state was against the Sheppard-Towner bill. Perhaps Gillette placed the bill in this committee hoping the bill would be defeated, by opposition from Samuel Winslow (R-Massachusetts), who served as a member and later chairman of the committee.
[22]United States Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, 1920, pt. 60:418.
[23]Rankin, Public Protection of Maternity and Infancy Hearings, p. 89. During this session of Congress the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held the hearings on the maternity and infancy bill instead of Committee on Labor.
[24]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 156.
[25]Ibid.
[26]Ibid.
[27]United States Congress, House, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 1st Session, 1921, pt. 61:7990.
[28]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 156.
[29]Ibid., p. 157.
[30]Ibid., p. 161.
[31]Josephine Goldmark, Impatient Crusader (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), p. 108.
[32]"Sheppard-Towner Bill," Journal of the American Medical Association 76 (May 28, 1921): 1504.
[33]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 162.
[34]Ibid., p. 157.
[35]Ibid.
[36]J. Stanley Lemons, "The Sheppard-Towner Act: Progressivism in the 1920's," Journal of American History 55 (1969):778.
[37]Same as Note 27.
[38]It should be noted that 113 Congressmen did not vote for or against the bill. There are

several explanations possible for the large number of non-voting Congressmen. One strong possibility would be that many of these Congressmen opposed the bill but feared they would not be re-elected if they voted against the bill. They may simply have refused to vote so they would not anger the women voters in their district.

[39]Robert Murray, The Harding Era (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 408.

[40]United States, Statutes at Large, Vol. 42 (1921), Chapter 135, pp. 224-225.

[41]Lemons, The Woman Citizen, p. 157.

THE ITALIAN ROOTS OF RACIALISM

RISA SODI

When the Fascist regime in Italy embarked on an official policy of racialism in the mid-1930's, it turned to a stable of propagandists, journalists, and politicians to publicize and, in some cases, lend purported scientific credence to its claims. A spate of books and articles appeared on the national scene expressing in more or less virulent terms the emerging official contention that Jews in general and the Jews in Italy in particular were responsible for Italy's ill fortunes. The annals of history were combed for references to Jewish treachery or, at the very least, undesirability. Recent political considerations were recast in an explicitly anti-Jewish light. And even religion was called into play to bolster Fascist claims on the one hand, while attacking the moral underpinnings of Judaism on the other.

Anti-Semitic remarks drifted in and out of Mussolini's speeches throughout the 1920's and 1930's. They were often counteracted by lavishly philo-Semitic declarations or patently pro-Jewish actions. The mid-1930's, however, brought about a definitive end to such vacillations. As political exigencies dictated the need for clear-cut discriminatory action against the Italian Jews, racialism, a pseudo-scientific doctrine, was imported from the north and emended to fit Fascist ideological prerequisites. Mussolini enlisted the help of a handful of writers to enunciate his emerging racial policy. Giovanni Preziosi, Giulio Cogni, Giacomo Acerbo, Roberto FArinacci Julius Evola and Paolo Orano all responded to the Duce's summons, though they did not interpret their assignments in the same way.

Risa Sodi received her B.A. in History and Italian from Smith College, and is currently a Master's candidate in French and Italian at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst).

An examination of their writings reveals certain proclivities and other marked differences of analysis among Fascism's racist writers. After a brief introduction to the concepts of race and racialism and a glance at Jewish history in Italy from the Risorgimento to the March on Rome, the work of these six writers will be analyzed in depth with an eye toward their political context, their degree of official backing and, especially, the origns of their racist interpretations.

I. Racism, Racialism and Anti-Semitism

Although the terms "racism" and "racialism" are often used interchangeably, it is useful, in the context of a survey of Italian racialist thought, to explore the differences and similarities between the two terms. Racism, in common usage, is the more common of the two. It describes a popular attitude, a gut feeling, that there is a natural, incontrovertible hierarchy of racial and ethnic groups on this earth, that the gaps separating superior and inferior are self-evident and manifest, and that race is the ultimate determinant of social, moral or political behavior. Racism is closely associated with such everyday concepts as bias, prejudice, and discrimination. Racism, as defined above, is associated with "low culture."

Racialism comprises these attitudes and is thus akin to its "poor cousin," racism. Yet it injects racism with a pseudo-scientific underpinning and ideological structure. The crucial difference between the two concepts is that racialism has pretensions to being a systematic body of thought. It presents itself in the positivistic light of nineteenth-century philosophizing as an objective, empirical theory, sustained both through scientific (biological and anthropological) evidence and by historical proof. In the tradition of other contemporary systematic characterizations of the world, such as Hegelianism, Darwinism, and Freudianism, it lays claim to an all-encompassing blue-print for ordering modern (in this case, Fascist) society.

Fascist racialism was a world-view which very succinctly structured the disparate social and moral tensions impinging on the regime. It was applied as a cicatrizing solution to the incipient rifts in Italian internal affairs, caused by imperialist expansion, socialist

dissension, and an economic slump. As a totalitarian system built upon a rigid hierarchy, this act of structuring was intrinsic as essential to Fascism's continued existence. Racialism was an expedient complement of the totalitarian, imperialistic components of Fascist dogma, and as such, added a "spiritual" or "philosophical" groundwork to Fascism's other political and economic doctrines. Far from an aberration, Fascist racialism was a logical outgrowth of intrinsic Fascist aims; its passage in 1938 from theory to practice was not a leap of faith but the natural next step along a well-laid path.

The last term in this triumvirate, anti-Semitism, occupies the middle ground between racism and racialism. It is a manifestation of the former as applied to Jews, and as such is grounded in the popular "low-culture" attitude present in a latent form in pre-Fascist Italy. It was also bolstered and justified by the scientistic tenets of Fascist racialism. Through racialist thought, longstanding, popularly-held anti-Semitic beliefs acquired legitimacy and captured a sophisticated national audience. As a systematizing, high-toned ideology, racialism was able to step confidently into the Italian political arena.

When Mussolini's Manifesto of Italian Racism came out in 1938 (soon followed by sweeping juridical measures that same year), Western observers were quick to label it a slavish imitation of Hitler's racial views. The Allies, in fact, had consistently attributed the stimulus for Italian anti-Jewish measures to German pressure of influence (while this view had been voiced before Hitler and Mussolini joined forces in 1936, it gained widespread diffusion after the signature of the Pact of Steel). Recent scholarship, however, has effectively disproven this view. Such writers as Michaelis, Bernardini, and De Felice have shown that Italian racialism has its own peculiar roots, roots that this paper will attempt to trace. In fact, a survey of some of the most influential Italian racialist writings from the 1920's, 1930's, and 1940's will reveal a deliberate effort on the part of virtually all racialist writers to distinguish Italian and German thought. The basis for such a distinction, as asserted by the "ideologues" themselves, will be examined in

greater detail below. However, at present it should be emphasized that the major Italian "race writers" - Preziosi, Acerbo, Farinacci, Evola, and Orano - took pains to stress the "spiritual," "ideological," or "philosophical" imperatives for an Italian racialist policy, as contrasted with the "biological" claims of their German counterparts (The outstanding exception here is Giulio Cogni, who subscribed so thoroughly to the German line as to transpose entire passages of Chamberlain's Die Grundlage des XIX Jahrhunderts to his book Il Razzismo). Many of these writers augmented their arguments with historical justifications for racial discrimination. Thus, a brief historical and demographic background of the Jews of Italy from the Risorgimento to the March on Rome is helpful to evaluate the context of such accusations.

Historical Background of the Jews of Italy

The walls of the Jewish ghettos were first erected in the early 1600's and were not completely razed until 1870. For nearly three hundred years, they were nearly impermeable barriers between Jewish and Christian society in Italy. With few exceptions, every Italian city with a Jewish population enclosed that population within locked ghetto gates. Emancipation for most Jews came only on the heels of the Risorgimento and thus found a great many Jews keen on embracing its liberal, anticlerical, free-thinking ideals.

Jews immediately entered the mainstream of Italian life, joining the ranks of university professors, civil servants, deputies and senators indisproportionate numbers (a fact that later racial publicists interpreted as proof of a longstanding, occult Jewish conspiracy to undermine the State). Jews also became prominent in the fields of economics, civil law, jurisprudence, medicine, music, and the natural sciences. Unparalleled among other European Jewish communities, a significant number of Italian Jews chose military careers: there were 86 army officers. in 1864, double that number by 1900.[1]World War I saw active participation by fifteen Jewish generals, fifteen colonels and three admirals, and over 1000 Jews were decorated for heroism. From the Risorgimento through World WarI, Jews earned a considerable reputation as

patriots. Even Mussolini was quick to ackjnowledge their "good citizenship" and "bravery" during World War I.[2]

Demographic changes also occured in the Jewish community in the ninety years from 1840-1930. While 1/5 of the Italian Jews (or 7,700 out of 37,000) resided in small Northern agricultural communities in 1840, by 1930 this number had shrunk to one in forty. Cities such as Rome, Milan, Florence and Trieste registered sharp increases in Jewish population, while Venice remained stable; and communities sprang up out of nothing in Bologna and Naples (it should be remembered that the Jewish population of Southern Italy remained virtually nil after the forced expulsions of 1492). Literacy rates were 94.2% for Jews in 1861, versus 35.5% for the general populace. In 1927, 27% of Italians did not know how to read or write while 0% of Jews were illiterate.[3]

Jews had also become prominent in government by the begionning of the new century. At one time or another, they occupied the positions of Minister of the Treasury, Agriculture, and War. Salvatore Barzilai was appointed "Ministro delle terre liberate" (from Austria) in 1915, and Luigi Luzzatto and Sidney Sonnino each served as Prime Minister. Ernesto Nathan, a leading exponent of Freemasonry, served as mayor of Rome from 1907-1913, and two Jews, General Ottolenghi and Vittorio Polacco, were nominated tutors to the heir by Vittorio Emanuele III. In the early 1920's, nine Jews sat as Deputies and 26 as Senators in the Italian Parliament. In addition, two leaders of the Socialist Party, Treves and Modigliani, were Jews.

Thus, by the advent of the Fascist regime, Jews had moved from a position of cultural, political, and even physical isolation to one of extensive participation. They lived at the crossroads of Italian life, no longer by the wayside, and exerted a not inconsiderable influenbce on many aspects of Italian society. They were, in general, urban, literate, newly assimilated, and eager to claim a place in the new society around them. Though recent tradition saw them aligned in the liberal, socialist and free-thinking camps, there was also a strong conservative current running through the Jewish community. Many were among Fascism's earliest supporters; some were even listed among its

"martyrs," and 238 Jews participated in the March on Rome.[4]

Neither was the Jewish community monolithic when it came to religious practices. At least three different rites existed in Italy (Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Italian) and many Jews had abandoned religious practice altogether for a secular life. Thus it is not surprising that Jewish leaders themselves felt constrained in the first decades of the new century to issue calls for "Jewish unity in the midst of multiplicity."[5] Ironically, this very heterogeneity of political and social loyalties was later exploited and "homogenized" by racialist writers via their contention that all Jews, no matter what their professed beliefs, instinctively and inexorably succumb to an innate, supranational blood allegiance.

Thus, at the same time that the Jews were accused of being the guiding lights behind Socialism, Bolshevism, capitalism, and Freemasonry - movements at either pole of the political spectrum - they were also accused of sharing an indissoluble common bond which, regardless of national loyalties, propelled them to work together behind the scenes for the creation of world Jewish dominion. Proof of this was found by such writers as Preziosi and Julius Evola in The Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion. This clamorous Czarist forgery, which purported to be the secret minutes of an international strategy session devoted to planning a worldwide Jewish plutocracy for the subjugation of all other peoples was revived and diffused by Preziosi in 1927. Though many booksellers initially refused to handle it, a second edition with introductions by both Preziosi and Evola received wide circulation in 1938, the year of the racial laws.

Alleged Jewish plutocratic aims, since supranational, were considered irreconcilable with the goals of the quintessentially nationalistic Fascist state. In addition to an international plutocracy, racialist writers also linked Jews to two other phantomatic global "organizations:" the "Jewish International" and "Jewish high finance." The Jewish International was allegedly an "umbrella group" uniting Jewish Bolsheviks worldwide. Even more than Jewish plutocracy, it was perceived as the main threat to Italian Fascism. Preziosi repeatedly

admonished his readership, through books and articles, about the parallels between Jewish incendiary Bolshevism abroad and Jewish socialism at home. That two of the three founding leaders of the Italian Socialist Party were Jewish (Treves and Modigliani) only lent the semblance of credence to his monitions. Moreover, Preziosi was relentless in listing the flesh-and-blood incarnations of this particular threat, from Marx in Germany to Trotsky and Kerensky in Russia, Enver Pasha in Albania to Bela Kun in Hungary, from Blum in France to Treves and Modigliani in Italy (Preziosi was also fond of "revealing" the "real" names of such leaders, for example Braunstein for Trotsky and Mordechai for Marx). Once again the Protocols were called into question, this time to prove that the Soviet Revolution was the result of Jewish agitation. Judaism was thus linked to Bolshevism, Fascism's foremost foe. Orano reinforced Preziosi's point. In his opinion, "Socialism is, to be unambiguous about it, a substantially Jewish doctrine."[6] To equate Jewry with socialism was to equate Jews with the Fascist anathema.

Jewish high finance was another supranational power wielded by Jews for their own occult purposes, in the racialist view. It, too, conspired against Fascism as seen by the Banca Commerciale controversy during World War I. The Banca Commerciale was founded in 1894, at Crispi's behest, with mainly German and some Austrian, Swiss, and Italian capital. By the outbreak of World War I, when Italy and Germany found themselves on opposite sides of the trenches, Preziosi railed against the number of bank executors who were foreign (German) - "and among them, ... how many Jews!" (*e fre questi ... quanti ebrei*.[7]) This alleged German-Jewish stranglehold on the Italian economy was threatening in and of itself, but also, in the racialist view, confirmed a Jewish propensity for international intrigue and self-serving racial (not national) allegiance. Moreover, the Jews in this instance were seen as willing instruments of Germany, craftily complying with German interests in order to covertly advance their own plutocratic ambitions. Preziosi remarked at the time that, in an Italy "pervaded with Judaism," the Jew was the "invisible dominator."[8] On another front, he also accused the German-Jewish banker Jacob Schiff of financing Trotsky - though

a bolshevic - on the sole basis of their "blood loyalties."[9] Mussolini had enunciated the same thought nearly two decades earlier, concluding that "Race does not betray race ... Bolshevism is being defended by international plutocracy. That is the real truth."[10] Similarly, Jewish banking interests in England were said to have instigated the British call for international sanctions against Italy after the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

In short, the Italian racialists argued that whatever the avenue, whether to advance their plutocratic aims, whether in the name of socialism or the Jewish International, or whether for their own economic self-interest, the Jews of the world instinctively banded together to help each other. Not only, but that they also were willing instruments of Italy's enemies, as long as they were assured of reaping a benefit. Jews espoused what Preziosi called "disorganizing ideas," running the gamut from liberalism to radicalism, radicalism to socialism, socialism to communism, and communism to anarchy.[11] As defiantly irreducible outsiders and enemies of the state, the Jews, racialists argued, merited separate treatment. Indeed, they brought such treatment on themselves, Farinacci and Orano declared. Two events of the thirties further exacerbated this view and eventually set the scene for the harsh measures adopted at the end of the decade. The first event was the invasion of Abyssinia, and the second was increasing Zionist pressure for a Jewish homeland.

The regime initially betrayed an ambivalent attitude toward Zionism, occasionally authorizing then denouncing the selfsame Zionist activities. After the establishment of the British mandatory regime in Palestine, the question of a "division of allegiance" arose. Italian Zionists were accused of acting as tools of the British to alter the Mediterranean status quo. The longstanding Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Near East came to the fore, along with allegations of international Jewish links to England-based Freemasonry, liberalism, and colonialism. Zionism was soon categorized as a nationalist movement - and as such, unacceptable to the regime - and Jewish Zionists were consequently branded as disloyal Fascists. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 and the ensuing League of Nations' sanctions, supported by England in

particular, worsened the situation for Italian Jews, stigmatizing them as "sanctionist" as well as separatist. The New African empire also raised serious racial questions for Italy, as the regime struggled to find an ideological justification for its colonial practice.

In such a context, the Fascist state and Mussolini in particular turned to a cadre of more-or-less officially recognized racial propagandists. Some, such as Preziosi, had been active since the first World War; others, such as Farinacci and Orano, rose to prominence within party ranks on the wings of various anti-Semitic campaigns. Preziosi, Cogni, Acerbo, Farinacci, Evola, and Orano laid the groundwork for an Italian racial policy based on "spiritual" values, as distinguished from the biological underpinnings of German "Aryan" thought. They concentrated on a group of "evils" which Preziosi partially, though succinctly, summed up in the title of his 1941 publication Giudaismo, bolscevismo, plutocrazia, massoneria (to which one could add capitalism, democracy, Zionism, and Jewish "high finance" as well). But they also had other, more pressing concerns as well, i.e., the theoretics of racialism, the importance of Catholic dogma to racialist thought, and the obsession with proving that Fascist racialism preceded (and, therefore, did not imitate) parallel German doctrines. Italy's position vis-a-vis its future ally underwent more than one about-face during the mid- to late-1930's. Just as the tenets of Italian racial policy were being laboriously and often quixotically ironed out, it became a political imperative to demonstrate ideological independence from Germany. Similarly, one of Fascism's sacred cows was that it derived its moral and political strength from centuries of Latin precepts and history, certainly not from its contemporary Northern neighbor. Lastly, public opinion toward Germany in the 1930's was particularly uncharitable - all reasons why the regime attempted to present the impression that it steered its own course, in matters racial and otherwise. A look at these three fundamental themes underlying the body of racialist writing will enable us to identify the substantial differences of approach, emphasis, style, and efficaciousness which characterized the six writers mentioned above, as well as to put their efforts into political context.

The supreme dogma of Italian racialism was a belief in Fascism's precedence over National Socialism in propounding a racial world-view. To a man, the six writers examined here reiterated this first and most holy of their commandments, though none as vehemently as Giovanni Preziosi. In article after article, he hammered home his conviction that Fascism did not imitate Nazi Germany but, if anything, was imitated by it. Ironically, Preziosi was also considered by some at the time to be Germany's "homme de confiance" in Italy. How did he maintain this position? As we will see, he did some careful fence-straddling and by and large avoided theory in favor of politically-oriented bombast.

Preziosi, the "dean of Italian Jew-baiters," jumped on the anti-Semitic bandwagon long before his younger colleagues - and years before the founding of the Fascist party, for that matter.[12] In 1915, he published the polemical pamphlet La banca commericiale e la penetrazione tedesca in Francia e Inghilterra, in which he lambasted those two countries for their lack of diligence and predicted dire consequences for their shortsighted capitulation to "German" (i.e., German-Jewish) economic interests. In later articles which appeared in Il Poopolo d'Italia during the 1920's, Preziosi's verbiage became more inflamed and more specific, explicitly accusing Jewish international finance, spearheaded by German-Jewish bankers, of infiltrating and trying to pervert the Italian state. He also established himself as enough of an authority in his field to act as mentor and inspiration to a younger generation of propagandists, Farinacci foremost among them. Furthermore, Preziosi played the critical role in reviving and diffusing that clamorous Tsarist forgery, the Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion.

Although Preziosi was an early member of the Fascist Party (he joined in 1920), his early admonitions against the Jews met with a negligible official response at the time and were largely ignored by the Italian public at large: at that stage of his career, Preziosi was something of an outsider, a "voice crying in the wilderness."[13] Nonetheless, he did not desist. as the tide of Italian racial politics shifted, Preziosi gradually found himself at the vortex of a new official policy. Through preseverence and devotion to cause, he eventually garnered and

maintained a foothold within the Fascist hierarchy.

Preziosi insisted over and over that Fascism, not Nazism, was the first to generate a racialist world view. Since Mussolini and the Fascist regime vacillated between the two poles of philo- and anti-Semitism for many years, no small amount of revision was required to sustain this last premise. Nonetheless, Preziosi was creative in his approach. He ascribed Fascism's initial racial consciousness to the Libyan War (1911-1912). The fear of a bastardized European race, he said, led to a Fascist stand of antimiscegenation, whose aim was "to avoid the catastrophic scourge of mestization (meticciato).[14] While this potential racial catastrophe had a general, rather than a Jewish referent, one cannot help but question Preziosi's assertion: after all, Mussolini was still a militant left-wing socialist at the time of the Libyan War, making it antihistorical to posit a Fascist racial consciousness any time before November 1914, at the very least.

This is far from Preziosi's only argument, however. In his 1940 article "Gli ebrei italiani furono avvertiti," Preziosi cites anti-Jewish speeches made by Mussolini before the 1922 March on Rome. He also omits, for obvious reasons, profusely philo-Semitic statements made by the Duce during the same period. It is equally significant that, while arguing that "Fascism followed it own path" [il Fascismo ha battuto la sua via] and extolling the Duce's "precursory philosophy" [pensiero precorritore del duce], Preziosi conveniently sidesteps Mussolini's post-1922 statements.[15] Perhaps he was aware, as Meir Michaelis has demonstrated in his book Mussolini and the Jews, that Mussolini's attitude toward the Italian Jews was changeable, contradictory, and influenced more by political strategy than by ideological conviction (Preziosi had certainly reached such a conclusion by October 1943, when he sent a venomous letter to the German High Command accusing Mussolini of surrounding himself with "Jew-lovers."[16]) Nonetheless, Preziosi was adamant in asserting Fascism's precedence over National Socialism, going so far as to dedicate his 1940 book to "Fascists everywhere - hierarchs and followers - so that they may have at their fingertips the uncontrovertible proof that it is 'simply absurd' and foolish to speak of

'imitation' when examining Fascism's attitude toward the problem of race in general and the Jewish problem in particular."[17]

Giacomo Acerbo, a politician and professor of economics and agricultural policy, member of the Gran Consiglio (and one of the majority who voted against Mussolini on July 25, 1943), as well as an occasional racial theorist, also felt a similar need to assert Fascism's precedence over National Socialism in things racial. His most important work, I fondamenti della dottrina fascista della razza, came out in mid-1940 - the same year as Preziosi's aforementioned anthology, and just as Italy was poised to join its Axis partner in declaring war on the Allies.

The Introduction to I fondamenti della dottrina fascista della razza (written by Alessandro Pavolini) immediately set the tone of the book. In it, Pavolini implicity differentiates between Italian and German racialism and concludes that Italy is destined for superiority: "By now, Italian racialism possesses its own distinct physiognomy in the scholarly world, a profound force of penetration in the popular consent, and full awareness of the incomparable human and historical values which underlie the Italian race and its destiny of supremacy."

Acerbo begins his presentation by arguing that to pinpoint an Italian ethnic identity naturally implies the defense of the same. Such a defense must be conducted on the political, economic, social, oral, and juridical levels. Acerbo then repeats a claim made earlier by Preziosi, namely that Mussolini has been interested in the concept of "stirpe" (literally, stock or race) since the early "battaglie di piazza" prior to the March on Rome.[18] While both Preziosi and Acerbo found it necessary to defend the consistency of thought of the Fascist regime, Acerbo takes this concept one step further by affirming that this concern with race is not a new exigency of "imperial Italy," but instead is immanent in the values underlying the progress of the Fascist revolution. Thus, while contradicting the letter of Preziosian revisionism (Preziosi, as we saw above, argued that the Libyan conquest had first engendered a fascist racial consciousness), Acerbo abides by the spirit of the "consistency" dogma.

Of the other racialist writers, only Roberto Farinacci and Julius (Giulio) Evola concern

themselves with questions of precedence (Orano takes a predominantly religious tack while Cogni focuses on race theory), and their references to Fascism's precociousness are essentially "en passant." Roberto Farinacci, called the "ras" of Cremona, "Mussolini's gadfly," the founder and editor of Il regime fascista, and a Fascist hierarch, published a tauntingly polemical pamphlet in August 1938, which contains a reference to this precedence debate. Called La chiesa e gli ebrei, it was issued in response to Pope Pius XI's March 1938 encyclical Mit brennender Sorge. Farinacci's treatise, therefore, is an attempt to remind the Church of its own anti-Semitic heritage and to shame it into softening its position.

Farinacci prefaces his scathingly sarcastic anti-Church attack with two obligatory statements: one attempting to distance Italian anti-Semitism from its German relative, and the other referring to Mussolini's landmark anti-Semitic speech of July 4, 1919 (Preziosi also quotes the same speech on at least two occasions).

Julius Evola, head of the School of Fascist Mysticism in Milan grounded most of his works in a spiritual, ethereal discussion of the larger implications of such Fascist by-words as duty, loyalty, patriotism, and race. An associate of Preziosi, his assertions do much to contradict Preziosi's dogma of Fascist precedence. In fact, in Sintesi della dottrina della razza, Evola blithely dates the official incorporation of racialism into Fascism to 1939 - some 28 years later than Preziosi's bench-mark date of 1911. Undeterred, Evola also documents his assertion, citing Numbers 5, 6, 7, 11, 15 and 18 of the official regime publication La difesa della razza. Whether Evola's date is motivated by self-promotion or by the obligations of doctrinal puritanism is open to debate, given that he also claims that his own 1936 book Il mito del sangue was the first Italian-language expose of racial theories, from Fichte to Herde, and, moreover, was completely "objective and impersonal."[19] Evola's dating is additionally damaging to the official Fascist view in that it implies that Italian racialist theory was not developed until after previous German theories had penetrated into Italy. Whatever his motives, Evola dealt an inconvenient blow to a precedence theory already

weakened by Mussolini's own mercurial positionings and Preziosi's overly-enthusiastic datings.

Each of the writers who touched on the issue of precedence asserted Fascism's supremacy over Nazi Germany, some more fiercely than others (Preziosi, for example), some even with deleterious implications (Evola). Nenetheless, they were substantially in agreement that Fascist racialist theories predated any official German facsimiles and that Italy, not Germany, spoke with the original voice in the racialist debate. This univocal approach was not repeated in the matter of the theoretical grounding of racialism. Faced with the unhappy prospect of adhering to the German "biological," "materialistic," or "blood and soil" reasoning - and thus, in practice, subtracting themselves from the Aryan superrace - most, though not all, of the Italian racialist writers sought out a middle ground, a series of caveats, or a new basis altogether for Fascist racialist theoretics. Not all, however, demonstrated such theoretical fealty. Some backed the German view, even to the point of no return and found themselves ostracized from Fascist officialdom because of it.

When Giulio Cogni published Il razzismo in 1936, he was mainly known as a writer and composed resident in Germany. He quickly established himself as a pro-German exponent of the same Nordic heresy that other Italians (Preziosi, for example) were careful to avoid. His two books, Il razzismo (1936) and I valori della stirpe (1937) are devoted almost exclusively to racial theory, with hardly a mention of Bolshevism, Zionism, capitalism, Masonry, or plutocracy, the pet evils of other, more politically oriented writers like Preziosi, Farinacci, or Telesio Interlandi. Characterized as a "rehash, in Italian form of Hitler's Nordic mythology," Il razzismo was the first indication that German racialism might make inroads in Italy.[20] It was initially received favorably by the Italian press and came out in 1937 - the same year that his second tract was published - Cogni had come under heavy fire from the official press and the Duce had withdrawn his support. A brief analysis of Cogni's main arguments will underscore why they were judged incompatible with current Fascist ideology.

Cogni begins Il razzismo by dividing the world into two main groups, Nordics and Latins.

Nordics, he writes, are self-sufficient. They are the descendants of Siegfried and Valkyrie and they embody a romantic and idyllic past. In florid prose, he goes on to extol "the mystical bonds of blood which have arisen from the primordial depths of human instinct."[21] Since "blood" and "instinct" were two of the most common catchwords of German biologically-based racial theory, Cogni is quick to point out at this junction that he conceives of "blood" as a spriritual term. By so doing, he was following the lead of other Italian racialist writers who often used the words "sangue," "stirpe," "nazione," and "popolo" (blood, race, nation, and people) interchangeable in order to indicate a cultural, rather than biological, unity. Moreover, he thus tempers what initially rings as an endorsement of the German blood-and-soil dogma. Cogni, in fact, asserts that he rejects "medical-anthropological" racialism. He instead espouses a philosophical racialism (or Weltanschauung, as he defines it), which, though availing itself of the data that "experimental racial science" has to offer, can also stand on its own (fa da se).[22] His words were echoed in 1939 by another racialist writer, Giuseppe Maggiore, who said: "Biology too, unless practiced by the Jews, is on our side."[23] Cogni considers "nature and spirit two aspects of a deeper reality" and calls himself the direct heir of German idealism.[24] He takes issue with one of the fathers of German racial thought, H.S. Chamberlain, for being too deterministic and overly positivistic. Thus, biological racialism is ultimately unacceptable for him since it neglects the spiritual aspects of race in favor of cold empirical data.

Having stated his concept of blood and race, Cogni then turns his attention to three races in particular: the Nordic, the Latin, and the Semitic. The former two share "the Aryan blood," "a vague, ideal concept," Cogni admits, "which roughly corresponds to the most common concept of the Indo-European."[25] Such a definition is patently devised in order to leave the Italians ample room under the Aryan rood. He later expounds on this definition in equally vague terms, concluding that "Aryan equals genius, profound mystery of the soul, which radiates out from man."[26]

In a chapter entitled "The Semitic Peoples," Cogni asserts the "historic inferiority of the

Semitic civilizations." Unlike Preziosi or Orano, he does not undertake an actual historical survey. Instead, he insists that practical measures are taken against Jews for reasons of self-defense alone. In the north, Nordics and Jews are caught in a warlike stance since Jews constitute a "sort of nation against the constituted nations."[27] They demonstrate a characteristic tendency toward Communism, internationalism, hatred of Aryans, refusal to intermarry, and usurpation of Germans from positions of importance. In Italy, however, that is not the case. Cogni affirms that "they have merged with [the Latin nations] into a single body."[28] Furthermore, Italy's Sephardic Jews, as descendants of "the ancient upper classes of the classic Israelite civilization," are superior to the Northern Ashkenazi Jews and create fewer problems for the Italian state.[29] (This argument was later modified by Preziosi, who claimed that Sephardic Jews fit into Italian society by reasons of physiognomy).

Cogni continues with a critique of Jewish religion and dogma derived largely from Chamberlain (in fact, it is interesting to note that German sources alone are listed in Cogni's bibliogrpahy, and that Il razzismo is salted with quotes by Rosenberg and Hitler). The essence of his argument is that only Indo-European (i.e., Nordic and Latin) people have a sense of inferiority; Semites are mere materialists. Materialism, in its connection with both Marxism and capitalism, was an anathema to Fascist ideology; therefore, by association, Jews were "genetically" identified as enemies of the regime.

Cogni concludes Il razzismo with the sort of Hegelian idealism that underlies his whole theory. The Aryan peoples, he states, are the product of the mixing of Aryans and Etruscans and, later, Germanic tribes and Italic tribes. The resulting fusion of Christianity and Germanism, Roman and Odinic civilizations produced a Hegelian "transcendental synthesis." By applying this logic, Cogni is also able to show that Dante and the other leading lights of Italian civilization were Aryan at heart and that Fascism was but a manifestation of the Nordic spirit.

Il razzismo was immediately hailed in the German press and understandably so. After an

initial, warm reception in Italy, Cogni's arguments met with increasing protest. He attempted to dismiss any criticism as the efforts of what he termed "half-castes, the ugly, the subnormal and the small-minded, in body and in soul."[30] Nonetheless, his excessive glorification of the Germanic myth at the expense of Italian "romanita" quickly convinced Mussolini to deny Cogni further official patronage. While his rejection of biological racialism for a spiritual emphasis ran parallel to official Italian racialist thought, Cogni was not pardoned his overly enthusiastic Germanophilism.

Giacomo Acerbo, on the other hand, is critical of the Nordic world view. He sets the tone of his anti-German polemic by openly doubting whether the concept of race can be defined at all: many ethnologists, he states, openly repudiate the term race as pseudo-scientific.[31] Nonetheless, four "orders" of the concept "race" can be identified: common, historic, naturalistic, and spiritual. Acerbo quickly eliminates the first order (based on somatic, linguistic, and cultural properties), yet devotes special care to the historic and naturalistic orders. The historic order, in his analysis, defines race in terms of political upheavals, conquests, and immigration. In the German interpretation, it is similar to Cogni's concept of a transcendental synthesis. Acerbo, however, denies the role of the Goths and Lombards as conquering peoples with a historic mission and asserts that their descendants were absorbed into the lowest strata of Italian life.

Acerbo similarly liquidates the naturalistic order. While it seems to rest on the solid ground of such physical evidence as morphology, pigmentation, height, etc., he concludes that it is utterly groundless. He forcefully asserts, "We can relegate to the junkpile of romantic ethnology and literary sociology the pretext that vast human collectivities ... can preserve their primordial complexities and that, once genetically identified, each of these complexities can be assigned by destiny a particular historic duty in the advancement of the species."[32] Clearly, Acerbo was destined to meet a hostile audience beyond the Alps. Mussolini was well aware of this fact before Acerbo went public with his views, and yet he commissioned Acerbo to present his theories to

the Instituto Nazionale di Cultura Fascista of Florence in January 1940; the book I fondamenti della dottrina fascista della razza was a transcription of that January lecture and was published by the Office of Racial Studies and Propaganda of the Ministry of Popular Culture. Why would Mussolini deliberately offend his ally? Perhaps an answer to this seeming contradiction can be found in Mussolini's steadfast though short-lived policy of non-belligerancy in 1939-40 and in the fact that, in January 1940, "relations between the two Axis Powers reached their lowest ebb."[33]

Mussolini's strategy was well-served by Acerbo's conclusions about the fourth order. In speaking about the "spiritual" concept of race, Acerbo immediately mentions Fascist doctrine and then refers to Fascism throughout. He feels that the spiritual concept of race coincides with Fascism's integral, totalitarian conception of the world. Fascism, he says, requires a concept which, instead of "sequestering" racism to one camp or another, will be synthetic and put due emphasis on moral, cultural, and linguistic factors - even in the light of anthropological data. Racialism, according to Acerbo, should stress spiritual values, Italy's "ideological and moral heritage, the sum total of tradition and collective effort."[34] Acerbo continues with his polemic in no uncertain tones:

> the concept of race in the light of Fascist civilization - the legitimate heir to the most radiant Italian civilizations - can only be construed in the most radiant Italian civilizations - can only be construed in the integral sense I have mentioned. The purely physical or somatic data underlying this concept, which if taken alone would humiliate the nobility of the human race (stirpe) by confining it to the realm of zoology and would turn racial policy into a treatise on zootechnics, must necessarily be integrated with ethnic and cultural data.[35]

Thus, Acerbo delivered a firm blow to many German racialist tenets - several of which had prominent Italian exponents. He denounced biology, he deflated the Nordic myth, and he "restored" expropriated Italian culture to Italy.

His concluding words fit in with the most impassioned Fascist rhetoric: "The unifying force of the spirit is forever at the guide of the Italian Nation."[36] Mussolini declined to step into the pro- or anti-German controversy which raged around the publication of I fondamenti della dottrina fascista della razza, and Acerbo thereafter refrained from publishing racial theory. Nonetheless, Acerbo was later officially rewarded for his efforts when Mussolini appointed him Minister of Agriculture in 1943.

Julius Evola strikes a middle ground in the debate over racialism's theoretical grounding while simultaneously trying to deflect the race discussion in a novel direction. Consonant with his interest in Fascist mysticism and a later fascination with Eastern religions, Evola attempted to elevate racialist theorizing to a higher ontological plane. While doing so, he both acknowledged the contributions of German theorists and chided them for their shortcomings.

Evola's first direct address to the Jewish question came in the form of a 1936 tract, Tre aspetti del problema ebraico: nel mondo spirituale, nel mondo culturale, nel mondo economico-sociale. Spiritual questions were clearly his primary concern - evident even in the order he gave the three "aspects" - yet the first paragraph of the book opens with a deprecatory reference to Goring and the Nuremberg laws. "In Italy," he states, unlike in Germany, "the Jewish question is not a primary concer." Goring's laws, in fact, "demonstrate the extreme result of such tensions" between Germans and Jews.[37] Italian theorists are allowed a calmer, more reflective approach, he continues, since Italy has long been free of the "special circumstances" that "have provoked more direct and unthinking forms of anti-Semitism elsewhere."[38] There can be little doubt that "elsewhere" and "special circumstances," here cautiously mentioned, refer to Germany and that Evola's immediate intent is to distance his "Roman" racialism from its Nordic cousin. In spite of this seemingly hostile approach, Evola nonetheless insists on using German authors ("naturalmente") as the points of reference for his racialist discourse, justifying this choice by insisting that they are "more specialized and more characteristic, given the 'myth' they propound."[39] He even goes so far as to agree with two German writers, Gunther and

Clausz, that there is a "culture of the Levantine soul" (der vorderasiatischen Seele) "more or less" synonymous with the Semitic peoples.[40]

At this point in his career, Evola tiptoes around the concept of "race," avoiding strict definitions and concentrating on circulocutions. He calls for a positive, universal definition of "Aryan," not just a "vague racialist foundation" and to do so he evokes Max Muller and the fundamental unity of civilizations, religions, symbols, and myths of the Indo-German group civilizations.[41] Evola also mentions Wirth's idea of a "primordial, unified pre-Nordic" (or in Evola's term, Hyperborean - "northern") civilization. Backofen's theory of antagonism between "solar" or "uranian" (heavenly) civilizations and "lunar" or "telluric" (terrestrial) civilizations and societies, where the former are based on virile principles and the later on feminine-maternal "gynecocracies" receives painstaking attention in Evola's book - he even includes an appendix of photographic evidence of these two major racial groups. The Aryans are, of course, identified with the uranian civilization, while the Jews, misfits, and the physically impaired are grouped together under telluric societies.

In a certain sense, Evola endeavors to beat the Germans at their own game. He quotes German sources exclusively - including a line or two by Hitler - yet carefully chooses only those authors whose theories refute or cast shadows on the orthodox German biological line. Culture and spiritual values are Evola's catchwords, not blood and soil. Furthermore, he insists that the Jews are not a race, as "some" hold, being merely a "people (popolo) made up of a chaotic ethnic mixture: desertic race, Levantine race, Mediterranean race, oriental race."[42] And when pressed to expound on his idea of race, he returns to the theory of a "typical attitude toward the spiritual world."[43] "We must be radical," he says. We must re-evoke values that can truly be called "Aryan" and are not just based on vague, unilateral concepts suffused with a kind of biological materialism. Evola champions the "values of a solar and olympic spirituality ... of a new love ... for the hierarchy and universality of a race (stirpe) newly enabled to virilly lift itself from mere 'living' to 'more than living' ..."[44]

Five years later, in 1941, upon publication of Sintesi di dottrina della razza, Evola demonstrated that he had indeed "become radical." He launched a searing criticism of the "propagandistic" and "polemical" aspect of racialism, refering in particular to anti-Semitic attacks and warnings against mestization; he attacked those "formulations (which were) as jounalistically brilliant as they were lacking in principles" (a probable reference to Preziosi or Farinacci); and complained of a lack of spiritual and doctrinal rigor.[45] As an antidote, Evola fascistically proposed a totalitarian formulation of racial doctrine, one which would be in line with "our" (Italian) spirit and the traditional spirit (a well-aimed barb directed against German racialism and a veiled reference to his concept of Fascism as the quintessential antimodern movement par excellence). If no one else could come up with a complete, coherent formulation of race, Evola was prepared to offer his own, structured as a series of axioms: race as anti-universalism, race as anti-individualism, anti-rationalism, and anti-evolutionism. Evola conceived of race as the spirit unifying "the living nation." It was conceived of race as the spirit unifying "the living nation." It was more than just a series of juridical, territorial, and biological limits: it was civilization, culture, and history. Evola was also quick to add that the Semitic race was lacking in all these areas. Indeed, it had co-opted its civilization from the "Irani," it had derived its culture from the negative and positive facets of surrounding ethnic groups, and it had reneged on its history by embracing the decomposition inherent in Jewish-inspired modernism.

Evola agrees with the idea of a superrace. Contrary to many German theories, however, his superrace embraces the entire progeny of the great Oriental Aryan civilizations, ancient Rome and the Roman-Germanic Middle Ages, thus yielding a Nordic-Aryan race of Italo-Germanic stock. Racialism, he says, is not a separate discipline but "is in strict dependence to a general theory of the human being." In other words, a materialistic world view will yield a materialistic concept of race, a spiritual formula, a spiritual concept, etc. He sets up three "degrees" of racial doctrine, which he enunciated in four languages (Latin, Greek,

Italian, and "Indo-Aryan"), whereby "corpo," "anima," and "spirito" apply to both the nature of the races under discussion and the ways of perceiving them. Evola favors a totalitarian "spiritual" view of racial characteristics, while at the same time defining the Aryan as the only "spiritual" race. To complement this totalitarian, all-embracing view, he ties in racial theory with sexual theory, advocating that there is a basic "race of man" and "race of woman": "whoever is born a man, let him be a man, whoever is born a woman, in all respects, in spirit and in body, without intermixtures and without attenuations."[46]

Evola is a case apart in Italian racial theory. This is not merely because he interjects mystical, ontological, and sexual considerations into his racial discourse, but also because he most successfully carves out a middle ground between the opposite poles of German and Italian thoeretical demands. He rejects German-inspired biological materialism outright and insistently, yet he does so with the "assistance" of German racial writers. He favors the spiritual, as did Cogni and Acerbo, yet he does not explicitly link the spiritual realm to orthodox Fascist values. Instead, he infuses the Italian racial discourse with novel, esoteric concepts, such as solar and lunar races and the races of man and woman. His theories elicited perplexity and confusion in the Italian racialist community at the time and remained marginal in terms of popular influence. Nonetheless, Evola's adamantly antimaterialistic stance earned him steady backing in official party ranks.

More conventional, on the other hand, was Preziosi's stand vis-a-vis the biological/spiritual debate. Preziosi generally kept clear of the Italo-German fray over the theoretical aspects of racialism. However, he did betray a biologizing, German-influenced leaning, deducible through scattered references to race. The bulk of Preziosi's anti-Jewish writings center on political or historical matters. Theory is neither his forte nor concern. Thus, much of his theoretical equivocations vis-a-vis German influence on Italian theory remain at a superficial level. In a piece called "Imitazione," Preziosi differentiates between "Mosaism" (the Jewish religion) and "Hebrewism" (the Jewish race).[47]

In line with such a distinction, he argues that even converted Jews remain "crypto-Jews": while they may change their religion, they cannot change their race. Converts from as far back as the 1700's - the same crypto-Jews who now infiltrate the bands and government - respond to the call of the race to help "pure-bred" Jews. "Whoever has had even one Jewish forebear in his family, either in his maternal or paternal line, will be instinctively inclined to defend his race."[48] This instinctual bond, Preziosi reminds his readers, is part of the physical and mental substratum of the Jew.[49]

Italian racialist thought generally rejected the German biological line since it either denied Latins entry to the superior race or expropriated their heritage for Aryan use. Thus, Preziosi was forced to carefully balance his position. When comparing Mussolini to Hercules or other Roman heroes or paraphrasing the Divine Comedy to assert that "outside our leader, there is no hope for salvation," he was also conniving enough to liken the Duce to the "old Aryan sovereigns of the last century."[50] On another front, Preziosi spoke of "liberating the (Italian) Aryans of the Jews," thereby equating Italian Aryans with German Aryans.[51] Thus, while not overwhelmingly biological or pro-German in his racialism - a stand which would have compromised his official backing - Preziosi nonetheless attempted to appease his German allies.

Italian racialist writers were sensitive to criticisms that they merely aped earlier, original German racialist theories. The depths of their concern is displayed by the lengths to which they went to deny such accusations and replace them with forceful assertions of Fascism's purported precedence in the race field. In many cases, Jews were not their explicit primary concern: instead, they often speak more generally about the Semitic and Aryan, Germanic and Latin stocks. Occasionally, as with Evola, they enlarge the discourse to include man and woman as well; other times, as with Preziosi, they limit their "theorizing" to the Italian realm. Whatever their discrepancies and divergences, the six writers profiled above each make an effort, for better or for worse, to stake out their own interpretation of the Fascist precedence dogma. It is unlikely that they convinced any portion of their readership above

the Alps. However, their efforts did go along with a larger regime-inspired practice of tracing all official policies back to a common, unadulterated Fascist matrix and doubtless were assimilated by a significant number of their subalpine Italian readers.

Regardless of the writers' generalizations to the contrary, it should be stressed at this point that the Jews, not the Semites or even the North Africans, were the targets of the Italian racial propaganda campaign - a point amply demonstrated by the last argument covered here, the influence of Catholic anti-Semitism on Italian racialism. Until now, this influence has not been mentioned. However, a discussion of the two remaining racialist writers could not be entertained without a brief examination of the Church's role in racialist thought. Both Roberto Farinacci and Paolo Orano deal explicitly with Catholic sources in their polemics but, as we shall see, each as a different goal in mind and employs a different means.

Roberto Farinacci published a slew of anti-Semitic articles in his provincial paper, Cremona nuova (after 1926, Il Regime Fascista). Along with Preziosi and Interlandi, he was one of the regime's chief propagandists; in fact, Farinacci was "converted" to anti-Semitism by Preziosi. He has been described as "a lifelong intransigent - recalcitrant schoolboy, rabble-rousing journalist, anticlerical firebrand, Fascist Party Secretary after the Matteotti affair, champion of the Rome-Berlin Axis, and leader of the anti-Semitic faction in the Fascist party."[52] In 1926, he was dismissed as Party Secretary and remained out of favor for ten years until his enthusiastic backing of the Ethiopian venture gained his readmission to the Grand Council in 1936. A political opportunist and cynic, Farinacci used his newspaper to maintain his power base.

One of Farinacci's polemical articles, La chiesa e gli ebrei, was issued as a pamphlet in August 1938 in response to Pope Pius XI's March 1938 encyclical Mit brennder Sorge. Pius XI had used the encyclical to denounce all racial theories "derived from the myth of blood and race," though he neither criticized nor mentioned anti-Semitism by name.[53] As a contemporary scholar has pointed out, "he [Pius XI] simply could not sanction the transformation from

ideological anti-Semitism to racial anti-Semitism..."[54]

Farinacci quickly launches into the heart of his argument: namely that Fascism considers the Jewish problem to be strictly political and not religious, but that Catholic Fascists nonetheless owe their anti-Semitic inclinations to twenty centuries of Church doctrine. He condemns the official Church attitude expressed in Mit brennender Sorge as being in "strident opposition" to the history of Catholicism.[55] Various saints, Tertullian, canon law, Vatican councils, and encyclicals are cited to prove the historical weight of Church-inspired anti-Semitism. Farinacci lists other countries which, in addition to Italy, followed and exacerbated Church-initiated anti-Jewish measures, and compares the new racial laws of 1938 with old canon law to prove their parallels. Farinacci tauntingly poses the rhetorical question, has the Church in modern times foresaken or corrected its canon law against the Jews? Of course not, he replies with barely concealed malice: to do so would be to call into question its very doctrine of infallibility.

In addition to specific Catholic anti-Semitism, Farinacci also cites the Church's generic opposition to the illuminist, democratic philosophies of which Jews have become the "fanatic propagandist." Jesuits, Farinacci asserts, long preceded Fascist racialism with their anti-Semitic pronouncements, and he points out that, in 1890, a Jesuit author writing for Civilta cattolica equated the "rights of man" with the "rights of Jews." Furthermore, he asks, are the Jews not leading the battle against the Church from the ranks of the international Masonic societies?

In order to quell the Vatican fears about Nazi racialism implicit in Mit brennender Sorge, Farinacci asserts that both Fascism and National Socialism aim to thwart Jewish racial megalomania, which is endeavoring for nothing less than worldwide domination. He concludes that although Fascism preceded National Socialism in its anti-Semitic thrust, still both regimes can work together to warn the world. He also points out that the Jesuits adopted stricter geneological criteria for defining a Jew than the Nazis themselves (i.e., going back to the fifth instead of the fourth generation) in order to

induce the Church to be less precipitious in its criticism of Italy's Axis partner.

Farinacci's last parry is perhaps his boldest. Why, he asks, has the Church's policy changed in but a few months? Why has it suddenly shifted from anti- to philo-Semitic? He wonders: could it be true what "the Jews" confessed to Simonini and Simonini told the Jesuit Fathers, that they control 800 priests and soon hope to have a pope in their party?[56] The implication of collusion is clear. He concludes his tirade with a threat and an admonition. First, he reminds the Church that, by the power of the Lateren Pact, political questions belong to the regime alone. Second, he admonishes the Church to continue its anti-Semitic teachings and to nurture "that anti-Semitic consciousness that the Church has provided us with down through the millenia."[57] Otherwise, he implies, continued Church intransigence could push the regime to seek a compromise with the Communists, the Masons, and the democrats - their mutual enemies.

Paolo Orano, another Party insider, also used religion as part of his racialist arguments. Unlike Farinacci, however, he was neither badgering nor malicious. Orano instead reveals a deep religious sensibility which he readily bent to serve the will of Mussolini and the racialist cause.

Orano was a journalist (at both Avanti! and later Il Popolo d'Italia), a biographer of Mussolini, and an expert on Sardinia. In 1925, he published Inchiesta sulla Massoneria. In 1937, when Mussolini was pondering the advisability of promulgating racial laws directed at Jews, he had Orano write Gli ebrei in Italia, an examination of the social, political, and religious arguments against the Jews. Whereas until that point, writers like Preziosi had been addressing their polemics to abstractions identified only as the "Jewish international" or "Jewish high finance," Orano's book signaled that Italian Jewry was to be the explicit target of this new campaign.[58]

Like his colleagues, Orano begins by distancing Italian racialism from German anti-Semitism. He does it, though, in a novel way, one which reflected the religious undertones of his work. All movements before Fascism were failures, he says - from Jacobinism to Mazzinianism - since they led to a

"decatholization" of Italy. The signing of the Lateran Pact forever resolved the dissension between Church and state in Italy, thus making Fascism unique, an anomaly with no precursors (it is interesting to note that Croce also arrived at a similar conclusion, though by a different path with different aims. He was concerned to prove that Fascism was an anomaly in order to demonstrate the non-evolution of Fascism from nineteenth-century liberalism). Not only has Fascism no Italian precursors, but Orano holds that it likewise gained nothing from "German atheism based on philosophical fads" - an oblique reference to Nietzsche, held by some as an influence on National Socialism.[59] Thus, there is a significant difference between Farinacci's and Orano's approaches: both center their arguments around "Italia concordataria," but one treats religion and religious power as a sham and the other infuses them with a morally legitimizing power.

Regionalisms or divisive religious or ethnic phenomena have no place in the new Italy, according to Orano, since they merely detract from civic patriotic sentiment. A totalitarian Italy must rid itself of diversifying currents and moral antagonisms. As the title of Orano's work makes clear, the Jews of Italy represent a concrete, implied threat to the viability of the new state.

Like Preziosi and Cogni, Orano also undertakes a historical survey of Jewish history, but his differs substantially from either one. Orano take us on a tour of Jewish contemptibleness from ancient Rome to the Roman ghetto. He mentions that while many races (stirpi) make up the Italian people, the Jews since ancient Rome have defiantly chosen racial isolation. If they refuse to assimilate, then they deserve segregation. Like Preziosi before him, Orano contends that Jews have brought their fate upon themselves (thereby absolving the regime of any responsibility). However, from our position of historical hindsight, we can also judge such conclusions as "trial" statements intended to test the waters for the impending racial laws.

Religion, for Orano, became the basis and justification for alienating Jews from the Fascist (Catholic) regime. "Religion for the Italians is a complete system which frees us from critical and philosophical preoccupations ...

Italians don't discuss religion or act as inquisitors to their faith the way Jews and Protestants do."[60] While it is interesting to note the jab at Protestant Germany, it is more significant to analyze Orano's implicit conclusion. Catholicism means resolution for him, and resolution is what a totalitarian state requires of its followers. He sees Christianity, Catholicism, the Church, and "romanita" as the exclusive components of History, thereby lending stability to the regime. Judaism, by contrast, is irremediably antihistorical and uncontestably anti-Fascist.

Not content with robbing Judaism of any historical foundation, Orano then "proves" that Jesus and the prophets were not Jews, that Christianity is no derivative of Judaism, and that the Holy Land was insignificant to Christ's passion ("Christ Romanly triumphed in Rome").[61] There is nothing Jewish, he says, in the christianity that became the Church or Catholicism. Orano also takes up an argument dear to Preziosi: that the Jews have never produced anything to rival Dante, Tasso, or the other products of "italianita." Of Dante, he says "all of Dante's thought, the entire construction of the poem is Christian, Catholic, Latin, Imperial and Roman."[62] "It is undeniable that the Jews have never given Italy a genius."[63] These three arguments taken together effectively deny any social, religious, or historical content to Judaism.

In a chapter entitled "Between Two Racisms," Orano absolves the Church of ever inspiring or guiding an anti-Semitic campaign a year before Farinacci's La Chiesa e gli ebrei. Even the ghettos, he says, were the idea of the common people (il popolino).[64] The real sources of racism, according to Orano, are the Germans and the Jews: the Germans, because they try to demonstrate that there was an Aryan stratum underlying Greece and Rome; and the Jews, because they hold that Greek and Roman philosophy, poetry, religion, and morality derive from Judaism. These arguments naturally trigger "a legitimate defense of Italy's national heritage." In the light of successive events, one can only assume that such an open-ended statement was conceived of as a veiled hint about the legal measures under consideration by Mussolini at the time.

In the last portion of Gli ebrei in Italia, Orano cites many of the most common accusations against the Jews: that of plutocratic scheming, Bolshevic agitation, Masonic leanings, and subversive instincts. However, he casts his entire polemic in liturgical language within a Christian framework. Evidence of this is the hyperbolic, pseudo-religious denunciation of Jewish perfidy: the Jews, he says, are awaiting an "internationalist, Communard, anarchist or just plain Masonic, rabbinical Messiah" instead of pledging their allegiance to Italy's political Messiah, Mussolini.

Three important threads wind through the works of Fascism's main racialist propagandists. To a man, they endeavor to assert Fascism's precedence over Nazi Germany in generating an official racialist stance. More problematic (though equally universal) is their insistence on distancing Italian "spiritual" racialism from its German "biological" counterpart. Lastly, we saw that at least two writers concerned themselves in depth with Catholic dogma, trying to the best of their sometimes malevolent abilities to use it as a justification for Fascist policy or as an indictment of the Jews.

Mussolini's propagandists were a diverse lot, both in background and in orientation. Nonetheless, by focusing on and reiterating a common agenda of anti-Jewish (and occasionally, anti-German) themes, they ably served the Duce's purpose of carving out a racial policy where before there was none and easing its timely inclusion into official Fascist dogma.

NOTES

[1]Attilio Milano, Storia degli ebrei in Italia (Turin: Einaudi editore, 1963), p. 338.

[2]Meir Michaelis, Mussolini and the Jews (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 29.

[3]Milano, op.cit., p. 383.

[4]Ibid., p. 383.

[5]Ibid., p. 5.

[6]Ugo Caffaz, L'antisemitismo italiano sotto il fascismo (Florence: La Nuova Editrice Italia, 1975), p. 49.

[7]Giovanni Preziosi, Giudaismo, bolscevismo, plutocrazia, massoneria (Milan: Mondadori, 1941), p. 24.

[8]Ibid., p. 27.
[9]Giovanni Preziosi, Come il giudaismo ha preparato la guerra (Rome: Tuminelli, 1940, 2nd edition), p. 65.
[10]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 13.
[11]Preziosi, op.cit., 1941, p. 43.
[12]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 18.
[13]Ibid., p. 38.
[14]Preziosi, op.cit., 1940, p. 79.
[15]Ibid., p9.
[16]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 349.
[17]Preziosi, op.cit., 1940, p. 9.
[18]Giacomo Acerbo, I fondamenti della dottrina fascista della razza (Rome, 1940), p. 11.
[19]Julus Evola, Sintesi de dottrina della razza (Milan: Editore Ulrico Hoepli, 1941), p. 6.
[20]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 116.
[21]Giulio Cogni, Il razzismo (Milan: Fratelli Bocca Editori, 1937), p. 11.
[22]Ibid., p. 18.
[23]Caffaz, op.cit., p. 24.
[24]Cogni, op.cit., p. 18.
[25]Ibid., p. 74.
[26]Ibid., p. 115.
[27]Ibid., p. 157.
[28]Ibid., p. 158.
[29]Preziosi, op.cit., 1940, p. 36.
[30]Cogni, op.cit., Preface.
[31]Acerbo, op.cit., p. 15.
[32]Ibid., p. 20.
[33]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 283.
[34]Acerbo, op.cit., p. 25.
[35]Ibid., pp. 25-26.
[36]Ibid., p. 28.
[37]Julius Evola, Tre aspetti del problema ebraico - nel mondo spirituale, nel mondo culturale, nel mondo economico sociale (Rome: Edizioni mediteranee, 1936), p. 11.
[38]Ibid., p. 11.
[39]Ibid., p. 12.
[40]Ibid., p. 13.
[41]Ibid., p. 14.
[42]Ibid., p. 35.
[43]Ibid., p. 28.
[44]Ibid., p. 29.
[45]Evola, op.cit., 1941, p. 5.
[46]Ibid., p. 103.
[47]Ibid.
[48]Preziosi, op.cit., 1940, p. 90.
[49]Ibid., p. 89.
[50]Ibid., p. 81.

[51]Ibid., p. 82.
[52]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 418.
[53]Gene Bernardini, "The Origins and Dvelopment of Racial Anti-Semitism in Fascist Italy," Journal of Modern History, September 1977, p. 434.
[54]Ibid., p. 434.
[55]Roberto Farinacci, La chiesa e gli ebrei (Cremona, 1938), p. 8.
[56]Ibid., p. 15.
[57]Ibid., p. 15.
[58]Michaelis, op.cit., p. 112.
[59]Paolo Orano, Gli ebrei in Italia (Rome: Casa editrice Pinciana, 1938), p. 11.
[60]Ibid., p. 42.
[61]Ibid., p. 50.
[62]Ibid., p. 64.
[63]Ibid., p. 181.
[64]Ibid., p. 74.

THE DRESDEN BOMBING AS PORTRAYED IN GERMAN ACCOUNTS, EAST AND WEST

ELIZABETH C. CORWIN

On February 13, 1945, in one of the most devastating bombing attacks in history, combined British and American strategic air forces attacked Dresden in three waves, creating a firestorm of extraordinary proportions. On that night the Royal Air Force set the city on fire with two "area" raids aimed at its center, accomplishing the (vast) majority of the destruction. The Americans followed at noon on the 14th. The number of people killed is still hotly debated, with some claiming the total to be equal or greater than the combined initial losses of the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[1] As if the great loss of life were not enough, the almost complete destruction, often characterized as needless, of Europe's "Florence on the Elbe," has made the bombing of Dresden notable. Critics charge that the attack was unnecessary because the defeat of Germany was already assured and no attempt was made to hit military targets - with the possible exception of railroads and bridges, for which a fire raid was ineffective.[2]

Unlike the even more devastating March 9, 1945 bombing of Tokyo, the bombing of Dresden has not disappeared into the annals of history. It is commemorated periodically in the press of many countries, including the United States, and remains an ever evolving point of contention between the two Germanies.

German views of the bombing on both sides of the Iron Curtain have been shaped by ideological

Elizabeth C. corwin received a B.A. in History from Vassar College, was a graduate student at Columbia University, and is currently taking graduate courses in history at the University of California at Berkeley. She studies American diplomatic history and late modern Europe.

disputes for which the bombing has become a symbol. The German past is an instrument of propaganda for both sides; not only is the bombing of Dresden controversial, but the division of Germany has led to controversy over interpretation of the event as well.

The perception and interpretation of an historical event is a dynamic process. The study of the forces which shape peoples' perceptions can be as interesting and significant as the event itself. Little has been published about the bombing of Dresden in this country, and, to my knowledge, no one else here has studied German views of it over time, much less compared the two Germanies in this respect. It is important to recognize that the understanding of events is defined and redefined in the changing context of time and that perceptions of this particular event belong to a continuing ideological struggle of forty years' duration, of which the bombing of Dresden is only a small, although revealing, part.

I have attempted to sample German periodical sources at different post-war periods and discuss them in the context of German historical accounts as well as in the broader Allied perspective. It was not a thorough survey of the literature, as my search was delimited by the collections available in the University of California library system and those which could be borrowed from other United States libraries. There were numerous German-language articles not available to me, although most of the books written about the bombing of Dresden were. In addition, when I travelled to Dresden in 1984, I searched out East German sources at the Sachischelandesbibliothek and managed to interview Professor Max Seydewitz and his wife, Ruth, as well as an archivist, who preferred to remain anonymous, at the Dresden Fotothek (an historical collection of photographs of Dresden), and several ordinary Dresden citizens. I also made a brief visit to the American Library in West Berlin.

The Allied policy of "what was ... described as 'terror bombing,'"[3] was the result of a British directive issued February 14, 1942, which "laid down the aim of the offensive would be focused on the <u>morale</u> of the enemy civil population and, in particular, of the industrial workers."[4] This policy, concealed from the public by the British until exposed by C.P. Snow

in March 1961, in a little book entitled Science and Government, was admitted the following September in the official history by Charles Webster and Dr. Noble Frankland: admitting "There is no doubt ... that Sir Charles Portal's instructions of 15th February 1942 to the effect that Bomber Command was to aim at built-up areas and not at factories were in accord with Government policy..."[5]

By February 1945, Germany was on the verge of defeat. The American and British troops had not yet reached her border, but the Red Army was already advancing through eastern Germany and, by the 13th stood only about 50 miles outside of Berlin, 70 miles from Dresden.[6] Dresden would fall into the zone of Soviet occupation.

The Yalta Conference, from which Churchill ordered the bombing of Dresden, began on February 4th. One major order of business at the conference was the determination of the occupation zones in Germany. Churchill had originally intended that the Dresden raid, code-named "Operation Thunderclap," coincide with this conference, but it had to be postponed because of inclement weather.[7]

At this late date in the war, Dresden was unique among large German cities in having been spared a major bombing attack.[8] Many Germans believed it would not be attacked and had sent their children to Dresden for safety.[9] The Germans had managed to inflict only relatively minor damage on England by air, the attack on Coventry having killed about 500 people and the heaviest attack on London about 1400,[10] while German cities had suffered severe damage and high death tolls from allied bombing. In the summer of 1943, in the midst of four days of repeated air raids on Hamburg, a new phenomenon, the urban fire-storm or "Feuersturm" (a term coined that night), erupted; occurring within a period of twenty minutes on the night of July 27 and burning for five hours, it killed roughly 50,000 people,[11] almost the number killed in the whole of Great Britain during the entire war, which is "precisely known at 60,595."[12] Devastation of such magnitude and intensity was not achieved again until Dresden.[13] But at Dresden there was a significant difference: where "Previously the fire-storm had been merely an unforeseen result of the attack; in the double-blow on Dresden the fire-storm was to be an integral part of the strategy."[14]

The strategy was immediately controversial. Although the Americans claimed the Soviets were responsible,[15] in 1961 the official British history of the strategic bombing offensive assigned responsibility for the attack to Winston Churchill.[16] The Soviets were informed shortly beforehand, but only of the American intention to bomb the marshalling yards, to which they raised no objection.[17] With reference to the statement by General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, that the bombing of Dresden had taken place at Soviet request, the British commented: "General Marshall read too much into the Russian request which, apart from the specific mention of Berlin and Leipzig, was in general terms. At any rate no evidence has come to light showing that the Russians asked specifically for the bombing of Dresden."[18] This controversy over the role of the Soviets pervades German accounts of the bombing.

Death toll estimates range widely, from 25,000 to over a quarter-million. The incalculable number of refugees crowded into the city and the intensity of the firestorm made it difficult to ascertain the number of people killed. Lack of a consensus on the death toll has been used for political purposes by both sides.

1950's

Axel Rodenberger's book, Der Tod von Dresden, the first extensive account of the attack on Dresden, appeared in West Germany in 1951. The author, who had lived off and on in Dresden for thirty-five years, reported his own experience along with information gleaned from notes and discussions with many Dresden survivors. In the foreword is a letter from the Silesian poet, Dr. Hanns Gottschalk, written in February 1945, in which he attempts to understand why the city had to die:

> Men, whether friend or foe, give no answer. But more clearly and more emphatically than any answer could, the destruction of Dresden demonstrates what man is capable of, when he wanders from the path of reason and sets the forces of hate in motion.[19]

Why Dresden was destroyed is the most persistent query in German accounts of the attack on both sides of the Wall; the question of responsibility follows closely. In 1953 Rodenberger asked the U.S. State Department "who

gave the order for the annihilation of Dresden?," and received the official explanation, that the attack had been requested by the Soviets, but he was not convinced.[20]

Echoing Gottschalk's suggestion that the act was irrational, Rodenberger took a philosophical approach and blamed war itself.[21] The fate of Dresden could become the fate of other cities, he wrote, as the powers of annihilation have become stronger yet, referring to the atomic bomb. In the introduction, Rodenberger characterized the attacks as "the atomic bombs for Germany," since the effect in his opinion exceeded that of the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the number of dead was far higher.[22] His account, which appears to have been widely read, at least in the Federal Republic, estimates a probable total of over 1/4 million dead, with perhaps only 50-70% recovered from the ruins.[23]

Twelve years later, in the epilogue to the book's eighth edition, Rodenberger answered the question of who gave the order for the Dresden attack quite differently. With the publication in 1961 of the official British history of strategic bombing, he wrote, it became official that area bombing had been unimportant in deciding the war, which the British knew long before the annihilation of Dresden, that Churchill was the impetus for the Dresden attack, and that the justification often mentioned - that it was retaliation for the bombing of Coventry - was only a pretext. He now used the word "Untat," or outrage, in reference to these unrestricted Allied attacks on civilians,[24] declaring the death of Dresden "should be an eternal memorial. A warning to mankind."[25]

An entirely different tone appears in two articles from the West German Hamburg newspaper, Die Zeit, in the early 1950's, which reflect the passionate climate of the Cold War at a time when the reunification of Germany was still being seriously discussed. Christian Wulffen complained that "The Soviets want Dresden to be a 'beacon in the struggle against the Americans.' A 'museum' which depicts and shows evidence of the destruction is supposed to immortalize the hatred."[26] The second article, appearing in April 1952, is a scathing attack against the Communists, claiming that the Sachsen Landessekretariat of the Socialist Unity Party (the ruling political party of the German

Democratic Republic) wanted to complete the city's destruction by going over the heads of the city administration to remove the ruins of the Schloß and the Opera House and even demolish the newly-restored Hofkirche for a parade ground for the working masses![27] In 1985 the Schloß ruins were still there, the Opera House had reopened to international acclaim, and the Hofkirche was again holding services.

In February 1953, Die Zeit published a letter to the Editor, which uncritically accepted the American attribution of Soviet responsibility for the attack, but which, nevertheless, directly criticized the British, pointing out - in reference to the annihilation of a French village by a unit of the German SS in June 1944[28] - that German soldiers at Oradour had been severely punished or executed for committing atrocities on a smaller scale than Dresden. Worse, the author complained, the German soldiers had only been following orders from their local superior officers, which were later condemned by the German High Command, whereas the highest levels of Allied leadership had given the orders for Dresden: "And moreover Russia was not even England's superior."[29]

Meanwhile, in East Berlin during 1950 an article appeared in the literary magazine Der Aufbau by Walter Lehweß-Litzmann presenting a reasonable, careful analysis of "Operation Dresden," without resort to the extensive political rhetoric that came to characterize the articles, for example, in Neues Deutschland. The question of the number of dead is left open: 30,000 were buried but "how many people beyond that fell victim to the catastrophe will never be determined ... a systematic investigation is impossible."[30]

The author pointed out that the British did not invent "terror attacks." Hitler had already used the tactic in Spain, Poland, England, and elsewhere, but it had backfired, tending to strengthen instead of weaken the will to resist. From this it follows that air attacks on civilian targets "were no longer justified, and thus this murder of, in the overwhelming majority, innocent people was senseless and purposeless..." and clearly planned at the highest level.[31]

Lehweß-Litzmann speculated on two possible reasons for the British-American attack on Dresden: 1) to complete the destruction of German

industrial and communication centers, or 2) to make the later work of reconstruction more difficult in the designated Soviet occupation zones. But even these reasons still do not appear to be "decisive" for the attack on Dresden "because Dresden possesses no key industry and the economic splitting of Germany was surely at that time not yet foreseen..."[32]

Strong exception is taken to the notion that the raid on Dresden was requested by the Soviets, "who had never during the entire war engaged in massive attacks against the civilian population," despite having had the capability. To have been exceptionally "successful," as claimed, the air attack should have facilitated the Soviet advance up the Elbe, which it did not, or bombed the military barracks and storehouses, which remained almost undamaged.[33] Moreover, if the Soviets had really wanted Dresden bombed, he contends, they would have done it themselves.

The Aufbau article illuminates an opening sparring point of Cold War polemics, asking why the Anglo-Americans were so concerned with the spot at which their troops met the Soviets, since the boundaries of the future zones of occupation had been fixed since Yalta: "It shows that there were powerful forces in the Western camp, which already wished to revise the Yalta Agreement when it was barely concluded." Lehweß-Litzmann cites events in March 1945, using descriptions taken from General Dwight D. Eisenhower's book Crusade in Europe, which show, he claims, that Churchill was anxious to take Berlin before the Russians - although aware that the British and American zones bordered about 300 kilometers west of Berlin - in order to increase British and American influence and prestige in post-war Germany, despite Eisenhower's opposition.[34]

Lehweß-Litzmann suspected that the American leadership also had plans to expand their zone of occupation to Berlin and the Elbe, noting the difficulties the Soviets had in getting American troops to withdraw from the Soviet Occupation Zone after the war as evidence. He then concludes:

> In light of these facts the destruction of Dresden obtains adequate significance for the first time. The crime probably belongs in the framework of parallel British and American attempts to expand their zones of occupation beyond the boundaries set at

> Yalta and thereby their post-war influence in Germany.

This is surely, he declares, how they defend their actions against critics in their own camp. Once again, the comparison to Hiroshima is made:

> Mass annihilation without military necessity, but with unrealized political goals of an imperialist stamp, considered cold-bloodedly--that characterized Operation Dresden, which had an effect on the unfortunate city and its inhabitants not inferior to an atomic bomb.

Now came the polemic, as he warns that more attention should be focused "on those forces and circles in the world, which continually and loudly threaten a repetition of Dresden and Hiroshima, with super atomic and hydrogen bombs..."[35]

A good example of East German 1950's hard line rhetoric is the book, The Undefeatable City: Destruction and Rebuilding of Dresden, by Professor Max Seydewitz, an eminent art historian who was also Prime Minister of Saxony in the difficult years immediately after the war and later General Director of the State Art Collections at Dresden. Seydewitz did not mince words, calling the bombing of Dresden a "crime against humanity for all time." He labelled the 1953 U.S. State Department statement shifting the blame for Dresden to the Soviets a lie, a "swindle ... served up anew for February 13, 1953 in the already refuted old form" to render previous assertions in the press "directed by American millionaires and armaments profiteers" more believable. He noted that some bourgeois newspapers in the Federal Republic also rejected the U.S. accusation against the Soviets, including the respected Süddeutsche Zeitung.[36]

Seydewitz makes a reference to Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well, but to make quite a different point:

> The terror attack on Dresden was no military action for the defeat of fascist Germany, but, like the dropping of the atom bomb over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one of the early steps towards preparation of a new war for the seeing through of American imperialist plans for world mastery, which made an appearance after the end of the war.[37]

In 1956 and 1957 tactical atomic weapons were introduced into Europe through NATO, under

American surveillance, and West Germany began pressuring NATO for atomic weapons.[38] This became an additional source of tension between the two Germanies, giving rise to a popular domestic movement against atomic weapons in West Germany, which reached a high point in 1957-1958. Despite its strength, however, in March 1958 the Bonn parliament passed a resolution preparing a legal basis for acquiring nuclear weapons and allocated money for that purpose.[39]

In 1959, a West German history, The Period of the World Wars, appeared. Its author, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, went so far as to compare the bombing of Dresden with the Nazi extermination of the Jews, implying a moral trade-off:

> Next to the names of Belcec, Treblinka and Auschwitz as symbols of horror ... stands the name of Dresden: here crowded great multitudes of homeless refugees. Into these defenseless people air squadrons ... dropped their explosive and incendiary bombs.[40]

This kind of comparison, from one of the most conservative German historians, is highly unusual in references to the Dresden attack. Most authors, both in East and West Germany, draw moralistic comparisons with the atomic bomb and avoid explicit reference to the Holocaust. The popular Hamburg magazine Stern, for example, published a series of articles in 1960 on the Second World War, in which Dresden was called the most horrible attack "prior to the entry of the atomic bomb," taking on a tone of severe reprimand directed at the Allies:

> The first attack alone should have sufficed to destroy Dresden and to murder tens of thousands of unprotected refugees, who were camped on the banks of the Elbe. However, in the same night the bombers came a second time ... That still was not enough: at noon the next day the enemy flew on Dresden a third time, completing the work of destruction.[41]

The authors take the moral high ground: if Dresden and the atomic bombs were the most horrible attacks in history, then Germans can be portrayed as nice fellows, who would not misuse nuclear weapons since they condemn wiping out whole cities. This subtle piece of turn-about propaganda appeared during the same year that the West German Army High Command was attempting to justify Bonn's demands for atomic weapons.[42]

In 1960, around the 15th anniversary of the bombing, many articles decrying the arms race and suspecting the militaristic intentions of the West Germans appeared in a major East German newspaper, Neues Deutschland. On February 14, a front-page article reported a French atomic explosion in the Sahara, terming it "the French-West German atomic bomb."[43] Another accused the West Germans of wanting to use force of arms to "correct the outcome of the Second World War ... In a 'regional blitzkrieg' conducted with nuclear weapons they want to 'roll-up' the DDR and then shift their positions to the Oder." It strongly protested "the aggressive character" of recent NATO maneuvers.[44] Similar concerns were voiced in the traditional commemoration speech given by Prime Minister Otto Grotowohl in Dresden as reported on that same page: "The Government of the DDR regards the introduction of a cessation of armaments in the whole of Germany as the most urgent question..."[45] East Germany was taking the propaganda offensive.

The publication of the official British history of the strategic bomber offensive in 1961 and of another British history in 1963, David Irving's highly detailed The Destruction of Dresden, brought many documents and little-known details to light. After an extensive survey of the wide range of estimates, Irving estimated the total dead at 135,000 - well below the higher estimates of 250,000-300,000, but about four times the official East German figure of 35,000 dead, which had been made in 1946.

In 1964, Wolfgang Paul's eye-witness account, ..For example, Dresden, came out. A former Dresden resident author and theater critic, Paul had been forced to leave the Russian zone in 1948 after openly criticizing the Kultur Bund and censorship of cultural expression. Similar to Erdmann, he implies a moral trade-off, writing that the horrors of "Hiroshima and Auschwitz will outlast the century ... Dresden also has horror to offer our posterity."[46] He uses the moderate Irving estimate of 135,000 killed. Paul is amazed at an act of war in which the soldiers of both Fronts live, while "between them lie the dead civilians ... Why," he asks," must they pile up horror after horror so shortly before the victory?"

Paul, like Rodenberger, blames war. He found the 1953 U.S. State Department justification

incredible, noting that not only had the Soviets not ordered the attack, but that it was not designed to support their offensive, since, for example, "The railway lines were passable again three days after the 13th of February, 1945." Perhaps the British and Americans wanted to impress the Germans with their military might and the Soviets as well, he surmises, thus suggesting a political motive new to West German accounts.[47]

In 1962, West German Defense Minister Strauß demanded that Washington install medium-range nuclear missiles on German soil.[48] In December 1964 the Western press reported atomic mines and nuclear demolition charges along the German interzonal frontier.[49] Alarmed, the East German press continued attacks on West Germany's nuclear capability and aggressive intentions throughout 1965.

That year, on the 20th anniversary of the Dresden bombing, a Neues Deutschland article reported that the city of Coventry had sent a delegation (as it has every year since the founding of the Coventry-Dresden Friendship Society in 1956). Residents of both cities took vows at the monuments of the victims of the "barbaric" air attacks "to do everything so that no city in the world would ever have to endure again what Coventry and Dresden experienced in November 1940 and February 1945." In the context of time, this meant demonstrating for the cessation of atomic armaments and prevention of the further dissemination of nuclear weapons.[50]

Mentioning that many people question the meaning of the "technically well-organized mass murder" which was Dresden, another article stated significantly:

> Even if it was madness, so was its method nevertheless ... Dresden was already a capital of that 'Cold War,' which the Western allies of the Soviet Union prepared with a view to the future.

Then, with a jibe at West Germany - "...The heirs of this policy sit today in Bonn and have endeavored desperately to maintain the Cold War" - it declared that the guilt of the "Dresden massacre" is not to be laid to persons, but to the "inhuman system of imperialism, which gave birth to such a crime. Hiroshima and Nagasaki proved that in the same year which brought annihilation to Dresden; today the mad atomic mine speculations of the Bonn Ultras proves that, and the U.S.A.'s playing with fire over Hanoi."[51]

At the same time, the first post-war mayor of Dresden, Walter Weidauer, published a book, Dresden Inferno: Lies and Myths Concerning Operation Thunderclap. Acknowledging the dispute raging over the destruction of his city in West Germany and elsewhere, occasioned by the opening of archives and publication of official documents, he asserted that Paul, Rodenberger, and Irving had, among other falsifications, greatly exaggerated the death totals, calling it a "swindle" for the purpose of glorifying the German militarists in the eyes of the younger generation.[52] Weidauer had been a member of the commission in Dresden charged with determining the number of dead, which reported at the end of 1946 a death toll of around 35,000, confirmed in 1965, he claimed, by recently discovered documents. Irving's estimate of 135,000 dead had been used in West Germany to show that the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima were not so bad after all, Weidauer asserted, citing a February 1964 article in the Stuttgart Zeitung which alleged that Irving's total took some of the wind out of the sails of the West German anti-nuclear movement, which East Germany saw as an important counter to possible West German and NATO aggression.[53]

Webster and Frankland name an August 1944 British Air Staff memo by Sir Charles Portal as the charter of the Dresden operation. "Operation Thunderclap," as originally conceived in the memorandum, was intended to be a special air attack on a "relatively undamaged city" to cause "immense devastation" and thus hasten or consolidate an impending victory.[54] Weidauer questioned what was "special" about this attack, since missions with up to 1000 planes had already been flown as early as 1942, and massive attacks on cities like Hamburg and Kassel had hardly hastened or brought about the collapse of fascist Germany. But Weidauer has a bomb of his own tc drop: "However improbable it may sound, it is quite certain nevertheless: The world's first atomic bomb was supposed to fall on a German city. For that the 'special plan' for the mysterious Operation 'Thunderclap' was created."[55]

Weidauer marshals considerable evidence that "Operation Thunderclap" was originally a plan to use th A-bomb in Germany. He quotes the director of the Manhatten Project, General Leslie M.

Groves, to the effect that, as late as August 1944, "The Fat Man (the plutonium bomb) was still under development, but there was some hope that the first of this model could be delivered as early as January 1945,"[56] and attributes great significance to the coincidence of this timing with the inception of Operation Thunderclap. Groves also disclosed that the training of air crews for the dropping of atomic bombs actually began in September 1944, that the first planes were ready in October and, furthermore, that overseas flight training began in December.[57] Weidauer's source for the U.S. intention to drop the first atomic bomb on Germany is Groves' quote of President Roosevelt at a meeting shortly before his departure for Yalta in February 1945, "Mr. Roosevelt informed me that if the European war was not over before we had our first bombs he wanted us to be ready to drop them on Germany."[58]

The fact that Operation Thunderclap was designed for a "virgin" city is not proof, although Weidauer claims it is, that Dresden was purposefully left relatively intact to become a target for the atomic bomb in Germany, even if Operation Thunderclap had originally been intended to be an atomic attack. After all, as he himself points out, there were "At the beginning of August 1944 in eastern Germany still several relatively undestroyed cities..."[59] Weidauer supports his conjecture with reference to a story reported by the German atomic scientist, Werner Heisenberg:

> In July, 1944, at the same time as the action 'Thunderclap' originated, Heisenberg, who was president of the German Uranium Association at the time, received a visit. Goering's adjutant communicated to him that an American threat was submitted to the German legation in Lisbon. In the nest six weeks an atomic bomb would be dropped over Dresden."[60]

If true, this would move the date of Allied atomic readiness up considerably, but Weidauer provided no further substantiation, and this is the only point he made which directly connects the city of Dresden with the atomic bomb. His best evidence supports the contention that the British and Americans had originally expected to have an operational atomic bomb at least as soon as early 1945. Weidauer postulated that the hidden purpose of the Dresden attack was to

impress Stalin with the might of the Western Allies, so as to create a favorable negotiated outcome at Yalta, for which an atomic bomb would have been most impressive.

With these revelations, 1965 was a very interesting year for East German writings on Dresden. In the East Berlin cultural magazine Sonntag, Bernt von Kügelgen had an intriguing article reviewing the new material which had surfaced in the books by Webster and Franklin, Irving, and Weidauer. The tone is remarkable:

> Our publications about the destruction of Dresden have a different tone than in past years ... (which were) nearly free of a polemic targeted against the supreme commanders of this night of bombs. Do we have, so we asked, a right to criticize the causes of the destruction of Dresden? Was not the first and most important cause a war such as that provoked by Germany? Is a people whose soldiers are guilty of Coventry and Amsterdam and Warsaw ever allowed to ask about guilt if a German city encounters the same fate? How many Dresden ruins atone for the barracks of Auschwitz?

This is the only reference to Auschwitz and Dresden together in an East German publication in my sampling. The author's answer is one which only an East German could use:

> We are only too conscious of these connections. And nevertheless, we have the right and the duty to criticize the causes of the destruction of Dresden. The right is guaranteed us by the lifeline of our republic, drawn over two decades, which was a hangman's noose for the Nazi spirit of Potsdam. We have driven it out and buried it ... We have earned the right to name the guilty.
>
> The duty of criticism proceeds from the danger inherent in myth-formation and a host of falsehoods behind which the true connections were obscured. Meanwhile, in the course of the years the stamp with the word 'secret' has faded ... the time of exact research results is here. Would we be allowed to ignore it?[61]

The attitude reflects an enhanced sense of self-righteousness. Among the excerpts included from the aforementioned books is Weidauer's allegation that Dresden was originally targeted for an atomic attack.

The claim that the secrecy surrounding documents from the war was fading was a bit premature regarding the Dresden raid, however. The American report on the bombing by Joseph W. Angell, although commissioned in 1953 for the United States Air Force Historical Division, was not even partially declassified until 1970; it is still very difficult to obtain.[62] As for the East Germans, as recently as 1984 the photo library in Dresden did not have and could not get aerial photographs of the city taken by the Germans shortly after the bombing, and library personnel had never been allowed to see them; they are reportedly kept under top secret classification in East Berlin.[63] As the West German writer, Goetz Bergander says of the effect of keeping studies and documents about Dresden hidden for decades: if the facts are not available, myths arise. The Dresden controversy is a classic example of this process.[64]

Von Kügeln criticized studies by bourgeois historians for inadequate explanations of the tragedy of Dresden, declaring:

> Only an unbiased, Marxist historian was capable of working out its quintessence: The 35,000 inhabitants of the city died, sacrificed by Fascism, as victims of anti-communism. They died because there was the Morganthau Plan ... They died because the advance of the Red Army was supposed to be impeded - scorched earth, destroyed road and information networks never facilitated marching. They died in a bloody lightning flash of atomic policy and the cold War, which made its debut with 'Operation Thunderclap.'[65]

This amazing claim of lack of bias among Marxist historians, coupled with the charge of an Anglo-American scorched earth policy directed against an Ally, are remarkably blunt. The common charge of anti-Communist motives in the Dresden attack now carried the implication of already contemplated nuclear coercion.

The twenty-year period of the 1950's and 1960's is remarkable for the number of issues on the political agendas of both Germanies in the Dresden accounts as well as the highly emotional content, especially of the East German accounts, which grew more distressed and polemical as the political stance of East Germany vis-a-vis the Federal Republic became more defensive.

1970's and 1980's

In 1975, West German estimates of the dead began to conform more with the official East German total. A Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung article mentioned that "a number, never determined, of people died - a five or six place figure...,"[66] while a Die Zeit story used the 35,000 figure,[67] as did an article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, which also surmised that the Allies under Churchill and Stalin intended to destroy the residential part of the city: "The high number of 650,000 incendiaries alone speaks for this assumption..."[68] It is most interesting that the author does not single the Soviets out for blame, although he does include them as intending to destroy residential areas of the city.

An important book on Dresden appeared in 1977 in West Germany, Dresden im Luftkrieg by Goetz Bergander, a Dresden resident who witnessed the bombing. This book, characterized in Die Zeit as the first scientific investigation of the bombing, aroused vehement controversy when it confirmed the official number of 35,000 dead maintained by the East Germans for many years, utilizing evidence cited by Weidauer.[69]

Bergander was skeptical of the commonly accepted estimates of the refugee population in the city, claiming that their numbers were greatly exaggerated. He allows that more people were killed than given in the official estimate, but by no means hundreds of thousands. This assertion has apparently met with passionate protest from people who felt it was an attempt to mitigate Allied guilt. West German reporter Christian Schütze, for example, decried this as an indication that the myths "corresponded with a need subsequently to win the lost war, at least morally, with the wonder weapon of indignation."[70]

Another West German, Helmut Günther Dahms, writing for the historical magazine Damals in 1985, went even further in the direction of East German interpretations, asserting that the bombing was clearly directed towards the Soviets. He explained that the relatively weak military position of Britain vis-a-vis the Soviet forces at the time of the Yalta Conference, and her junior-partner status relative to the Americans, were inducement to impress Stalin with a show of

power calculated "to obtain ... further respect for the power of the island empire as the helper of the Soviets." Dahms attributes to England's Combined Intelligence Committee the opinion that "it would be 'politically valuable...' to set a visible beacon" through an attack behind the German Eastern Front.[71] His estimate of the death toll was below Bergander's.[72]

The 40th commemoration was given a different twist in the hands of the younger generation in the ecologically-orientated West Berlin newspaper, Tageszeitung. The account acknowledged the official East German 35,000 death toll estimate and then remarked:

> Each of us has heard about it - nevertheless these war scenarios are less familiar to us, the under-forty generation, than the scenarios of ecological collapse, of atomic catastrophe. Perhaps it is the experience of the night of bombings, as in Dresden, that caused the older generation to become relatively inured to the modern apocalypse. Do they not embody the experience: The Apocalypse is survivable?[73]

A second article in the same issue, written by an eye-witness to the bombardment who had been only fifteen years old at the time, likewise accepted the East German 35,000 death toll estimate as well as the argument that Churchill wanted to impress Stalin "with an intimidating proof of strength, in order to improve his position at Yalta."[74]

The influential West German news magazine Der Spiegel ran two stories on this occasion. One lengthy article, mainly about the recently rebuilt Semper Opera House, which had been destroyed in the bombing, ignored the dead, declaring that "Over 250,000 people had lost their homes" in the "senseless attack." It very briefly compared the bombing to a natural catastrophe: "Beneath streams of liquid phosphorus fire and a black rain of ashes in the firestorm the baroque Elbe-Florence turned overnight into a German Pompei."[75] The second reported that East German Prime Minister Erich Honecker's commemorative speech about world peace "uncommonly enough" spared the words "imperialism" and "revaunchism,"[76] while an article in the Süddeutsche Zeitung noted that Honecker avoided the phrase "Anglo-American

terror bombing," otherwise common in East Germany, in his depiction.[77]

Albrecht Hinze also accepted the East German official death toll of 35,000 in a report in the Süddeutsche Zeitung that both Honecker and the Federal Republic of Germany representative laid wreathes in memoriam.[78] In a later article, he granted that there might be some justification for Weidauer's assertions of strategic political and military connections between the bombing and the Yalta conference. West German President Weizsacker's message was that the 13th of February was "a day of sorrow for all Germans."[79]

At this point, while West Germans were increasingly accepting the official East German estimates, some East Germans were admitting, as had Lehweß-Litzmann in 1950, that it was only a tentative figure, with a potential for upward revision. A Neues Deutschland article by Hajo Herbell questioned the number of 35,000 dead asking "Does it do justice to the entire dimension of the horror? Who really knows how many people were staying in Dresden at the time ... How many may have disintegrated into ashes in the city?"[80] There were other indications of a more conciliatory attitude towards the West: the article was a very long one, and although he hinted that the destruction of Dresden was anti-Soviet in nature, Herbell significantly did not argue that the attack was meant as an opening blow in the Cold War. He used the word "imperialism" only twice - once in conjunction with the Nazis and once in reference to the "unbridled high level of imperialistic armaments." The article mentioned that military targets had not been hit in the raid, but just at that point asked "Is it not a matter of bitter necessity to recall everything that had previously been ruined in Europe by imperialistic Nazi barbarism?," thereby returning to a position more than twenty years old, assuming again the burden of Nazi guilt.

CONCLUSION

It is now more than forty years since Dresden was bombed. An extremely traumatic and controversial event, the raid is a perfect vehicle for propaganda. As such, the destruction of Dresden surely belongs in the propaganda hall of fame. It has all the necessary characteristics: a high level of emotion, death

tolls of all sizes for every purpose, opportunity for fingerpointing in all directions - at the Nazis, the Soviets, or the British and/or Americans, or at war in general. It can be used to vilify or to vindicate.

The two Germanies viewed each other with suspicion in the 1950's and 1960's, paralleling the attitudes of the respective power blocs, and their accounts of Dresden reflect this. While East German writers almost invariably utilized the opportunity to air general criticisms of the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany, West German articles reserved their criticism mainly for the Soviet Union and only occasionally Great Britain and the United States, and were less critical on the whole.

East and West German authors are in general agreement that the civilian population was deliberately targeted and that the attack was militarily senseless. They disagree on the motivations behind the attack. West German accounts rarely ascribed anti-Soviet motives for it, while East German ones invariably did, generally stressing anti-Soviet motives. Not until the mid-1960's, after the publication of the official British record, did some West Germans hint at the possibility of anti-Soviet intent.

The West Germans seem reluctant to draw conclusions as to motive, describing war in general, and the destruction in Dresden in particular, as senseless and attributing it to enflamed passions - hatred and revenge gone out of control. In sharp contrast, East German views interpret the attack as purposeful jockeying for post-war position. The West Germans appear to have become more receptive to this argument in the last ten years, as the two German governments have attempted to ease tensions. The idea that the bombing of Dresden was an opening move in the Cold War, so common in East German portrayals, has, however, never been accepted in West German accounts, with the exception of those in the youthful and very recent Tageszeitung.

The position taken on the central question of responsibility for the attack differs among West and East German accounts. Some West Germans point the finger at Churchill, but the Soviets are more often blamed, especially in the 1950's, and even as recently as 1983. None of the East German sources blame the Soviets, preferring to

point the finger at imperialism, a general category which includes the Nazis, the British, and the Americans, and expectedly absolves the Soviets of all responsibility. Some of them have gone so far as to declare that the Soviets, out of principle, would have never considered doing such a horrible thing, while others claim that its purpose was to intimidate the Soviets. In recent years many West Germans have taken the position that the Soviets simply acquiesced to the British and American plans, with or without prior information as the the civilian nature of the target.

The issue of the death toll of the raid on Dresden is an excellent example of a game of numbers being used for political purposes. West German estimates are in general much higher than East German, particularly prior to 1975. One might think that, for purposes of emphasizing the "criminality" of the bombing attack, which many of the latter allege, this would be reversed. It is sometimes suggested in West German accounts that the East Germans minimize the numbers in order to "minimize the possible co-guilt of the Soviets." What is interesting is that it is the West Germans who use larger figures and seem to have a vested interest in retaining them, as the criticism (which included death threats) of Bergander's acceptance more than thirty years after the event of the far lower East German figure would indicate.

There are several possible explanations for this anomaly. Given that the process of de-Nazification in West Germany was less thorough and that therefore a greater number of former Nazis reside there than in the East, the higher figures might be viewed as an attempt to achieve some kind of moral trade-off by playing up Allied as against Nazi atrocities, as Christian Schütze suggested. On the other hand, the higher figures tend to have intimidation value implying Western military strength, corresponding to West German efforts in the 1950's and 1960's to bolster its military situation, by joining NATO for example, in the face of alleged threats of "Russian expansionism." This interpretation is indicated by frequently expressed East German fears of West German acquisition of nuclear weapons in accounts of the raid. West Germans, by playing up the numbers, appear to want the West to seem more intimidating to the East.

The psychological phenomenon of self-pity would have played a supporting role in this game. The atomic bomb analogy is widespread on both sides. Weidauer even goes so far as to assert that the first atom bomb had been originally intended for use on Dresden. Yet the East German government, by playing down the numbers, might have wanted the nuclear-armed West to appear less intimidating. The scaling down of West German estimates in the 1970's and 1980's corresponds to a determined effort by the West German government to reach an accommodation of interests with the East Germans.

The articles from East Germany in the 1980's emphasize the desire to improve East-West relations, despite pressure from the Eastern bloc in the face of increasing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.[81] They do not seem to be making accommodations to the West in terms of the various controversies surrounding Dresden; the concessions made are more tone than substance. In February 1985 the East German Prime Minister met with former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in Dresden, and there was another attempt to have the heads of the two German states meet, this time in West Germany. It was unsuccessful due to East-West tensions accompanied by East bloc pressure, but reveals a continuing attempt on the part of both Germanies to ease tensions.

In the 1950's the question of blame was emphasized, amid the hot rhetoric of the Cold War. In the 1980's there is new inflammatory rhetoric between the super powers, but between East and West Germany there is a new tone of reconciliation. Unlike the 1950's and 1960's, the tendency in the German-German relationship today runs counter to the tendency in the great power relations. German portrayals of the bombing of Dresden were more hostage to superpower rhetoric during the first part of the Cold War, whereas at present they seem to reflect more distinctly German attitudes.

NOTES

[1]Axel Rodenberger, Der Tod von Dresden (Frankfurt/Main: Franz Müller-Rodenberger, 1965), p. 17, and David Irving, The Destruction of

Dresden (San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p. 14. Irving relied on the figure supplied to him by the Dresden official in charge of the Abteilung Tote of the Bureau of Missing Persons, a "conservative estimate" of 135,000 dead. In the report sent by both Hiroshima and Nagasaki to the United Nations in 1976, the total deaths due to exposure to the atomic bomb by the end of 1945 was estimated at 140,000. See the Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical, and Social Effects of the Atomic bombings, trans. Eisei Ishikawa and David Swain (New York: Basic Books, 1981), p. 113.

[2]These circumstances have led some people to categorize the bombing of Dresden as a war crime. See the article by R.H.S. Crossman in New Statesman, May 3, 1963, p. 684, and the book by F.J.P. Veale, Advance to Barbarism (London, 1968). Winston Churchill himself admitted to the Chief of Air Staff in March 1945, "The destruction of Dresden remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing." Sir Charles Webster and Dr. Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-45 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1961), p. 112.

[3]Ibid., p. 116

[4]Noble Frankland, Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of Europe (Ballentine, 1970), p. 41.

[5]Webster and Franklin, op.cit., p. 114.

[6]Melden E. Smith, Jr., The Bombing of Dresden Reconsidered: A Study in Wartime Decision-making (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms, 1971), p. 45.

[7]Webster and Franklin, op.cit., p. 103 and Irving, op.cit., p. 93.

[8]That is, of cities of more than half a million inhabitants. "Perhaps one of the reasons why Dresden's legitimate targets had not earlier been attacked in force was that the city lay at extreme range from the Allied bomber bases in England." Smith, op.cit., p. 241.

[9]Dieter Georgi, "The Bombings of Dresden," Harvard Magazine 87 (March-April 1985):58. Georgi, fifteen at the time of the bombing, was one of these children.

[10]Charles S. Maier, "Why the Allies Did it," Harvard Magazine 87 (March-April 1985):61.

[11]Hamburg Statistisches Landesamt figure, cited in Irving, op.cit., p. 44. See also Martin

Middlebrook, The Battle of Hamburg (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), pp. 222 and 232.

[12]Alexander McKee, Dresden 1945: The Devil's Tinderbox (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1984), p. 12.

[13]Alan S. Milward, "Die deutsche Kriegswirtschaft 1939-1945," trans. Elisabeth Maria Peteinal, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: 1966).

[14]Irving, op.cit., p. 112. See also Georgi, op.cit., p. 10 and Norman Longmate, The Bombers: the RAF Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1983), p. 334.

[15]W.F. Craven and J.L. Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 731.

[16]Webster and Franklin, op.cit., p. 103.

[17]Smith, op.cit., pp. 232-235.

[18]Webster and Franklin, op.cit., p. 113. This is nevertheless still controversial in England, where the "blame-it-on-Stalin" theory persists. Witness the article in The Times of London on February 13, 1985 by Alexander Hamilton: "The East Germans, now masters of Dresden, plan a major event, following the Soviet principle of using the crimes of Hitler to argue against German reunification. That Dresden was an Allied crime committed at Stalin's request is unlikely to be raised."

[19]Axel, op.cit., p. 7.

[20]Ibid., p. 193.

[21]Ibid., p. 12.

[22]Ibid., p. 17.

[23]Ibid., pp. 195 and 187.

[24]Ibid., pp. 195-198.

[25]Ibid., p. 192.

[26]Christian Wulffen, "Tabula Rasa in Dresden," Die Zeit, 13 July 1950, p. 4.

[27]"Restaurierung war vergebens. Die Dresdner Hofkirche steht den Aufmärschen im Wege," Die Zeit, 3 April 1952, p. 11. It is not at all evident whether there was anything of substance behind this fear, except perhaps with regard to the Opera House. See Wolfgang Paul, ...zum Beispiel Dresden: Schicksal einer Stadt (Frankfut am Main: Wolfgang Weidlich, 1964), p. 189.

[28]Herbert Michaelis, et al. Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Bilder, Daten, Dokumente (Bertelsmann, Lexikon Verlag, 1968), p. 668.

[29]Die Zeit, 19 February 1953, p. 14.

[30]Walter Lehweß-Litzman, "Operation Dresden," Aufbau 6 (1950):111.

[31]Ibid., p. 115.
[32]Ibid., p. 116.
[33]Ibid., pp. 117-118.
[34]Ibid., pp. 118-119
[35]Ibid., p. 120.
[36]Max Seydewitz, Die Unbesiegbare Stadt: Zerstörung und Wiederaufbau von Dresden (Leipzig: VEB F.A. Brockhaus Verlag, 1982), pp. 133-134.
[37]Ibid., pp. 161-162.
[38]Albert Legault, "Atomic Weapons for Germany?," International Journal 21 (Autumn 1966):451.
[39]Willi Wilke, "Bonn Demands Atomic Weapons," German Foreign Policy 3 (1964):100.
[40]Karl Dietrich Erdmann, Die Zeit der Weltkriege from Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, Band 4, ed. Bruno Gebhardt (Stuttgart: Herbert Grundmann, Union Verlag, 1959), p. 311.
[41]J.J. Heydecker, Arnim von Manikowsky, and Henning Meincke, "In Europa gingen die Lichter aus: Sturz in den Abgrund," Der Stern, 19 March 1960, p. 80.
[42]Wilke, op.cit., p. 100, citing information from Wehrkunde 9 (1960):476 and 481.
[43]"Sahara-bomb," Neues Deutschland, 14 February 1960, p. 1.
[44]"Blitzkrieg - Blitzselbstmord," Neues Deutschland, 14 February 1960, p. 4.
[45]"Nicht totaler Krieg, sondern totaler Friede," Neues Deutschland, 14 February 1960, p. 1.
[46]Wolfgang Paul, op.cit., p. 7
[47]Paul, pp. 14-15.
[48]Albert Legault, op.cit., p. 457.
[49]Ibid., pp. 457-458. The author is associated with the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva.
[50]Horst Richter, "...damit keine Stadt der Welt je wieder leide!," Neues Deutschland, 13 February 1965, p. 5.
[51]W.M., "Ende und Anfang," Neues Deutschland, February 1965, p. 5.
[52]Walter Weidauer, Inferno Dresden: Über Lügen und Legendum um die Aktion 'Donnerschlag' (E. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1966), pp. 6-7.
[53]Ibid., p. 118.
[54]Webster and Franklin, op.cit., p. 55.
[55]"So unwarscheinlich es auch klingen mag, so sicher ist es dennoch: Die erste Atombombe der Welt sollte auf eine deutsche Stadt fallen." Weidauer, op.cit., p.63.

[56]Ibid., p. 66. See also General Leslie M. Groves, Now it Can be Told (New York: Da Capo, 1983), pp. 255-256.

[57]Groves, op.cit., pp. 259-260.

[58]Ibid., p. 184 and Weidauer, op.cit., p. 67. This assertion, nevertheless, was denied by the British, specifically Sir Charles Portal. Shortly after the Neues Deutschland interview with Weidauer appeared in January of 1965, the Hamburg newspaper, Die Welt, reported that Portal "...denied Sunday a report of the S.E.D. paper, Neues Deutschland, according to which Great Britain recommended dropping the first atomic bomb on Dresden in the summer of 1944 ... Portal said there had never been an atomic attack planned for Europe." From "Bericht auf Dresden als Atomziel Dementiert," Die Welt, 25 January 1965.

[59]Weidauer, op.cit., p. 62.

[60]Also in Ibid., p. 63. Heisenberg reported the story to the publisher of the Physikalischen Blätter on October 25, 1963, says Weidauer.

[61]Bernt von Külelgen, "Rauchschrift," Sonntag, 7 February 1965, p. 2.

[62]The American Angell Report is supposed to have been fully declassified since 1978, but it is not available at respected and comprehensive institutional libraries, such as the University of California system, the Stanford library system, and the Hoover Institute, and does not appear on the lists of available declassified Government documents.

[63]My source is one of the librarians at the Dresden Fototek interviewed in person in August 1984.

[64]It is perhaps worth noting that Bergander was very critical of the Angell Report. It supposedly was written entirely from official sources, but Bergander found much erroneous information, for example, citations to respected sources but with erroneous page references. In addition, there is confusion between an earlier and a later declassified version as to whether the study rests on generally accessible sources, but the documents were in no way "unclassified," declares Bergander, saying that such obfuscation arouses suspicion.

[65]Bernt, op.cit., "Sie starben in einem blutigen Wetteleuchten der Atompolitik und des kalten Krieges, die sich mit der 'Aktion Donnerschlag' ihr Entree besorgten."

[66]"Dreißig Jahre nach dem feuersturm über Dresden," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 February 1975, p. 7.

[67]Manfred Sack, "Dresden 30 Jahre danach," Die Zeit, 21 February 1975.

[68]Klaus Schumann, "Die Nacht, in der Dresden unterging," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 February 1975, p. 3. The reporter erred in calling the operation "Clarion" instead of "Thunderclap."

[69]See Christian Schütze, "Unsterbliche Legenden über den Untergang von Dresden. Der Nachhall der NS-Propaganda hält noch nach 40 Jahren an," Die Zeit, 12 February 1985.

[70]Ibid.

[71]Helmut Günther Dahms, "Vor 40 Jahren: Bomben auf Dresden," Damals, February 1985, p. 118.

[72]Ibid., Die Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (München-Berlin: Herbig, 1983.), p. 576.

[73]"Bomben auf Dresden," Tageszeitung, 13 February 1985, p. 1.

[74]Axel Besteher-Hegenbart, "Über den Dächern, unten im Keller," Ibid., p. 10.

[75]"Der Freischütz mit der Wunderharfe; Die Wiedereröffnung der Semperoper als gesamtdeutsches Fernsehfest," Der Spiegel, 11 February 1985, p. 176.

[76]Uly Foerster, "Es lastet und es blutet," Der Spiegel, 18 February 1985, pp. 28-29.

[77]Albrecht Hinze, "Am 40. Jahrestag der Zerstörung Dresdens Honecker ruft zu Friedensbemühungen auf," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 February 1985, p. 1.

[78]Albrecht Hinze, "Dresden - vierzig Jahre nach der Zerstörung: Zwechmäßiger, wohnlicher und schöner?," Süddeutsche Zeitung, 13 February 1985, p. 8.

[79]Hinze, op.cit.

[80]"Dresden - 40 Jahre danach," Neues Deutschland, 9/10 February 1985, p. 9.

[81]"Große Doggen und kleine Hunde," Der Stern, 31 January 1980, p. 1968.

SOCIAL CENTERS IN WISCONSIN, 1911-1915

VICTOR JEW

One year before he was elected President of the United States, Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey addressed the First National Conference on Social Center Development in Madison, Wisconsin. His opening remarks on October 25, 1911, aptly described the social center movement:

> It is necessary that simple means should be found by which, by an interchange of points of view, we may get together, for the whole process of modern life, the whole process of politics, is a process by which we must exclude misunderstandings ... bring all men into common counsel and so discover what is the common interest. ... There is no sovereignty of the people if the several sections of the people are at loggerheads with one another. Sovereignty comes with cooperation ... everywhere you find men ... determined to solve the problems by acting together, no matter what older bonds they may break, no matter what former prepossessions they may throw off, determined to get together.[1]

What was to be the "simple means" by which people would recognize their commonality and exercise their sovereignty? What was to be the mechanism for the new citizenship? for the Madison conferees the local schoolhouse, operating as the neighborhood community center, served this purpose. At the schoolhouse citizens would organize themselves into a "deliberative body to supplant party divisions." The social center within the local school would serve as a

Victor Jew received a B.A. in History from the University of California, Los Angeles. He received his M.A. at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he is currently writing his dissertation on a social history of arson in the United States.

consensual meeting place for all Americans liberated from the partisan environment of saloons and boss-controlled assembly halls. In this environment they could rationally and efficiently solve public problems for the good of all instead of trading votes for narrow interests.

The preamble to the recommended "Constitution of the Neighborhood Civic Club" summarizes the intent spirit of the social center vision. "We the citizens .. are now united in one political organization as members of the voting body." Hence the voters would become a political organization of themselves and for themselves, conscious of their political obligations and powers, and wielding their heretofore dormant sovereignty - independent of political parties. For what purpose should such powers be manifest? "The responsibility (of) voting demands organized preliminary deliberation." Therefore, "(w)e the citizens ... do constitute ourselves a deliberative organization or Neighborhood Civic Club, to hold meetings in the public school building for the open presentation and free discussion of public questions and for such other civic, social, and recreational activities as give promise of common benefit."[2]

The social center movement reached across the nation to garner support from numerous persons identified by historians as "Progressives." The roster of supporters included such individuals as Frederic C. Howe, formerly of the University of Wisconsin faculty and director of the People's Institute in New York City; Frank P. Walsh, chairman of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations; Margaret Woodrow Wilson, daughter of President Woodrow Wilson; John Collier, organizer and first secretary of the National Board of Censorship of Motion Pictures; Dr. H.E. Dearholt, Director of the Bureau of Health Instruction in the University of Wisconsin Extension division; Zona Gale, a leading woman author; Walter T. Sumner, Chairman of the Chicago Vice Commission; Dwight H. Perkins, School and Recreation Architect of Chicago; Mary V. Grice, National President of the Home and School Association; Clarence A. Perry of the Russell Sage Foundation; and the Rev. Dana Bartlett, leader of the Social Center movement on the Pacific Coast.[3] In the 1912 presidential election the Democrat Woodrow Wilson, the Republican incumbent William Howard

Taft, and the Progressive Party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, all endorsed the social center ideal. Such unanimity across party lines gave the social center reformers both hope and hubris. With the election of Wilson one social center advocate effused, "it is not impossible that the basic program of the social center - the self-organization of the voting body into a deliberative body ... may be effected in one administration."[4]

In 1911 the State Teachers Association of Wisconsin and the University of Wisconsin's Extension Division lobbied and prodded the state legislature to enact a law allowing local schools to become social centers for political deliberation, educational lectures, and community recreation. This legislation, the first of its kind, successfully passed muster and authorized school principals to establish "evening schools, vacation schools, reading rooms, library stations, debating clubs, gymnasiums, public playgrounds, public baths, and similar activities" while allowing the free use of school buildings to "nonpartisan, nonsectarian, and nonexclusive associations of citizens."[5] Following Wisconsin's leadership, seventy-one cities in twenty-states established social centers by 1913 and the following year seventeen states passed "wider use legislation" - the geographic balance clearly seen in the following breakdown: five states in the East, five in the mid-West, four in the far-West, and three in the South.[6]

Wisconsin offers a good case study of this national movement, not only for its legislative precedent. The Badger State possessed several unique attributes that provided a tailor-made environment for the community center movement. First, Wisconsinites such as Dr. Charles McCarthy of the Legislative Reference Library and Governor Francis McGovern advocated the "Wisconsin Idea," an ideology that justified the extensive state action that social centers required. Second, the University of Wisconsin's Extension Division offered an institutional arm of the state for the movement's propagation. Both the Wisconsin Idea's "service state" ideology and the University Extension department endorsed the agenda of transforming local schools into crucibles of democracy. Finally, Wisconsin's first (and only) supervisor of the Bureau of

Civic and Social Center Development was a man who articulated the movement's vision and purposes in his book, The Social Center. His name was Edward Joshua Ward.

How did the movement progress in the land of the service university and the service state? If one equates accomplishment with large numbers, the social centers proved to be a modest success, since by 1915 there were over 500 such community centers. On the other hand if one judges this experiment by its own standard of bringing democracy to the people the social center movement in Wisconsin was a failure. This defeat could be attributed to the personality quirks of the head of the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development; however, this fact notwithstanding, the social center vision was flawed at its core and the Wisconsin experience reflected its internal contradictions.

This research note draws upon evaluations written by University Extension agents on the performance of the social centers and its adviser, Edward J. Ward. These evaluations were candid reports to Louis Reber, the University Extension Dean, and represent some of the best records we have of the social center experiment in Wisconsin. Other helpful documents such as the papers of Dean Ward or the records of the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development are lost. The reports I discuss in this article have remained untapped by historians and I offer both an examination of their contents and the light they throw on the social center movement in one Midwestern state.[7]

Edward Joshua Ward's entry in Who Was Who in America, 1943-1950 identifies him as a social engineer and that description accurately describes his major concerns throughout a varied career. Born on March 9, 1880 into a Buffalo, New York clergyman's family, Ward would follow his father's footsteps and enter the ministry as an adult. He graduated from Auburn Theological Seminary in 1905 at the age of twenty-five and pastored the First Presbyterian Church of Silver Creek, New York. While there, he saw a glimmer of what would later dawn as the social center movement. In Silver Creek, Ward lent his church building as a facility for various city club meetings and recreational activities.

Ward decided to pursue his calling outside the church and became an assistant professor of

history and English at Hamilton College. In 1907-1910 he left this academic environment to enter public service. The social center movement began to take hold in Rochester, New York, in 1907 and Ward supervised its development. That experience significantly shaped his theories on the civic clubs. In 1910 the University of Wisconsin Extension Division hired Ward to take charge of neighborhood community centers in the Badger State. Receiving the job title of "Adviser for Social and Civic Center Development," he was listed as associate professor and received a salary of $2,500 a year. Ward would leave this position four years later, not without alienating a considerable number of people and confounding them on the purpose and plan of the social centers. Before discussing Ward's tenure in Wisconsin it would be helpful to explain some of the political assumptions of the neighborhood civic club movement.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF WARD AND SOCIAL CENTERS

The social centers exemplified political values many historians today identify with Progressivism. Ward in The Social Center (a book published in 1913 by D. Appleton and Company in its National Municipal League Series) defended the social centers because they were anti-partisan, consensual, efficient, and "scientific." The social centers, according to Ward, promised to usher in the new Progressive polis, the true fulfillment of American democracy.

Ward's theory of government was democratic - in an abstract manner. He stressed the sovereignty of the citizen, the "people" were their own best governors. He wanted to return to the New England town meeting ideal where they could exercise their own judgement without politicians intervening. To achieve this ideal, the nation had to be organized into community centers where individual citizens could meet and deliberate on the public issues. Democracy would be realized at the local level through the employment of neighborhood schools as social centers.

What of existing political arrangements and institutions? For Ward, the political parties destroyed citizen participation and undercut democracy. Partisanship was the "son of perdition who is the father of partition." For

Ward, the "party spirit" was justly condemned by George Washington as "the worst enemy" of a democracy; it undermined proper political education by turning the "supreme jury of the citizenship" into "noisy factions instead of (the people) calmly sitting together with fair hearing and free discussion in judgement." The political parties distorted the quality of information needed for deliberation and judgement by contaminating it with "private self interest." The parties kept hostage, the "will of the people" through "emotional reaction actuated and controlled by the 'committee on rumor.'"[8]

The social centers would provide an alternative to the political party. People (primarily men as voters, although women had a role paralleling their responsibilities in the domestic sphere) would gather at the neighborhood school and rationally seek out the truth. In this antiparty "mugwump" vision, voters would

> get together, by neighborhoods, in the district public buildings not to get this or that privilege ... or to get a certain candidacy or theory advanced, but to learn the facts about any public matter, to find the answer to each problem as it arises, to think out what is needed, and to select the best men to do what the majority agree should be done.[9]

For Ward, this was the proper way to approach politics because it was rational, scientific, cooperative, and efficient.

THE SOCIAL CENTERS IN PRACTICE

The social centers enjoyed the support of educators' associations and key officials within the University. Moreover, the ideology of the Wisconsin Idea legitimized its establishment; nevertheless, how did the social centers actually work?

According to Ward (admittedly a biased source), the social centers failed to progress much beyond its start-up phase. Three years after the state legislature mandated the school boards to provide "for the free, convenient and gratuitous use of the public school buildings for the meetings of the citizenship," only a relatively small number of school districts attempted this project and even a greater number failed. In 1914, Ward would glumly note that "social center development has begun in no more

than three hundred districts throughout the state." Moreover, many school districts' efforts began to "languish after a time and in many cases ... the community civic assembling had been abandoned."[10]

Ward attributed this failure to the lack of salaried professional leadership in the local community centers. He so advised Dean Reber in his report of June, 1914 and argued that

> In order to bring about the systematic and continuous use of the public school buildings as headquarters of citizenship deliberation by adults, as training places in self-government for youth ... and as recreation centers, it is NECESSARY that the person in each district who is to serve as secretary ... be definitely authorized and made responsible, by being remunerated for this service.[11]

And who was to serve in this official capacity and be so remunerated? Ward's plan called for the local school principal to fulfill this obligation. The school principal already administered the school during its "normal" role as educator of youth; he would assume a new role as the general civic secretary for the local social center. To bolster his recommendation, Ward cited the response level to a questionnaire he sent to a number of school principals: "Do you believe that the schoolhouse should be made the civic, social and recreational center of the district if the school principal or teacher is paid for the extra service as secretary of adult activities and director of young people's activities?" Ward duly noted that the response of 800 school principals was an unanimous "Yes."[12]

Professionalism would replace a volunteer force of ad hoc social center secretaries with school administrators properly compensated for their efforts; this would inevitably lead to greater morale and leadership. Ward traced the failure rate directly to this problem and noted that "where no authorization and definite remuneration of district secretarial service has been provided" then the "limit of volunteer willingness to perform public service for nothing has been reached" and subsequent social center activity suffered.[13]

But there was a deeper malady afflicting Wisconsin's social center development, and much

of it could be traced to Edward Joshua Ward himself; however, the movement itself contained contradictions that undermined it. Ward's job was to propagandize the social center ideal; to do so he delivered powerful revival messages for community democracy. Unfortunately the man often got in the way of the message. Arrogant, haughty, distant, and altogether too taken with his theory, Ward's performance caused many to complain. "The Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development has been doing too much hot air shooting and not enough real simple, definite, concrete work that can be measured in the form of tangible results." Such assessments were common in a number of reports to Dean Reber.[14] One district representative of the University Extension system reported to Dean Reber that while Ward's prepared remarks "inspire(d) most of the audience with a desire for Civic Center activities," his informal discussions "antagonized a few influential people who opposed the movement more strongly than ever."[15] The Secretary of the Lecture Department reported that "(i)ndividuals have sometimes found fault with his personality, since he sometimes impresses people at first sight as being egotistical, overbearing and snobbish."[16]

Ward probably felt alienated from people he perceived as being too provincial or traditional; in his eyes they were pharisaic in their hesitancy to accept his message of political salvation. And in some cases Ward did encounter traditional attitudes that took umbrage with his tolerance of saloons and "modern" forms of social interaction. (Ward viewed saloons neutrally; they merely served a "natural" social function, one that could be satisfied by the neighborhood social center.) "Quite frequently," reported the Lecture Department secretary, "church committees have said to us that they did not like Mr. Ward's open defense of dancing." On another occasion the "leading lumberman at Hawkins" wanted to complain to the President of the University "because Mr. Ward in his address ... referred in a humorous way to the mischievous thievery of small boys. This man felt ... that Mr. Ward should have censured the small boys for stealing rather than to have sympathied [sic] with them."[17] Some of the "antagonisms ... he created among the people" were clashes between outlooks; one relatively "modern," the other traditional.

Nevertheless, Ward displayed a crippling disregard for the sensibilities and intelligence of the local people he supposedly viewed as the fountain of democracy. Mr. O'Connor, the district representative for the Fourth District, wrote that in Ashland, Ward delivered a "personal narration which was not related to Ashland in any way. In fact, (the city) was not mentioned during his speech. He gave this same talk at the City Hall two years ago."[18] Moreover, "after (this) talk of two years ago, (the Ashlanders) went to Mr. Ward, expressed their interest, and asked him what they should do to get this grand work started in Ashland, and that as a result he gave them no information or plans whatever." O'Connor's judgment echoed the sentiments of many: "To send a man out to advertise himself in this manner is a waste of state funds."[19]

Personal inefficiency compounded Ward's woes. The Secretary of the Extension's Lecture Department reported to Dean Reber that "Last year I heard some complaint that Mr. Ward did not always fill the engagements that were made for him. Sometimes forgetting to fill them, sometimes missing his train, because of his own neglect..." Nevertheless, the secretary defended the Social Center adviser and observed "(a)s is the case with many propagandists, Mr. Ward probably lacks the ability to get down to brass tacks."[20]

Brass tacks and reality eluded Ward, especially when he propagandized the social center mission. Andrew Melville of the Second District subtitled a section of his report, "Why the Social Center is a Failure in the Oshkosh District" and he laid a good deal of that blame on Ward's inability to work with political reality. Ward, the former clergyman, dogmatized his theory of democracy. If that theory demanded that local officials participate as social center leaders then local officials would be dragooned into the effort. This proved a disaster in the Fox River Valley and Melville noted "(what) maybe alright in theory ... certainly does not work out in practice."[21]

In the city of Menasha Ward "invariably insisted upon the mayor ... being elected president of the social center club, and the city clerk as secretary." In fairness to Ward, his dogmatism reflected the political lessons he learned in Rochester, New York, where the lack of

mayoral support crippled the movement. Unfortunately for Menasha's citizens, their mayor had no interest in establishing, much less maintaining and developing, a social center. According to Melville, the "mayor owns a saloon, a gambling room, and is interested in a house of ill repute." Naturally he would sabotage any community centers that competed with his centers of "sociability." Indeed, the mayor was "absolutely opposed to anything that looks towards the betterment or welfare of the city in any way, for he knows that these innovations will hurt his business." According to Melville, the results were predictable, the social center "organized ... under Mr. Ward's direction never met, and ... he lost any prestige that he might have had ... prior to his coming (to Menasha)." In addition, the community of Algoma also suffered from Ward's "insistence (that) a man wholly unfitted for carrying on the work (be) made president of the organization."[22]

Edward Joshua Ward was not meant to be the social center director of Wisconsin. His personal work habits undermined his effectiveness and credibility, his dogmatic and theoretical bent of mind proved useless to Wisconsinites who may have sympathized with him. Melville complained that Ward could not "get down to earth where he c(ould) work out any of his ideas." It almost seemed that Ward held his listeners in contempt as he refused to speak to their level. "Again and again," Melville noted, "have I heard people ask him for advice and direction, and again and again have I heard him go off on a tangent about the theory of government or the idea of the state or something of that kind."[23]

Ward resigned as "Adviser to the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development" in 1915, the bureau itself dissolved and re-emerged as the Bureau of Civic, Commercial and Community Development with Andrew Melville, the District Representative from the Second District, as its new adviser. For those who stayed behind in the University Extension, Ward was "unbalanced," a "difficult personality," and an "individualist with great enthusiasms." That he was plagued by personal troubles, much evidence exists in the record to confirm; however, political problems both internal and external to the University Extension division also contributed to the frustration of the social center movement.

Externally, Ward's resignation came one year after a state-wide conservative reaction swept the Progressive apostate, Emmanuel Phillip, into the governor's office in 1914. Phillip attacked the University and the Extension as examples of Progressive Republican profligacy. The social centers came under attack, especially in Milwaukee, where one of Ward's creations, the Institute of Municipal and Social Service, became associated with the socialist mayor Emil Seidel. To conservatives in 1914 the social center was a center of socialism.

A hostile political environment in 1915 contributed to Ward's resignation; however, the internal politics of the University Extension division were just as unfriendly. According to Chester Allen, a field agent administrator within the Division, departmental relations were acrimonious. Moreover, the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development competed with other arms of the University. According to Chester Allen "(t)here were many difficulties in the way of conducting an effective community institute program" and the most "effective in slowing up the work" was the College of Agriculture. That school saw Ward's program as a direct threat to its own Farmers' Institutes.[24] Dean Reber thought the social centers could overcome a "seemingly insurmountable obstacle to the spread of university extension in rural communities," an obstacle due to "the apparent lack of public gathering places and other facilities for the meeting of groups for study." For Dean Reber, "the community gatherings at the schoolhouse center are natural assemblers" and would release "the tremendous possibilities ... (of) our school plants."[25] The College of Agriculture, on the other hand, had long worked in the fields of rural socialization and Country Life and defended its stake.[26]

The demise of the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development also reflected a new political environment. After Ward's departure, the University did not fill his position; indeed, the Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development disappeared in an act of creative destruction that established the Bureau of Civic, Commercial and Community Development. The name of this agency reflected a new agenda, Ward's social centers became passe while the University directed its efforts to aiding commercial enterprises.

This agenda reflected business-oriented concerns about industrial and commercial problems in Milwaukee and smaller cities. The Bureau of Civic, Commercial and Community Development arose in response to the University Extension-sponsored Commercial and Industrial Congress, a state-wide conference held in Madison from February 14 to 16, 1916. In light of the divisive internal politics at the University Extension, it is interesting to note that both the conference and the subsequent agency were headed by one of Ward's strongest critics: Andrew H. Melville, the District Representative from Oshkosh.

Melville wrote of the social centers' problems, as did the other four district representatives who submitted reports to Dean Reber in the spring of 1914. Signs of trouble could be discerned in such remarks as "Regret to say that Mr. Ward's lecture did not take very well here. It was not at all suited to the community."[27] For Mr. Roseman, then the third district representative, too much activity led to an "over organized" situation where the functions of a social center were already being performed by the "Associated Charities; Y.M.C.A.; Y.W.C.A.; Franklin public debating forum; North Side Progressive League; Board of Trade; clubs of various names in different parts of (LaCrosse); debating and literary societies in ward schools." It is "difficult to secure an audience when they are all running," he noted and concluded that it was "uneconomical in time, energy, and money ... to put across something of which the people do not feel the need."[28]

Roseman and O'Connor realized that democracy could not be imposed from above. The social centers tried to mobilize the citizenry to fulfill the grand prescriptions of people such as Edward Joshua Ward, who never really examined the assumptions and implications of their theory. Roseman advised the Dean of University Extension that "(i)t is much more economical to find a place in which (the people) feel the necessity of developments along a certain line, and assist them in working out their problems in this particular direction." In other words, democracy should build from real-world issues through real-world coalitions, not artificial meetings to create the democratic spirit. O'Connor concurred when he wrote:

> There should be no sensationalism in order to get people to come together. Neither

> should a program be forced upon them If a reasonable amount of propaganda work does not bring the people together for active cooperation on some of the problems of their individual community, it seems to me that the matter should be left alone for another year, or until some specific proposition comes up on which collective action is essential to its success.[29]

Ward believed he could awaken that need, that he could bring people to recognize their want of a "neighborhood head-and-heart quarters." "He is a propagandist," wrote the Lecture Secretary approvingly, "and has kept the idea of a social center very prominently before the people."[30] Being a propagandist, Ward thought he could impose democracy upon people by giving them a vision. Once possessed of this plan they would create neighborhood clubs and follow guidelines laid down by the Social Center Adviser (on Monday evenings people were to discuss national issues; Tuesday evenings, state concerns; Wednesday evenings, local problems; and Thursdays were for recreation.) Ward's democracy was power to the people by precept.

Considering the nature of social center theory, could anyone have transformed this vision into reality? The social centers were appeals to community, consensus, and democracy, looking forward to a nation built upon neighborhood loyalty while looking backwards to some idyllic New England town meeting ideal. Social center advocates wanted a homogenous and scientific polity, one not riven by partisan or class divisions; however the social center theory never explained how existing divisions would be subsumed in the new order. Especially in Ward's vague formulas the theory implied that local schools would become neighborhood centers and democracy would magically and ineluctably follow. According to Edward Stevens, Jr., a historian of social control and Progressive era education:

> ... a community of values must underlie any social progress. Yet the 'source' of this community was a puzzle. If, as Woodrow Wilson had suggested, community arises from a variety of competing interests, how could that community, except through some magical dialectic, ever transcend those interests? Further, if the social center were a political forum - a marketplace for

> competing ideas (interests), and if the centers themselves were to promote a community based on neighborhood, how were these two functions reconcilable? The marketplace was no place for community, nor was community any place for competing values and interests. The problem was simply magnified by a retreat to the Little Red School House and the idealized rural community it represented.[31]

Was the social center vision a total failure? However vague it might have been, the propaganda of Edward Joshua Ward did stir a number of Wisconsinites, especially rural citizens. Perhaps they took Ward's message and adapted it to their own world view and everyday needs. Perhaps they selected bits and pieces and shaped it to fit their lives. In one reported instance, the social center vision crossed class lines. While the social center movement always carried a middle class, Protestant taint, one Extension district representative reported a successful working-class center. He noted that "(i)n some towns there have been good live organizations or clubs of working men in a factory, as for instance - the men in the Gurney Refrigerator Factory at Fond du Lac, who have carried on the Lincoln social center in that town successfully for three years."[32]

For some, as in the Fox River Valley, the message of Ward spoke to them about "community" and about "democracy," terms they probably interpreted in their own fashion. Ward struck a chord as Melville noted, "(t)he people want something better than (Ward's) 'visions' of democracy. They want to be told how to go about this business of getting democracy by some one who knows them and their ways, and who is able to give it to them from their point of view."[33] The representative for the sixth district reported these responses from the Eau Claire region: "some community spirit aroused;" "cleaning up of lake front resulting from this movement and that community spirit has been created;" and "the people are interested in governmental affairs and the improvement of (the) town."[34] Did these working class people see the promise of democracy as taking more control over their lives, or was it the less revolutionary, middle class deliberating society of Ward's speeches? The answer is beyond the scope of this paper. But if

it is true that people were concerned over "this business of getting democracy" then perhaps they shared the insurgent spirit of the 1890's first noted by David Thelen in The New Citizenship.[35] If it is true that people were willing to make their institution more accessible, their lives more democratic, their power fortified; if it is true that insurgency and grass-roots democracy still fired people's fervor, then the state of Wisconsin did its citizens a disservice by imposing an elitist, expert-inspired vision of "democracy." Some of the people, as did the citizens in the Fox River Valley, wanted the genuine article; instead the state gave them "hot air blowing."

This note will conclude by offering some suggestions for further research on a movement that reflected the tensions and contradictions of political Progressivism. As stated earlier, there were some positive responses to Edward J. Ward's "propaganda." Historians need to identify the social sources for the varied responses to Ward's vision. I have hinted that some people saw the empowering potential in meeting together - they were willing to use the social center mechanism as did the workers at the Gurney Refrigerator Factory. Did social center activity differ by class background? Did it differ geographically? We know the pronouncements of Edward J. Ward - that is the history of the social centers from the "top down." We need to understand this movement from "the bottom up" and the ways people appropriated Ward's ideas. As mentioned earlier, the social center movement was not restricted to Wisconsin; there existed the Social Center Association of America (of which Edward Ward was the National Secretary). How did the social centers work in the other states? Can detailed studies of local neighborhood clubs reveal insights about Progressivism? Why did people such as Professor Frederic Howe, Margaret Woodrow Wilson, and John Collier (the organizer of the National Board of Censorship of Motion Pictures) seize the social center idea as if it were a panacea? Answering questions such as these will hopefully throw light on the meanings Progressives gave such words as harmony, society, and democracy.

NOTES

[1]Edward J. Ward, ed., The Social Center (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1913), p. v. Herafter referred to as Ward.

[2]"Suggested Constitution of the Neighborhood Civic Club." Appendix to Ward, p. 339.

[3]Edward J. Ward to Louis Reber, June 2, 1914. In the Richard Van Hise Collection, University of Wisconsin. University Archives. Hereafter referred to as Van Hise Papers.

[4]Ward, p. vi.

[5]Edward W. Stevens, Jr., "Social Centers, Politics and Social Efficiency in the Progressive Era." History of Education Quarterly (Spring 1972):16. Hereafter referred to as Stevens.

[6]Charles Zueblin, American Municipal Progress (New York, 1916), cited by Stevens, p. 16.

[7]These documents are found in the Charles Van Hise Papers in the University of Wisconsin Archives. They consist of five reports from the University Extension's district representatives: Melville (Second District), Roseman (Third District), Hamilton (Fifth District), O'Connor (Fourth District) and Ames (Sixth District). No report exists from the first district. These documents have no date but a similar report from the Secretary of the Lecture Department of the University Extension is dated June 4, 1914. This latter report mirrors the content of the district representatives' work. The other documents in the file are dated from May 30, 1914 to June 2, 1914; it is reasonable to infer that the five reports were written around the same time period.

[8]Ward, pp. 19-42.

[9]Ward, pp. 19-42.

[10]Ward's report to Dean, June 1, 1914, "Definite Remuneration of District Secretarial Service Necessary for Systematic and Continuous Social Center Development" in the Van Hise Papers.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Report of Mr. Andrew Melville, District Representative, Second District. "The Bureau of Civic and Social Center Development, And How It Has Functioned In the Life of the People of the Oshkosh District." n.d. Van Hise Papers. Hereafter referred to as Melville report.

[15]Report of Mr. O'Connor, District Representative, Fourth District. n.d., p. 7. Van

Hise Papers. Hereafter referred to as O'Connor report.

[16]"Report from the Secretary of the Lecture Department upon Mr. Ward's work." June 2, 1914, p. 2.

[17]Both references are from Ibid., p. 2.

[18]O'Connor report, p. 7. On the twice given talk O'Connor related that a "man who heard the talk at the City Hall gave me a complete resume, thus proving that there is no question as to the identity of the two speeches."

[19]O'Connor report, pp. 7-8.

[20]Secretary's Report, June 4, 1914, p. 2.

[21]Melville report, p. 2.

[22]Melville report, p. 2.

[23]Melville report, p. 3.

[24]Chester Allen, "University of Wisconsin: The Louis E. Reber Administration." June 1955. Unpublished manuscript in the Chester Allen Papers. University of Wisconsin Archives. University Extension Division. General Administration, p. 93.

[25]Quoted in Ward, p. 321.

[26]Given the fact that the University Extension agents worked with the College of Agriculture, it is not irrelevant to ask whether the reports of the district representatives were especially harsh in their judgments of Ward in 1914.

[27]"Report from the Secretary of the Lecture Department upon Mr. Ward's work." June 2, 1914, p. 2.

[28]"Report of Mr. Roseman, District Representative, Third District," pp. 3-5.

[29]Roseman, p. 4. O'Connor report, p. 8.

[30]"Report from the Secretary of the Lecture Department upon Mr. Ward's work." June 2, 1914, p. 2.

[31]Stevens, p. 30.

[32]Melville report, p. 2.

[33]Ibid.

[34]"Report of Ames, District Representative, Sixth District" in Van Hise Papers, University of Wisconsin Archives, p. 10.

[35]David Thelen, The New Citizenship: Origins of Progressivism in Wisconsin, 1885-1900 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1972).

BOOK REVIEWS

Maria Helena Moreira Alves. State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. xiv + 352 pp.

Maria Helena Moreira Alves' book State and Opposition in Military Brazil seeks to demystify the rhetoric of the so-called national security state and provide background to the dramatic events of January 1985 when Brazil returned to civilian rule. The coup d'etat that brought the military to power in Brazil in April of 1964 was a watershed in the recent history of Latin America. The significance of this event was recognized first and foremost by the foreign sponsors of the overthrow of President Joao Goulart: the Pentagon, the State Department, and the American multinationals operating in Brazil. U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon spoke of the coup as "one of the great turning points of the twentieth century: congratulating dictator Castello Branco on his ascension to power. A glance at the political map of South America just ten years later would reveal that what had occurred in Brazil was no fluke. From the Amazon to the Southern Cone the continent was in the grip of military regimes dedicated to the "doctrine of national security."

Alves' work concerning military Brazil stands in the shadow of two trends that have dominated the literature on authoritarian Brazil. One school of thought depicts the generals as a behemoth: a totalitarian monster sitting atop civil society. In the writings of Brazilian scholars such as Nelson Werneck Sodre (Vida e Morte da Dictadura, 1984) the Brazilian dictatorship is described as a form of "tropical fascism." Carried away by political passions the proponents of this school fail to note the crucial distinction between the military regimes of Latin America in the seventies and European fascism. The latter movement represented the last attempt by the German and Italian bourgeoisie to prevent the collapse of capitalism through the institutionalization of a terroristic regime bent on the extermination of the organized working class and all forms of representative rule. By contrast the military coups in South America of the sixties and seventies took place

at a time when the elites of the continent were immersed in economic crisis but during an epoch in which the proletariat posed no immediate threat to the capitalist system. Consequently, the military had a stake in preserving the facade of democratic practice so as to rally the middle class to the side of the dictatorship. As political scientists Alfred Stepan and Guillermo O'Donnell have argued in their respective works the national security state forged by the military in Argentina and Brazil, as well as elsewhere in South America, was designed as a stopgap measure to provide temporary relief for the South American bourgeoisie suffering from the latest round of the perennial crisis of legitimacy that plague dependent capitalist societies.

The doctrine of national security as applied to Brazil is analyzed by Alves through a careful reading of General Golbery do Couto e Silva's book Geopolitica do Brasil (1981) the Mein Kampf of the Revolution of 1964. The main tenets of the doctrine may be summarized as follows: (1) The nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union makes a conventional war pitting the two superpowers improbable, for such a conflict would escalate into a nuclear exchange; (2) Communism, understood to be monolithic and centered in the USSR, seeks to expand through the export of revolutionary warfare; (3)Revolutionary warfare involves not only armed struggle but also psychological and ideological subversion aimed at weakening the West i.e. the U.S. and its allies like Brazil; (4)To counter the threat of Communist subversion the states of the West must assume extraordinary powers, even at the cost of representative democracy and human rights. The national security state itself ultimately determines who constitutes the internal enemy, and which opposition activities constitute antagonisms or pressures. Thus responsibility for the control of subversive or revolutionary activities gives the military forces practically unlimited power over the population; finally(5), National security requires economic development, but development is defined by the military as exploitation of the nation's productive resources, not an improvement in the living standards of the population. If the doctrine of

national security bears a chilling resemblance to the pronouncements of certain members of the Reagan Administration during the Iran-Contra hearings this is not surprising. The essential elements of the doctrine can be found in the strategy of containment of communism as practiced by every American president since Truman. Alves is convinced that by 1964 the Brazilian military leadership and its North American allies had decided to put an end to civilian rule and reshape the nation as a garrison state serving as the regional policeman for the United States. The actual implementation of this policy, however, was a slow, jerky process as the military confronted dissension within its own ranks (nationalists vs. pro-Americans, hard-liners vs. legalists) and opposition from those sectors of Brazilian society that did not profit from the generals' drive for economic growth.

Since Brazil was a designated member of the "Free World" it was important to the military to maintain the trappings of a democratic society, but the state would be purged of all elements not completely loyal to the armed forces. After the coup of 1964 the political rights of all suspected subversives, including members of congress, were suspended. Trade union leaders, university professors, and even military officers not in sympathy with the regime were dismissed. Elementary civil liberties such as habeas corpus were abolished. The use of torture against political detainees became widespread. Equally offensive, the economic provisions of the national security doctrine resulted in the impoverishment of the vast majority of Brazilians. Alves cites statistics compiled by the dictatorship to show that government economic policy from 1964-74 led to the lowering of real wages, a greater concentration of income in the hands of the top 20% of the population and an increase in malnutrition in the countryside. Yet the Brazilian people did not sit idly by while its living standards deteriorated. A fascinating aspect of Alves' work is her discussion of "the dialectic of state and opposition." The repressive measures of the state were constantly challenged by disparate elements of the population from slum dwellers to Catholic Bishops.

The officially recognized opposition to the military coalesced around the Party of the

Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), which represented the interests of the Brazilian bourgeoisie. While the middle class had initially supported the coup of 1964 Alves feels that this group turned against the military once the regime's arbitrary power was turned against "respectable" elements of society --- lawyers, doctors, clergymen, etc. But while PMDB challenged the dictatorship on constitutional grounds a second opposition front was working alongside it. The victims of the "economic miracle" of the seventies --- urban workers, peasants, intellectuals --- engaged in non-traditional forms of protests. New labor unions, born in the wake of the strike wave of 1978-79, broke free of the aegis of the state. Ecclesiastical Base Communities taught the poor to fight for their rights. In fact, the Catholic Church in Brazil is widely acknowledged to be among the most progressive theologically and socially in Latin America and indeed the world; further, probably the most important single theological and social innovation of the church in Brazil has been the formation of the basic Christian communities. With the result that the Brazilian electorate, when offered a true choice, voted against the pro-government Partido Democratico Social in every election since 1974 --- culminating in the defeat of the military sponsored candidate in the electoral college in January of 1985. The pages of this book are a stirring testimony to the Brazilian people's devotion to democracy.

Such fine sentiments, however, do not suffice to grant this tome a prominent place in the literature on contemporary Brazil. Her analysis of the national security state reveals Alves' notion of history which is to examine documents and pieces of legislation and then recount how such laws were put into practice. This method of interpretation is not dialectical but dogmatic. The author simply assumes that history begins and ends with the written word. State and Opposition fails to place its subject matter in any historical context. To cite but one example, the strength of the Brazilian working class in resisting the encroachment of the state can be traced to the long history of Anarchist and Communist agitation inside the trade unions. This development goes unnoticed by the author.

The English-speaking student of Brazilian affairs who wishes to understand the true nature of the coup of 1964 and its aftermath would do best to turn to Alfred Stepan's masterful The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (1971), and the equally perceptive work by Peter Flynn Brazil: A Political Analysis (1978). Both authors provide the kind of in-depth research sadly missing in the present volume.

Julio Cesar Pino
University of California, Los Angeles

Frederick S. Calhoun. Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1986. xi + 333 pp. $24.95

President Woodrow Wilson has attracted so much scholarly attention over the years that the casual observer might believe that he and his era have been thoroughly exhausted as a field for further historical research. Frederick S. Calhoun's Power and Principle demonstrates that this is clearly not the case, and that the only obstacle preventing a more profound reinterpretation of the past is a critical imagination and exhaustive primary research. Calhoun manifests a plethora of both virtues in his fascinating revisionist critique of the Wilson Administration. He writes, "to a remarkable extent, Wilson identified the goals, established the methods, and defined the terms of U.S. foreign policy in this century."

Wilson is not usually characterized as an enthusiast for things military; in fact, he is usually depicted as an intellectual with little interest in, and no patience for, the opinions of military men. Calhoun argues that while Wilson was no militarist, he understood the utility of arms as an adjunct force in resolving difficult foreign problems. Wilson was able to reconcile the conflicting requirements of power and principle, accepting the responsibilities and advantages of both, without being completely beholden to either. Wilson was more than a mere ideologue or a promulgator of pious platitudes, he was also a consummate power politician

applying calculated levels of violence in addition to diplomatic negotiations. Some scholars may take exception to Calhoun's interpretation of Wilson because it challenges the current consensus, but that is the essential strength of this work.

Power and Principle is the most comprehensive treatment of Wilson's seven foreign military interventions and the different philosophical rationales that underlay each of them. While each of the interventions has been treated in greater depth elsewhere, Calhoun provides the first integrated analysis of them all. Calhoun describes the multiplicity of Wilsonian objectives - preserving order, promoting democracy, upholding international law, and the repulsion of aggression - which survived the Wilson era to form the basis of modern American liberal internationalism.

Power and Principle is a considerable contribution to the corpus of Wilsonian scholarship and should provide the basis for continued reconsideration of the President and his diplomacy. In addition, Calhoun describes a persistent pattern in twentieth-century American foreign relations - the application of force to aid in the resolution of complex situations overseas. Thus Calhoun's work serves as a cautionary warning that contemporary decision-makers would do well to ponder, because the requirements and contradictions of power and principle still need to be resolved.

David M. Esposito
Pennsylvania State University

S.L. Cline and Miguel León-Portilla, eds. The Testaments of Culhuacan. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1984. 281 pp.

The Testaments of Culhuacan is a collection of sixteenth-century Indian wills, written in Nahuatl text using the Roman alphabet, with an accompanying English translation. Its publication is a valuable contribution to the social history of native Latin American peoples,

since this collection of testaments is highly representative of the Indians of Central Mexico's internal world during the sixteenth century.

The editors, S.L. Cline and Miguel León-Portilla, are well-known historians of Colonial Latin America who have accomplished much innovative work on the Indians of Central Mexico. Their work has been based on a variety of Indian notarial records written during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries in Nahuatl, Central Mexico's dominant Indian Language.

Their newest collection of Nahua testaments will be welcomed by those students and scholars interested in the development and transformation of Indian culture of Central Mexico. For most wills, the editors provide a brief explanation accompanying the translated text, after which the reader is on his own, interpreting and analyzing patterns of everyday life in Culhuacan. Culhuacan, a colonial Nahua town, was a famous prehispanic center, inhabited by the Toltecs who were subordinated by the Mexicas or Aztecs who later established themselves in Tenochtitlan (Mexico City). Most Indians of Central Mexico were Nahua speakers, and these different Indian groups shared many cultural characteristics. Therefore, the collection of these 65 Indian wills is highly representative of the entire Nahua society.

Nahua testaments are among other Indian notarial records used by recent colonial historians. These types of sources complement the previous work of historians such as Charles Gibson's Aztecs Under Spanish Rule (1964) in two important ways: first, 1960's historiography did not use Indian documents, but mostly Spanish ones. The product was not entirely biased or wrong, but merely incomplete, for there were many aspects of Indian life that could not possibly have been understood without the use of Indian documents, and thus without the knowledge of Nahuatl. In this way the use of Nahua documents by historians such as Cline and León-Portilla, provides a better view of the internal structure of Indian society and of how Indians viewed themselves.

The second way in which previous historiography is complemented is in that whereas in Gibson's Aztecs we had the view of the Indian community as a whole, we can now look into the lives of individual Indians, and families, for

testaments provide a window into the lives of individual Indians occupying all strata of society. By enumerating their possessions and property, Indian testators shed light on patterns of landholding, and by bequeathing possessions to heirs, they give indications of Indian inheritance patterns.

Many innovative studies in these areas have resulted from the use of wills, and potentiality for research is still unlimited. For example, internal relations between family members is a topic that has been little studied as well as aspects of role differentiation within the family. Wills can prove to be an important contribution to these little studied areas of Central Mexican Indian history.

Students of Nahua history of the Central Valley of Mexico can greatly benefit with The Testaments of Culhuacan for this collection is highly representative of what we can call the second stage of Indian/Spanish interaction, 1550-1650. These wills were dictated between 1579 to 1599 by many Indian men and women of Culhuacan. In them we can see the historical trend characteristic of this period: Indian adoption and adaptation of Spanish ways, which can most clearly be seen in linguistic changes occurring in the Nahuatl language.

Indians were borrowing religious, material, legal, and other Spanish words which indicates a trend of adoption of Spanish ways. However, an opposite trend was occurring as well. Indians were adapting Spanish words and accommodating them into their own cognitive schemes. This is indicated in their phonological substitutions, as well as in the ease in which they borrowed words fitting in many instances their previous notions.

The Testaments of Culhuacan provide us with yet another source by which we can refute those still widely held notions that Spaniards destroyed Mexican Indian culture in one blow. From the testaments of Culhuacan, voices from the past tell us that Indian traditional ways, and sets of beliefs, customs, and rituals were, at least during this stage (1550-1650), still very much alive and thriving.

Aida Mostkoff
University of California, Los Angeles

Steven C. Hause and Anne R. Kenney. Women's Suffrage and Social Politics in the French Third Republic. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984. ix + 381 pp. Illustrations, maps, tables, bibliography, and index.

Why did women in the land of liberté and égalité remain disenfranchised so much longer than women in most other western, and many eastern, countries? That is the question Hause and Kenney address in this overdue book on women's suffrage in France. For at least five centuries before the Great Revolution of 1789, privileged French women of all estates voted in national elections. However, the course of occurrences through the revolutionary 1790's stripped all women of virtually all political rights. It was not until 1944 that France finally extended its "universal" suffrage to include women.

Concentrating on the years between the late 1890's and the early 1920's, the authors review various factions in French society that influenced the issue of women and the vote. While there was a considerable movement struggling for women's suffrage in France, counter-currents from both the right and the left proved to be stronger and more effective on the political front.

One important characteristic that stood firmly in the way of women's suffrage in France was the country's solid Catholic heritage. Catholicism posed two separate problems. On the one hand, Catholic women supported the Church's position that a woman's place was in the home. On the other hand, liberal anti-clericals believed that women were influenced mainly by their clergymen and would, given the vote, elect conservative, pro-Catholic representatives. Thus, both Catholics and anti-clericals alike had their reasons for actively supporting women's continued disenfranchisement.

On the far left of the political spectrum, the socialists, radicals, and radical-socialists were at best sympathetic to the cause of women's suffrage: though not directly hostile, they were uncommitted. The left in the government

generally supported suffrage for women when the issue was raised but never actively embraced the cause. The parties were more interested in the plight of the working classes than in any gender-specific oppression. Even the women of the working classes were hardly impressed by the bourgeois aspirations of the middle-class suffragist movement. Any support at all from these sectors was, in general, extremely passive.

In addition to reviewing such ideological considerations, Hause and Kenney also follow the more institutional aspects of the suffrage movement. There were, for example, no less than fifteen women's rights organizations promoting suffrage and ten associated publications from 1910 to 1914 in Paris alone. The provinces, too, exhibited impressive organizational activity. In the legislative sphere, suffragism did find some supporters in the government and certain initiatives, notably the Dussaussoy Bill (introduced in 1906 and supporting somewhat limited suffrage for women), made it a visible and viable issue during the pre-war years.

While this book is a welcome addition to the scholarship on women's suffrage in late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century France, there are several problems with it. First of all, it is not altogether clear what set France apart from other countries that granted women the vote before 1944. The argument for the Catholic heritage is impelling, but does not seem sufficient to explain such slowness. Similarly, the French left betrayed not a specific French characteristic but a general leftist position, at the time, regarding women's suffrage; the left in most countries was only a lukewarm ally to women's suffrage movements. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the book is something of a curious throw-back to the women's history of women's history's earliest hour - that is, the early 1970's. While the political and institutional aspects of women's movements are a necessary part of the history, they hardly tell the whole story. Opponents to women's suffrage are never necessarily anti-feminist. In the French case, many of the arguments against suffrage came from women who considered that, by defending anti-suffragism, they were defending women's greatest interests. Catholic women as well as socialist or working-class women were

trying to protect themselves in their specific social positions. The subject was not suffrage but social survival as they saw it. The authors address these issues only superficially.

The interesting and more vital question seems to be not "Why were French women so late in getting the vote?" but "Why were so many French women themselves apathetic about, or even opposed to, suffrage?" Hause and Kenney do not adequately investigate this question, yet methodologies in women's history have certainly progressed enough for such an investigation.

The authors' work will be appreciated by any scholar of French women's history. The maps, tables, and other numbers produce an invaluable source of reference since, surprisingly, nothing of the kind has been published before. However, a social history must parallel this politico-institutional history and would undoubtedly prove not only more interesting but infinitely more enlightening. In the end, this book remains another rather dull history of suffragism, a story of facts instead of faces.

Anne-Marie Poole
University of California, Los Angeles

Robert H. Larson. The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1984. 265 pp. Charts, notes, bibliography, and index.

The British Army invented the tank and pioneered its development during World War I, and produced the leading theorists of armored warfare, J.F.C. Fuller and B.H. Liddell Hart, during the interwar years. Yet, the British were caught totally off-guard by the German blitzkriegs into Poland in 1939 and into France in 1940, and it took the British years to regain their superiority in armored warfare.

This book insightfully and authoritatively chronicles the development of the tank and the theory of armored warfare during this crucial era. The greatest contribution of Professor Larson's study is the refutation of the persistent and erroneous myths given to explain the failure of Great Britain's armored forces at

the beginning of the Second World War. In the past, this failure has been attributed to the dominance of the officer corps by the "landed classes," who had "entered the army seeking a leisurely outdoor style of life compatible with their upbringing." Because of their upbringing, this stereotype continues, these officers favored the cavalry, and staunchly opposed every effort aimed at a diminution in the use and influence of the cavalry. These provincial traditionalists purportedly also sought to protect their revered regiments, many of which would have had to be abolished by the threatened expansion of the Royal Armored Corps.

The author adroitly presents statistical proof that this "social interpretation" is "very largely nonsense," since in 1930 the aristocracy and landed gentry constituted only eleven percent of the entire officer corps and forty percent of those holding the rank of major-general or above (p. 17). In addition, by an analysis of the promotion patterns of officers of the three combat arms (Infantry, cavalry, artillery) into the general officer ranks during the interwar period, the author shows that the cavalry was being steadily relegated to "a position of insignificance, if not total exclusion."

The author also ably dissects the argument that British government policy and draconian economic measures were the cause of the initial British armor setbacks in World War II, and concludes these pretexts have "severe limitations." This argument does not explain, after the government realized it must prepare for a Continental commitment, why the ratio of armor to Infantry decreased- when it should have logically been increased. Nor does British policy explain the inability of its armored forces to successfully deploy against the Germans until the third year of the war.

From these analyses, the author keenly deduces that the British armored forces were improperly trained for the type of combat which confronted them in World War II, primarily because "the British Army refused to change its basic strategic doctrines to maximize the potential of a new weapon of war."

The remainder of the book supports this thesis. Pre-World War I military strategy was based upon the Napoleonic experience of "absolute

war" and of the destruction of the opponent's forces through unrelenting offensive pressure, the application of maximum force in the decisive attack, and "an unswerving determination by both commanders and troops to conquer at any cost." The victory of Britain and her Allies in the Great War- a war of attrition- vindicated in the minds of the generals their faith in this conception of war, confirming their dependence upon a psychological distortion of Clausewitz. It was this dogmatic rigidity to the army's traditional strategic doctrine, according to the author, which fettered innovations in British military thought during the interwar period.

This evolution, indeed revolution, of strategic doctrine is narrated in rich detail, correctly emphasizing the roles of Fuller and Liddell Hart and their coterie of kindred spirits. This development is shown as manifested in the changing relationships between technology and strategic and tactical concepts and the increased emphasis on mechanization, changes in subsequent editions of the Field Service Regulations, and the topics of articles and editorials in the professional military journals.

The endnotes are very complete and readily serve as references to additional sources of information. In juxtaposition with the endnotes, the bibliography shows that the author conducted extensive research on this topic. He utilized War Office documents and memoranda, and the personal papers of such protagonists as Liddell Hart, Fuller, Hobart, and Lindsay, but apparently did not use the papers of other advocates of armored warfare, notably Stern and Swinton. As the author included H. Rowan-Robinson's Some Aspects of Mechanization (London: William Dowes and Sons, 1928) in his bibliography, it is unknown why Rowan-Robinson's follow-up book, Further Aspects of Mechanization (London: William Dowes and Sons, 1929), was not included.

However, just as the early tanks were plagued with mechanical problems, this book is plagued with spelling, or typographical errors- at least six being noted in the first chapter alone.

The sole reference in this book, in an endnote, to A.P. Wavell as the author of an article on the strategy of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in World War I, is a glaring omission of Wavell's actual accomplishments. Wavell played a not insignificant role in the

mechanization of the British Army. In 1926 Wavell became G.S.O. 1 of the 3rd Division, where "the most significant part of Wavell's work ... was his close association with the birth and early trials of the first mechanised [sic] formation in the world, the Experimental Armoured [sic] Force of 1927-8, which was the mother of all armoured [sic] divisions." (John Connell, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London: Collins, 1964), p. 155). In 1927, Wavell was among the team of contributors selected by Liddell Hart to write articles for the 14th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.

Wavell demonstrated his prescience and unorthodox thinking in the article "The Army and the Prophets," (R.U.S.I. Journal, 75 (November 1930): 665-675). Wavell addressed not only the potential of the "air arm" and gas weapons, but also addressed the transition to mechanized forces, "which do hold out some hopes of restoring to armies, freed from the dull obsession for mere numbers, full play for manoeuvre [sic] in the open field." (p. 668). In that same year Wavell was selected to command the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Division, and in 1931 Wavell's formation was entrusted with a series of experiments connected with the general mechanization of the Army, these experiments paralleling the earlier "Armoured [sic] force" experiments. Wavell, aptly described by General Burnett-Stuart as "that inspired and inspiring teacher of troops," also wrote Volume II of the Field Service Regulations (1935), a fact noted by Liddell Hart in his Memoirs (Volume I, page 250), but totally ignored by Larson. Wavell later successfully commanded the 2nd Division, and was Commander-in-Chief, Middle East (1939-1941), serving as O'Connor's superior during the lauded Operation "Compass." Wavell's accomplishments and his role in the mechanization of the British Army deserve at least a mention by the author.

It is worth noting that Robert Allan Doughty's The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon, 1985), covering a similar theme in investigating the French Army's lack of preparedness at the outbreak of World War II, serves as a singularly outstanding complement to Larson's book.

Omissions and spelling errors aside, Larson's book is a penetrating and discerning reappraisal

of an important and controversial topic in British military history. It is a model of clarity and percipient analysis, and convincingly demonstrates that the previously held notions on the failure of British armor during the lean years of World War II are erroneous. This failure was due to the mental inflexibility of the British officer corps which did not permit them to advance their doctrine beyond the concepts of a war of attrition, in which armored forces would play a minor, subsidiary role.

This fascinating book is strongly recommended as essential reading for students of military history as well as for professional soldiers concerned with the innovative development of strategic and tactical doctrine.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.
University of California, Los Angeles

Bruce J. Malina. Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Models for Biblical Interpretation. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1986. v + 230 pp.

Bruce J. Malina, professor of theology at Creighton University, offers in Origins a cogent testimony to the current eclectic state of New Testament studies. The book attempts to discover what the actors in the New Testament mean and to understand meaning from the readers' perspective. In addition, since the implied reader of Malina's work is the college-educated non-specialist of New Testament studies, this volume should be the pragmatist's choice both for New Testament courses and for undergraduate history classes surveying the early Christian movement. Particularly useful is the book's overview approach, one which obviates the need for a mass of biblical commentary and heads off ethnocentrism from the outset.

The basic framework of Malina's approach is the application to the biblical text of sociologist Mary Douglas' group/grid model of cultural analysis. However, Douglas' work is neither slavishly followed nor reproduced without modification. Where necessary, Malina draws upon the work of such other leading theorists as

Talcott Parsons and Hayden White. After all, Malina is consciously working within the category of qualitative social analysis. Nevertheless, the major portion of the work discusses Malina's adaptation of Douglas' group/grid model as it relates to both the New Testament and to contemporary Americans. Two final sections - the first concerning historians and their cultural scripts, the second a test of Douglas' model - complete the volume.

Origins' singular contribution is, without a doubt, the adaptation of Douglas' group/grid model to "the social context of the New Testament documents" (p. iv). Primarily, the adapted model serves to acquaint readers with the complex games of social behavior as they relate to the New Testament. In addition, Malina contends that this same model is useful for identifying the reader's perspective, which, for most of his audience, is that of mainstream U.S. culture. This two-fold analysis, that of delineating the point-of-view of the New Testament text, as well as that of the reader, is the practical task of Malina's adaptation. The implied reader should be able to locate both the perspective of the New Testament (mostly strong group/low grid) and his or her own perspective (Americans are generally weak group/high grid) on the group/grid model. (To be sure, part of the enjoyment of Malina's volume is in the reader being able to locate himself according to the model and the several script features within each quadrant.) In Malina's adaptation of Douglas,

> grid points to the degree of match a person finds between the values, norms, and perceptions a society proclaims, such as the values persons learn from parents and relatives in the course of growing up, and the experiences one has that society ... Group, as noted above, refers to the degree of social pressure at work on a given individual or group to conform to the norms of a society (pp. 17-18).

In short, grid refers to the degree of correspondence the person realizes when comparing his childhood and adult experiences, whereas group refers to the degree of social pressure the individual senses within his own society.

But the relevance of the model does not stop here. Group/grid social interaction also results

in meaningful human living involving four main games. The four main games - belonging, meaning, power, and wealth - are somewhat abstract, but simply put "they are the symbolic means that people employ reciprocally to have each other do what they want and value" (p. 77). It is in this complex intersection of the group/grid model with the four main games that action is channeled and facilitated. Malina's volume analyzes the New Testament along the lines of this intersection (complete with 17 figures and 6 tables).

Two final chapters supplement Malina's analysis of the New Testament. The penultimate chapter explains how historians describe the flow of the action, an analysis not only simple but enjoyable for any aspiring or professional historian. This chapter "is entirely indebted to Hayden White" and summarizes well his work on how historians tell stories (p. 167). White's work is a succinct summary of how historians relate a story, the telling of which reveals the respective historian's own social world.

The last chapter, which tests Malina's models as they apply to fasting, is presented in order "to demonstrate the usefulness of those models" (p. 185). The chapter generally encourages the testing of models (also useful in Malina's other work, New Testament Introduction (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981)), since often the non-specialist reader of a volume is unable to apply a work pragmatically - at least with any ease. This chapter is also replete with ideas for lesson plans (making an instructor's task that much easier).

In conclusion, Malina has written an eminently practical work, historically sound, and innovative in its application of models to the New Testament. The work deserves wide reading, especially considering the increasing application of social science models to the New Testament and related literature. In short, the work offers an approach sensitive to the benefits fostered by a sympathetic reading of the New Testament when it is coupled with contemporary social science theory.

G. Mick Smith
University of California, Los Angeles

Florencia E. Mallon. The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Mallon's work deals with an important theme in Latin American history: the relation of the class struggle to the form which capitalist transition will take in peripheral societies. Mallon is aware of the constraints which are imposed on circumstances by the past. In the case of Latin America, these constraints are imposed by the colonial past and shape the form of the class struggle. By using concept of class struggle in her analysis she has added a crucial dimension to previous studies of the area. Her theoretical focus adds clarity to an understanding of class formation and the role of the peasantry in the development of Latin America. The outcome of the class struggle will, in turn, decide the type of capitalist transition which will occur in a particular region or nation.

In this particular class struggle, Mallon studies the Yanamarca Valley, a region of Peru's highlands. The book is divided into three sections. The first section, "The Peasants Confront Commerce, 1860-1900," deals with the initial impact which trade had on the peasant communities of the region. The author introduces the geographical, historical, and social circumstances in which the various social classes and individuals interact. The strong peasant communities of the region resisted efforts to extract labor from it. Therefore, extra-economic coercion was applied for labor extraction.

The commercial and mining boom of the late eighteenth century created a new regional elite which would challenge the dominance of the traditional landowning class. The wars of independence provided new opportunities for land acquisition by this new elite. There were attempts to revitalize production by this group. These attempts were doomed to failure because they were based on the pre-capitalist relations of production. Pre-capitalist relations would dominate in the region until the War of the Pacific.

The War of the Pacific brought the peasantry into the national life of the country. The

prominent role of the peasantry changed its relationship towards the national state and national elites. The war exacerbated the heightening class contradictions between the elites and the peasantry. It also produced a heightened nationalism in the peasants who participated in it. A reformist nationalist coalition was possible during this historical moment but the elite was not interested because of their identification with traditional agriculture and the socio-economic relations surrounding it.

The second section, entitled "The Peasants Confront Industry, 1895-1930," introduces the impact foreign capital had on the transition to capitalist relations of production. The author analyzes the initial attempts and subsequent failures of the national elites to accumulate capital. This failure was due to peasant resistance against entering the labor market as wage workers. One form of resistance was based on the traditional patron-client relationship inherited from the colonial past. The patron-client relationship allowed the peasants the opportunity to play one elite faction against another. The peasant, in this manner, disentangled himself from the labor market. This would also contribute to the difficulty of capital accumulation given the costs necessary to retain labor. It was not until the national elites formed an alliance with foreign capital that innovation came into the production process.

Foreign capital penetration into the region underwent two phases: the manufacturing phase and the industrial phase. The breakdown of the traditional pre-capitalist relations of production began to accelerate with the introduction of investments into the region through the Cerro de Pasco Investment Company, associated with mining and railroad interest. The heightened economic activity in the region brought a gradual breakdown of the peasant communities. Social and economic differentiation began to emerge as peasants engaged in labor migration to the mines, livestock haciendas, and plantations as well as participation in petty commercial activities. There was resistance to this increased participation in the labor market by resorting to the patron-client relationship which produced difficulties during the manufacturing phase. The peasantry, in this

manner, would participate in commercial economic activity but continued to have a foot in the household economy.

The industrial phase further integrated the peasantry into the market economy by creating increased wage dependence. The peasantry in the region surrounding the Oroya smelter were dispossessed of their land because of the destruction of the land's fertility which ensued. As the land became useless the company bought it which contributed to the proletarianization of the peasantry. The Oroya smelter also contributed to a new phase in labor relations. The new relations of production required a permanent skilled labor force for production.

Besides changes in the regional economy and its integration into the national market, the state played a much more dominant role in altering community relations. The peasantry became dependent on the federal government to settle community disputes. The constitution of 1920 made the state responsible for Indian communities thereby weakening community solidarity. As the peasants returned to their communities after the 1929 world-wide depression they returned to a vastly transformed world in their communities. Social and economic differentiation had greatly increased. A new village elite had emerged as well as a pauperization within the community of many of its members. A reversal to pre-capitalist relations of production based on the peasant household was still possible through the acquisition of land by the miner-peasant's wages. The process of proletarianization could still be reversed.

The final section, "The Peasants Confront Poverty: The 1930's and Beyond," analyzes the peasants' proletarianization. Class differentiation through migration and subsequent wage dependence made it difficult for the peasantry to return to subsistence levels of production. Returning to a community in which some members had become wealthy and others were in poverty altered the class relationships within the community. This agrarian bourgeoisie was created through "the privatization of communal land, the commodification of private and communal labor, continuing social and economic differentiation, and the ever more complete integration of the peasant community into the

national economy and political system" (p. 306). The transition which took place is very rare in Latin America. An agrarian bourgeoisie in Latin America usually develops through the "Junker model." In this case, an agrarian bourgeoisie developed out of the peasantry following the peasant model.

Dr. Mallon's work is based on exhaustive research and documentation. She has worked in numerous local and national archives in Peru. Anyone interested in pursuing similar research can read her indispensable bibliographical essay which contains a section on theoretical and comparative materials. This book has truly contributed to a clarification of the study of capitalist transition in Latin America. Her theoretical focus and model is applicable to other areas of Latin America. This work will be an indispensable volume for any researcher's shelf for a long time to come.

Carlos Pérez
University of California, Los Angeles

Claire Robertson and Iris Berger, eds. Women and Class in Africa. New York: Africana Publishing Company (a division of Holmes and Meier), 1986. 310 pp. Introduction, tables, map, bibliography, and index.

That the study of African women is still in its early stages is indicated by the lack of full-length books and the proliferation of edited volumes. But collected essays, typically replete with recent important research, also demonstrate the strength of the field. Women and Class in Africa is an excellent example of the new research being done, and of how to organize a set of essays so that they not only are thematically related but support each others' conclusions, making a coherent whole of the book itself.

The introduction to the volume, by Robertson and Berger, is a fine overview of the field and relevant theoretical considerations. While it focuses on the articles that follow, it also pulls together many of the disparate threads of research on African women in the twentieth century. The main themes of the volume are

explicated within a grounding in African studies generally and particularly the place of class and gender within African studies. Robertson and Berger begin by pointing out that earlier publications on class in Africa have ignored gender issues, with one especially telling example: a collection of forty-two articles on social class in Africa published in 1977 contained not one single article that addressed gender or women's issues.[1]

Some of the ways in which African women were ignored mirrored similar gaps in western social history. Women were assigned to their husbands' class position, or were discussed only in the context of marriage and the family. The essays in this collection refute both generalities. In Africa perhaps more than in other world areas women were economically active and independent of men before and during the colonial period. One of the often cited effects of colonialism is the increased dependence of women working in subsistence agriculture on the wages of their employed husbands. But earlier expectations of female independence colored that relationship, so that women in many areas were expected to continue their economic independence in the face of a new economic system that did not incorporate women workers. Thus although women needed their husbands' wages, they often did not have access to that money.

Another issue dealt with in the introduction is the difficulty in applying the traditional concept of class to the African situation, where the ownership of property was not common. In many parts of rural agricultural Africa, people had the use of land for growing crops, but ownership was only introduced by colonial governments. The usage rights were certainly related to political power, and the twentieth-century transformation of those rights into actual ownership was a way of formalizing a system to the disadvantage of women. Robertson and Berger argue that in order to accommodate African reality, the idea of class must revolve around access to critical resources rather than actual ownership. This enables us to study stratification and hierarchies of political and economic power without the problems of applying ideas of ownership to societies that did not recognize those ideas. It also enables us to

examine women's position without attaching them to men, or assuming that they fill only certain economic roles in the society. We can also better understand both gender differences between men and women, and status differences between women.

The introduction and organization of the volume address three main areas: class as "access to critical resources," "dependence versus autonomy," and "female solidarity or class action." The thirteen articles include both eastern and western Africa (with perhaps too much attention to Kenya and Nigeria), as well as one article on South Africa. While most contributions are detailed case studies, each topic area also has one longer more general article.

The first section focuses on the issue of access to critical resources. The broad essay in this section examines access to formal education; in it Robertson argues in part that formal education is dysfunctional for African girls and women. They are still of central importance in Africa's food production, yet after education many girls refuse to work as peasants, but are also not able to find other work due to (among other things) a continuing preference for male workers. The case studies in this section examine Kikuyu [Kenya] self-help groups (Stamp), women in a Kenyan pastoral society [Tugen] (Kettel), Ghanaian cocoa farmers (Vellenga), and land control among the Yoruba in Nigeria (Afonja). All of these studies specifically address questions regarding women's economic position within these different societies, and in particular the impact of colonialism on that position, which was negative in all these cases.

The next section, "Dependence versus Autonomy," has a more social focus, and looks particularly at the ways in which women's class position is determined. The case studies include women in the Zambian coppertowns where their husbands worked as miners (Parpart), businesswomen in Zaire who have profited from the inflationary situation (MacGaffey), and stratification among Ugandan women as exemplified in a close look at a Ugandan physician and her personal network of family and friends (Obbo). The overview article in this section illustrates how capitalist transformation in Africa has only rarely drawn women into wage labor; women

continue their agricultural work and in many areas turn to petty commodity production and petty trade in order to supplement their agricultural efforts (Bujra). The process of class formation is also reflected within families, in status differences between husbands and wives and parents and children, who must now struggle over access to the resources of the society.

Political activity is the theme of the final section on "Female Solidarity or Class Action." Articles on South African women in recent labor struggles (Berger), Yoruba women's political activity under colonialism (Johnson), and labor activism among Kikuyu female coffee pickers under colonialism (Presley), all support the more generalized article by Staudt on stratification and the implications for women's politics. In all three case studies women became active as women, in response to their oppression, yet they were also constrained by class differences between women. In the two discussions of labor activism, their work conditions were colored by their status as women, and their efforts at organizing were in response to their situation as women workers. The Yoruba history especially demonstrates the importance of both class and gender, in a study of three different organizations, each based in a set of women of specific class background. While some attempted to organize women across such boundaries, others were restricted to their original base, whether that was market women or women of the elite.

The mass of detailed information in the articles is well presented and fascinating in all cases. Despite the division along the subtopics described, the ideas presented are woven between the different articles and sections, all contributing to the development of the essential argument: African women's history depends on an elucidation of the issues of both class and gender, and anything less is incomplete.

My one criticism of the book is directed at the map. A single continental map is included at the beginning of the book, and the labels for Botswana and Zimbabwe have been transposed! But this lapse is not repeated throughout the book, which is exemplary in its lack of printing errors. The twenty-two page bibliography is a very useful list of relevant literature. This

collection is highly recommended. If you only read one item on African women this year, read the introduction, which I recommend as a state-of-the-art essay in African women's history. Then I hope you go on to read the entire volume for its insights and information on the history and current situation of African women.

Kathleen Sheldon
University of California, Los Angeles

[1]Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, eds. African Social Studies: A Radical Reader. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977.

John C. Super and Thomas C. Wright, eds. Food, Politics, and Society in Latin America. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985. 261 pp. Index.

The ten essays collected in Food, Politics, and Society in Latin America offer a thorough critique of current understanding of land-use practices and agricultural production in Latin America. In focusing on linkages between political structure and the region's continuing problems with agricultural production and food supply, the volume provides a new and important context for our view of Latin American society.

The book presents work written from markedly different perspectives and concerned with a wide range of periods of Latin American history. Essays cover both general issues (such as urban provisioning in Latin America history, the Green Revolution, comparative effects of United States food aid) and more specific concerns (diet in nineteenth-century Peru, revolutionary approaches to food in Cuba and Nicaragua, food dependency and malnutrition in Venezuela during the oil boom).

A third of the essays supply general background to food-and-politics issues and provide historiographical analysis. Outstanding among these pieces is Roland Bergman's "Subsistence Agriculture in Latin America," which presents a revisionist view of the supposed "irrationality" and inefficiency of the subsistence techniques employed by sixty percent

of Latin America's agricultural population. In an innovative approach to the debate, Bergman combines his extensive fieldwork in Mexican small-holding regions and in the diverse micro-climatic zones of the Andes with the wide body of literature on subsistence cultures in Africa and Asia. Bergman concludes that subsistence agriculture has remained important in Latin America not as a component of a backwards "traditional" rural sector, but because subsistence techniques work quite well in meeting the day-to-day needs of their practitioners. Although he admits that subsistence agriculture may have limits, Bergman does not think those limits have been reached.

The remaining essays provide grist for the mill by presenting recent research on more specific Latin American food-production issues. The essay by James W. Wilkie and Manuel Moreno-Ibáez on food-production trends in the era of modern land reform, for example, brings into question several common conceptions of Latin American land use in the late twentieth century. The two authors show that, contrary to popular belief, many Latin American countries have been quite successful at producing food at a rate greater than population growth. Further, Wilkie and Moreno-Ibáez suggest that it is difficult to assign food production per capita successes and failures to general similarities or differences in the agrarian policies or political structures of the countries. The authors show that the marked successes in food per capita terms of two countries which have had major land reforms in the twentieth century - Bolivia and Mexico - indicate that land reform by itself does not necessarily lead to inefficient land use, as is sometimes believed. The essay demonstrates that long-term trends in food production must be studied in the context of the distinct historical evolutions of the twenty Latin American countries.

As one end result of its combination of diverse disciplines and topics, Food, Politics, and Society in Latin America places Latin American land-use practices in the context of global structures and processes. Interestingly, the book portrays a Latin America that shares many of its agricultural problems with the highly-developed societies of North America and

Western Europe. The book suggests that the simultaneous existence of highly efficient commercial-agricultural production and tremendous difficulties of distribution of basic food-stuffs among people is not unique to Latin America, nor to "under"- or "un"-developed areas, but is a global problem and must necessarily become a global concern.

The editors should be given credit for a fine job of binding together the diverse themes of the book with their introductory essays. As well as supplying a context for the work of the other scholars, these essays stand on their own as interesting and useful syntheses.

David Lorey
University of California, Los Angeles

Tad Szulc. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986. 660 pp. Bibliography, and index. $19.95.

Since the outbreak of Revolution in Cuba there has been a myriad of articles and books written about Fidel Castro Ruz and his role in the Revolution. Much of the literature has been political in nature: either siding with, or vociferously opposing, the Castro Revolution. The majority of the works barely discuss Castro's life, and those that do focus on it beginning in 1952. In Fidel: A Critical Portrait, Tad Szulc, the New York Times reporter who broke the Bay of Pigs story, is one of the first to write a biography of Fidel that delves into his early years.

Szulc's work strays from the recent work on Revolutionary Cuba's History. Instead of attempting to analyze the effects of the Revolutionary government on Cuban society, as the recent Cubanologists have done, he instead chooses to follow the narrative-biographical approach of many of the writers of Cuba during the 1960's. The result is a useful synthesis of Castro's life that makes no attempt to analyze or portray contemporary Cuba.

Szulc does an excellent job of integrating the numerous but fragmented accounts of Fidel's early life and the Revolutionary movement to provide a

fairly comprehensive biography. Szulc supplements his use of secondary accounts and memoirs of participants in the Cuban Revolution with interviews of Castro, his brother Raul, and other Castro associates still active in Cuban government. He also interviews Fidel's friends and political acquaintances from his university days, many of whom now reside in Miami.

Szulc organizes Fidel: A Critical Portrait into five sections: The Man, The Younger Years (1926-1952), The War (1952-1958), The Revolution (1959-1963), and The Maturity (1964-1986). The majority of the work, 459 pages, is devoted to Fidel's life prior to the 1959 triumph of the Revolution. In each section he narrates the course of events, and when appropriate he mentions discrepancies in the various accounts. He is especially effective when he discusses areas of Castro's life that Castro himself selectively omits from discussion.

Szulc supplies a well-balanced portrait of Fidel's character. He portrays him as both an idealist and as a calculating pragmatist, always aware of public opinion and how best to manipulate it for his own ends. He narrates how Fidel took advantage of Herbert Matthews, the New York Times editorial writer, during Matthew's 1957 interview of Castro in the Sierra Maestra. Szulc explains how Castro had his army put on a show for Matthews to make him think that the rebel army was more numerous and more organized than it actually was. Matthews returned to New York to write a series of editorial articles that were favorable to Castro and his movement. These articles were also reprinted in the Cuban press as Batista had eased censorship. Fidel's strategy was successful in winning him support both in the United States and in Cuba.

By characterizing Fidel as a calculating manipulator, Szulc attempts to address the long debated issue of whether Fidel was a Marxist-Leninist prior to his declaration of December 2, 1961. He shows Fidel to be aware of and influenced by Marxist-Leninist teachings during the 1950's yet not espousing such rhetoric for fear of alienating the more progressive yet anti-communist sectors of the Batista opposition. In his belabored analysis, Szulc is not successful in shedding any new light on this worn issue.

A shortcoming of Fidel: A Critical Portrait is Szulc's minimal discussion of contemporary Cuba.

Although he does address Castro's role in directing Cuban policy since 1959, he adheres to only publicized subjects, such as The Bay of Pigs Incident and the Missile Crisis, providing nothing new to our knowledge of contemporary Cuba or Castro's role in it. However, this can be attributed to Szulc's sources which do not allow for an in-depth examination of Cuban society.

Overall, Szulc provides a coherent biography of Fidel, using secondary sources and oral interviews with people who were close to the Revolutionary leader at one time. The strength of Szulc's work lies in its synthesis of existing work on Castro and the Revolution, and in its thorough coverage of Fidel's early life. Szulc provides a biography of Fidel which portrays the revolutionary leader as the determining factor in Cuban society. Although Szulc's work adds little to the knowledge of contemporary Cuba and would be seemingly of little interest to both students of Latin America as well as Cubanologists, it does provide a reference volume of Fidel's life. Szulc's work would also be of interest to the non-specialist since it does provide a basis for understanding Fidel Castro.

Enrique Ochoa
University of California, Los Angeles

THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Theory and Interpretation

Edited by Robert M. Markley, John Samson, and Jeffrey R. Smitten

The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation offers a forum for research on all aspects of the cultural, social, and political life of Europe and America from 1660 to 1800. Publishing critical and scholarly articles on literature, history, fine arts, science, history of ideas, and popular culture, it seeks to foster integration among disciplines and constructive debate among methodologies. By publishing traditional, innovative, and theoretically self-conscious essays, *The Eighteenth Century* attempts to raise questions, not assume answers.

Forthcoming in *TEC:*

- Frans De Bruyn *on* the Sublime
- John Dwyer *on* Scottish Ethics
- Ellen Pollak *on* Defoe
- T. G. A. Nelson *on* the Child Figure
- Special issues on Alexander Pope and the French Revolution
- Reviews by Daniel Williams, A. Owen Aldridge, Stuart Peterfreund, Sally Shuttleworth, and Bruce Clarke.

TEC is issued in three numbers (winter, spring, and autumn) per volume.

Please enter my subscription for *The Eighteenth Century* beginning with volume 29 (winter 1988).

$10.00, individual (foreign add $3.00)

$18.00, institutions (foreign add $4.00)

My check or money order drawn on a U.S. bank is enclosed.

Charge my VISA_____ MASTERCARD_____ Exp. date_____

Acct. #_____

(For MASTERCARD include Interbank #)

Signature_____

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

Country_____

Send order to: TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY PRESS
Lubbock, TX 79409-1037 USA
(800) 832-4042 (toll free)

Southern Historian

The SOUTHERN HISTORIAN is an annually published graduate journal focusing on all aspects and periods of Southern history and culture. Written, refereed, edited, and published only by graduate students, the SOUTHERN HISTORIAN promotes excellence in research and writing, providing graduate students with an opportunity to publish original scholarly work in competition with their peers. Submissions are welcomed.

MANUSCRIPTS: Deadline for receipt of papers is November 15. Papers should be typed, double-spaced, in triplicate, and no more than 5,000 words excluding endnotes. Stylesheets available upon request.

AWARDS: The Kenneth R. Wesson Award, plus $100.00, is awarded to the author of the outstanding article.

BOOK REVIEWS: Potential book reviewers should write the SOUTHERN HISTORIAN, enclosing a brief *vita.*

SUBSCRIPTIONS: One Year - $4.50; Three Years - $10; Lifetime - $50 (includes full set of back issues); Back Issues (Vols. I-VIII) - $2.50 each or $16 for the full set.

ADDRESS: Editor, SOUTHERN HISTORIAN, History Department - Box 1936, The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35487.

The Johns Hopkins University Press

REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY

Stanley I. Kutler, Editor
Stanley N. Katz, Associate Editor

". . . The secret publication most useful to me, guiding me to important ideas, books, and scholars is *Reviews in American History*. . . . It always enlightens; often provokes."

— Bryon Dobell, Editor
American Heritage

REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY
March, June, September, and December

Please enter my one-year subscription:
☐ Individuals $18.00 ☐ Institutions $45.00

Payment:
☐ Check or money order enclosed ☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard

Account # _____ Exp. date _____ Signature _____

Address:

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Send orders to:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

Subscriptions are available on a calendar year basis only. Make checks payable to The Johns Hopkins University Press. Prepayment is required before shipment. Subscribers in Mexico and Canada add $3.00 postage; other subscribers outside the U.S., Mexico, and Canada add $7.00 air freight. Payment must be drawn on a U.S. bank or be by international money order. Maryland residents add 5% sales tax.

87 EA

Studies in History and Politics

Etudes d'Histoire et de Politique

VOLUME 5. 1986

SPECIAL ISSUE: "LABOUR LEADERSHIP IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE"

Editor/Rédacteur
Andrew F. Johnson

Assistant Editor/Assistant de Redaction
K. W. Schweizer

Contents - Sommaire

Stephen McBride	Trade Union Leadership in Capitalist Society: Between Context and Disposition
Tony Adams	Leadership and Oligarchy: British Rail Unions, 1914-1922
Darryl O. Holter	Labour Leadership and Left Politics in Northern France, 1929-1949
Paul Street	Breaking Up Old Hatreds and Breaking Through the Fear: The Emergence of the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee in Chicago, 1933-1940
Roger Horowitz	"It Is Harder To Struggle Than To Surrender": The Rank and File Unionism of the United Packinghouse Workers of America, 1933-1948
Michael Honey	Labour Leadership and Civil Rights in the South: A Case Study of the CIO in Memphis, 1935-1955

Studies in History and Politics/Etudes d'Histoire et de Politique is an annual journal devoted to articles and research notes on special themes of current historical or political interest. Papers may be submitted in English or in French and should be sent to: The Editor, Studies in History and Politics, Bishop's University, Lennoxville, Quebec, J1M 1Z7.

Annual rates:
Canada and the United States
$8.50
All other countries
$9.50
Payment by cheque or money order should be made to The Editor, at the above address.

This issue appears simultaneously in hard cover.

AMERICAN JEWISH HISTORY

An American Jewish Historical
Society Quarterly Publication

The objects of the Society are the collection, preservation, exhibition, publication and popularization of material of every kind having reference to the settlement, history and life of Jews on the American continent, and the promotion and encouragement of research in, and the study of, Jewish history in general, and particularly in its relation to American Jewish history, and in connection with the causes and nature of Jewish emigration from various parts of the world in this continent.

Correspondence concerning contributions, books for review, and all editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, American Jewish Historical Society, 2 Thornton Road, Waltham, Massachusetts 02154.

American Jewish History is published in September, December, March and June by the American Jewish Historical Society.

Annual Membership dues are $35.00 per year, $10.00 of which is for a subscription to *American Jewish History*. Application for membership and inquiries covering the various types of membership available should be directed to Bernard Wax, Director, American Jewish Historical Society.

Articles in *American Jewish History* are abstracted regularly in *Historical Abstracts and America: History and Life,* publications of the American Bibliographical Center of Santa Barbara, California, in *Current Contents,* published by the Institute for Scientific Information, Philadelphia, and in *United States Political Science Documents,* published by the University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh.

COMING IN AUTUMN IN

VICTORIAN STUDIES

A SPECIAL 30th ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM

with contributions by
Philip Appleman, William Madden, Michael Wolff, Donald Gray
George Levine, Mary Burgan, Paul Zietlow, Martha Vicinus, and
Patrick Brantlinger

PLUS

Articles by

THOMAS KARR RICHARDS on "The Image of Victoria in the Year of Jubilee"

BRUCE KINZER on "John Stuart Mill and the Irish University Question"

BRIDGET ELLIOTT on "New and Not So 'New Women' on the London Stage: Aubrey Beardsley's *Yellow Book* Images of Mrs. Patrick Campbell and Réjane"

Victorian Studies **Indiana University**

"The most widely cited source in the leading field of historical research in the United States."

Coming in volumes 22 and 23 of the

Journal of Social History

1988-1989

The Journal continues to define new areas of historical coverage and to clarify major interpretive issues in the field with groupings of articles on such subjects as:

Issues in women's history: work, protest and professionalization

New studies in working-class history:
popular leisure; aging and the labor force

Social history and management history

Disease as a historical artifact — new research findings

New developments in Latin American social history

Improving the comparative perspective in social history

Plus many other articles and reviews, as the JSH maintains its role as a basic outlet in the field

Also: The JSH discount book service to individual subscribers — 25 percent off on titles from 15 American and British publishers

Annual subscription rates: $43 institutions, $22 individuals, $16 students

Journal of Social History, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213

ARE YOU STILL READING SOMEONE ELSE'S COPY OF *ISIS?*

IF SO, now is the time to enter your own subscription. Isis, the official journal of the History of Science Society, is the leading journal in the field.

Isis keeps over 4,000 subscribers in nearly fifty countries up to date on all developments in the history of science with articles, critiques, and documents and translations. Its notes and correspondence and news of the profession provide useful information to professionals, educators, scholars, and graduate students.

Lively essay reviews and over 200 book reviews a year cover every specialty in the history of science, technology, and medicine.

In addition to your four quarterly issues of Isis you will also receive:

- Membership in the History of Science Society.
- The annual *Critical Bibliography*, listing over 3,000 publications in the history of science, technology and medicine from the preceding year.
- The triennial *Guide to the History of Science*, containing a directory of members and information on scholarly programs, societies, and over ninety journals in the field. The 1986 edition is now available.
- The quarterly *Newsletter*, providing current news of the profession, including employment opportunities and approaching meetings.

ISIS

History of Science Society
Publications Office, Dept. GX
University of Pennsylvania
215 South 34th St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19104-6310

Or call TOLL-FREE
(orders only, please!)
1-800-341-1522
DATATEL-800™
6AM-9PM EST

YES! Please send me Isis for the calendar year(s) 1987 _____ and 1988 _____
$29 for one year ($16 for students). $54 for two years ($29 for students).

☐ Check enclosed. ☐ Bill me. (Issues sent on receipt of payment.)

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____ PHONE ( ) _____

UCLA HISTORICAL JOURNAL

The UCLA Historical Journal *is dedicated to promoting excellence in graduate student research and writing. Published annually in the fall and circulated to over one hundred colleges and universities nationwide, the* Journal *welcomes submissions from all fields of history and related disciplines.*

The Journal *offers the THEODORE SALOUTOS AWARD to the author of the outstanding article each year. The monetary prize is $200.*

ARTICLES, book reviews and correspondence should be sent to the Editor, UCLA Historical Journal, *Department of History, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. Articles should be double-spaced, typed, and submitted in triplicate. If authors wish their manuscripts returned, they must enclose a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The deadline for receipt of manuscripts is May 31.*

SUBSCRIPTIONS: $7.00 per year for institutions; $5.00 for individuals. All orders should be prepaid and sent to the UCLA Historical Journal *at the above address.*

SUBMISSIONS REQUESTED